Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment following a jury trial in an action brought by plaintiff, a California state prisoner, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a prison doctor and nurse, alleging claims of deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from defendants' termination of his prescription for morphine pills without tapering, despite the risk of withdrawal.The panel concluded that the district court's deference instruction, which instructed the jury to defer to defendants' asserted security justification, violated established law under the facts presented and was not harmless. In this case, plaintiff introduced substantial evidence that the prison did not act pursuant to a security-based policy and that the prison had several less drastic alternatives available, including Direct Observation Therapy. Accordingly, the panel remanded for a new trial. View "Coston v. Nangalama" on Justia Law

About 50 businesses that offer live adult entertainment (nude or nearly nude dancing) sought loans under the second round of the Paycheck Protection Program enacted to address the economic disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Congress excluded plaintiffs and other categories of businesses from the second round of the Program, 15 U.S.C. 636(a)(37)(A)(iv)(III)(aa), incorporating 13 C.F.R. 120.110. Plaintiffs asserted that their exclusion violated their rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.The district court issued a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the Small Business Administration (SBA) from denying the plaintiffs eligibility for the loan program based on the statutory exclusion. The Seventh Circuit granted the government’s stay of the preliminary injunction and expedited briefing on the merits of the appeal. The SBA satisfied the demanding standard for a stay of an injunction pending appeal, having shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Congress is not trying to regulate or suppress plaintiffs’ adult entertainment. It has simply chosen not to subsidize it. Such selective, categorical exclusions from a government subsidy do not offend the First Amendment. Plaintiffs were not singled out for this exclusion, even among businesses primarily engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. Congress also excluded businesses “primarily engaged in political or lobbying activities.” View "Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. United States Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

Every Saturday morning since 2003, six-12 protesters have picketed Ann Arbor’s Beth Israel Synagogue, displaying signs on the grass by the sidewalk in front of the synagogue and across the street. The signs state: “Resist Jewish Power,” “Jewish Power Corrupts,” “Stop Funding Israel,” “End the Palestinian Holocaust.” The protests coincide with the arrival of the congregants to their worship service but the protesters have never prevented them from entering the building, have never trespassed on synagogue property, and have never disrupted their services. The signs, the congregants allege, inflict extreme emotional distress on congregants: one sometimes forgoes attending services or visits a different synagogue to avoid the signs; a Holocaust survivor, feels extreme distress when she sees the signs.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit that alleged that the protests (and the city’s failure to enforce a city sign ordinance against the protesters) violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb – 2000cc-5, civil rights statutes, and the congregants’ substantive due process and free exercise rights. While the plaintiffs have alleged a concrete and particularized harm to a legally protected interest, the First Amendment affords “robust protections” to nonviolent protests on matters of public concern. View "Gerber v. Herskovitz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to confront his accusers was violated during his second criminal trial.The victim, T.C., was thirteen years old, deaf, and developmentally delayed. During trial, the district court found T.C. incompetent and declared a mistrial. At the second trial, Defendant objected to the hearsay testimony from five witnesses who would testify to what T.C. told them. Defendant argued that his right to confrontation was violated when he was denied his request to interview or depose T.C. and when he could not cross-examine T.C. during trial. Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting T.C. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated when the court admitted testimony from three witnesses about T.C.'s out-of-court statements without Defendant having a prior opportunity to cross-examine T.C., and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Tome" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment in this action challenging the denial of Plaintiff's application for a "permit to purchase" a firearm, holding that Defendant provided no basis on appeal for overturning the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants.William Lyver, the chief of police for Northborough, Massachusetts, denied Plaintiff a permit to purchase based on Plaintiff's criminal history - specifically, his two out-of-state firearms-related convictions. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 131(d)(ii)(D) violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The district court upheld the provisions on the ground that they were substantially related to an important governmental interest. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff provided no ground for overturning the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants. View "Morin v. Lyver" on Justia Law

Icker, a part-time uniformed police officer, twice pulled over a woman who was driving alone at night and detained her, claiming that she appeared intoxicated or that he could smell marijuana. Icker handcuffed each woman and searched her car, claiming to find incriminating evidence. The women had criminal histories. He advised each that charges could put them in violation of their supervision or bond. Icker indicated that he wanted oral sex and transported each victim in his police cruiser to a location where the woman performed oral sex on him. Icker also groped or harassed three other women, using his authority as a police officer. Icker pleaded guilty to two counts of depriving the victims of their civil right to bodily integrity, 18 U.S.C. 242. The plea agreement recommended 144 months' imprisonment and included several conditions of supervised release but did not refer to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901. Icker waived his right to appeal.The Third Circuit vacated the imposition of a condition of supervised release that required Icker to register as a sex offender under SORNA “as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency.” Convictions under section 242 are not SORNA “sex offenses.” Icker was not given notice of any potential SORNA requirements in signing his appellate waiver. Any attempted delegation of Icker’s status as a “sex offender” to a third party was an improper delegation of Article III powers. View "United States v. Icker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction for intentional or knowing murder entered in the trial court following a jury trial, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence and statements that were obtained in violation of Defendant's constitutional rights.In denying Defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court determined that the searches of Defendant's property were not unreasonable because the emergency aid doctrine supported the searches, that suppression would not be justified even if they were, and that Defendant's statements were made voluntarily. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that Defendant's rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Me. Const. art. I, 6, 6-A were violated, and that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. View "State v. Akers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the order of the superior court judge denying Defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of a search of Defendant's home, holding that the warrantless investigatory review of the video footage taken from use of a body-worn camera that was unrelated to the domestic disturbance call in this case was unconstitutional.As he responded to a call about a domestic disturbance at Defendant's home, a police officer, who was equipped with a body-worn camera, created a digital recording of the encounter. The video footage was later retrieved and reviewed in connection with an ongoing independent investigation of Defendant for firearms offenses. Defendant was indicted on firearms-related offenses and moved to suppress the video recording from the body-worn camera and the fruits of the search warrant. The motion judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the motion to suppress, holding that (1) the use of the body-worn camera within the home was not an unconstitutional search; but (2) the later warrantless investigatory review of the video footage violated Defendant's constitutional right to be protected from unreasonable searches. View "Commonwealth v. Yusuf" on Justia Law

Compensatory education is not an automatic remedy for a child-find violation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Compensatory educational services are designed to counteract whatever educational setbacks a child encounters because of IDEA violations—to bring her back where she would have been but for those violations. At minimum, a parent must offer evidence that a procedural violation—like the child-find violation asserted here—caused a substantive educational harm, and that compensatory educational services can remedy that past harm.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court was well within its "broad discretion and equitable authority" when it concluded that plaintiff had not shown that the school board's child-find violation resulted in educational deficits for the child that could be remediated with prospective compensatory relief. Furthermore, because the school began its special education referral process before plaintiff filed suit, she cannot show that she is entitled to attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "J.N. v. Jefferson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his counsel was ineffective by not challenging whether his prior drug convictions were predicates, as Indiana law defined cocaine isomers more broadly than federal law.The Seventh Circuit concluded that, although petitioner forfeited his theory of ineffectiveness in the district court, it is subject to plain error review. The court also concluded that, because it was objectively reasonable for petitioner's counsel not to advise risking a mandatory life sentence to pursue the isomer argument, the district court did not plainly err in ruling that counsel's performance was constitutionally adequate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. View "Harris v. United States" on Justia Law