Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After Albuquerque Police Officers Demsich and Melvin entered plaintiff-appellant Bradley Soza’s front porch with guns drawn, handcuffed him, and patted him down as part of a burglary investigation, Soza sued the Officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the Officers violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights when they seized him without probable cause and entered the curtilage of his home without a warrant. The Officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity, which the district court granted. Because the law regarding the constitutionality of the Officers’ actions was not clearly established, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Soza v. Demsich, et al." on Justia Law

In 1994, the jury convicted Desmond and Jesse Rouse, their cousin Russell Hubbeling, and another cousin of sexually abusing five nieces. Defendants ultimately raised claims in Rule 60(b)(6) motions seeking relief from the dismissal of their initial 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions. The district court denied the Rule 60(b)(6) motions as successive section 2255 motions and granted certificates of appealability.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that newly discovered evidence in support of a claim previously denied and a subsequent change in substantive law justifying relief - fall squarely within the class of Rule 60(b) claims to which the Supreme Court has applied section 2244(b) restrictions. Furthermore, the motions were an improper attempt to circumvent the procedural requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty (AEDPA). Assuming arguendo that petitioners' Rule 60(b)(6) motions were not unauthorized second or successive motions subject to section 2244(b)(3), the district court did not err in determining that the allegations, including claims of newly discovered victim recantations, medical evidence and claims of juror bias, did not meet the extraordinarily high burden of proving actual innocence, a complete miscarriage of justice, or are evidence that would produce an acquittal in a new trial. View "Rouse v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of one count of felony strangulation of a household member and one count of misdemeanor domestic battery, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court violated his due process rights when it refused to allow him to plead guilty to domestic battery and by refusing to accept his guilty plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that he had a protected due process interest in changing his plea to guilty; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's request to change his pleas. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's pro se civil rights complaint filed pursuant to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 (ACRA), Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-101 to -108, in which he alleged that Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) officials violated his constitutional rights, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the complaint.Appellant sued Appellees in their official and individual capacities, alleging that they had violated his constitutional rights to free speech, free exercise of his religion, access to the court, due process, and equal protection. The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellees were immune from liability because Appellant failed to raise claims that demonstrated the deprivation of a constitutional right. View "Muntaqim v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that he was denied effective counsel prior to his criminal trial and that this violation of his Sixth Amendment right entitled him to coram nobis relief, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.Petitioner was convicted of two counts of capital murder and one count of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on the capital murder charges. Petitioner later filed his coram nobis petition, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel did not support issuance of the writ of error coram nobis. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims against two dentists, two unidentified Department of Corrections officials, and several municipal defendants for medical malpractice under state law and violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from a gum condition that he alleges that was not adequately addressed.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that plaintiff failed to plead that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against Defendant Greenman failed because he did not allege that Greenman acted with deliberate indifference. Rather, plaintiff disagreed with Greenman's assessment of the severity of plaintiff's condition and recommendation for treatment. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Hamilton failed for similar reasons. In this case, the allegations failed to establish that Hamilton possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind where, even if the court were to assume that a dental cleaning was inadequate and that plaintiff should have known this, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, plaintiff failed to allege that the Doe Defendants acted with deliberate indifference because he does not allege any personal involvement in alleged constitutional deprivations. View "Darby v. Greenman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a tax imposed solely upon a small number of billboard operators is a discriminatory tax that violates the rights to freedom of speech and a free press protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.The City of Cincinnati imposed a tax on outdoor advertising signs, but through definitions and exemptions within the city's municipal code, the tax burdens feel predominantly on two billboard operators only. The two billboard operators (Appellants) sought a declaration that the tax violated their constitutional rights to free speech and a free press and requesting an injunction against the tax's enforcement. The trial court permanently enjoined the City from enforcing the tax. The court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the injunction, holding that the billboard tax did not survive strict scrutiny and therefore impermissibly infringed on Appellants' rights to free speech and a free press. View "Lamar Advantage GP Co. v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions of one count each of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute one hundred grams or more of heroin and one count each of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of heroin, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendants' pre-trial rulings denying their motions to suppress evidence that resulted from the search of their vehicle, including their statements made during the stop; (2) the district court did not impermissibly limit the questioning of Gutierrez in violation of the Confrontation Clause; (3) the prosecutor improperly made a statement during closing argument that referred to facts not in evidence, but the statement was harmless; (4) the district court properly instructed the jury in response to a question asked during deliberations; and (5) the district court did not err in applying the mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(i). View "United States v. Cruz-Rivera" on Justia Law

After plaintiff and Thunder Studios filed suit against defendants in federal district court, the jury found that defendants committed the tort of stalking under California Civil Code 1708.7. In this case, defendants hired protestors, organized leafletting, hired a van to drive around Los Angeles with a message on its side, and published emails online to make the public aware of their views of plaintiff’s business practices.The Ninth Circuit held that defendants' speech and speech-related conduct was protected under the First Amendment and was therefore excluded from section 1708.7. The panel explained that the First Amendment applied to the speech and speech-related conduct of defendants, who were outside the United States at all relevant times, because their speech and speech-related conduct were directed at and received by California residents. The panel need not, and did not, here consider under what other circumstances a noncitizen living abroad has standing to claim the protections of the First Amendment. The panel also held that none of defendants' conduct constituted a "true threat" outside the protection of the First Amendment. Therefore, because defendants' conduct in California was constitutionally protected under section 1708.7(b)(1), there is no "pattern of conduct" that can support a judgment based on a violation of the California statute. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Thunder Studios, Inc. v. Kazal" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's jury conviction for two counts of first-degree murder and his capital sentence. The panel applied the deferential standard of review in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and held that the district court properly denied petitioner's claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not renewing a motion to change venue based on pretrial publicity and in failing to develop additional mitigating evidence. Furthermore, petitioner did not show that the California Supreme Court's denial of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to renew the change of venue motion after jury selection was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington.The panel granted petitioner's request to expand the certificate of appealability to include his claim that counsel acted ineffectively in not seeking a further continuance to develop additional mitigating evidence for the penalty phase. However, the panel concluded that petitioner has not shown he is entitled to relief under Strickland for counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase or for counsel's related determination not to seek a further continuance. Furthermore, even assuming that counsel's performance was constitutionally defective, petitioner cannot show prejudice under AEDPA's deferential standard of review. View "Bolin v. Davis" on Justia Law