Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and other offenses, holding that Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his convictions.After he entered his appeal, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The superior court declined to act on the motion, as the Supreme Court would be reviewing the record. In his trial appeal, Defendant raised thirteen claims of error, and in his motion for a new trial, Defendant raised a number of claims that were also made virtually identically in his direct appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief as to either either his allegations of error on appeal or his motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Andrade" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the deliberate homicide case against him, holding that the district court erred when it ordered Appellant to pay his public defender fees.Appellant was convicted of the deliberate homicide of his father and for tampering with evidence. The district court imposed a seventy-year prison year for the two offenses and ordered Appellant to pay $25,250 in costs for the assistance of assigned counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's due process rights were not violated by the State's conduct investigating and relating the crime scene; (2) the prosecutor's comments at trial did not improperly distort Appellant's presumption of innocence or the State's burden of proof; but (3) the imposition of costs must be stricken in the interests of justice. View "State v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the seizure of their car and the deprivation of its use for five months violated their rights to due process under the federal and state constitutions. In this case, the police stopped plaintiffs' son while he was driving their car, found marijuana in the car, and arrested the son. The car was then seized pursuant to Arizona state law and eventually returned five months later. The district court dismissed all claims.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that plaintiffs' claims were barred because they did not file a notice of claim under A.R.S. 12-821.01, concluding that this statute does not apply to claims for declaratory judgment or for injunctive relief. The panel confidently predicted that the Arizona Supreme Court would hold that where only nominal damages are sought, no claim must be filed under section 12-821.01 before filing suit. In regard to the district court's alternative basis for dismissal, the panel reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' biased adjudicator claims. The panel explained that the saving construction adopted by the district court cannot be reconciled with the statutory language, and that on the facts as recited in the complaint, Deputy Navajo County Attorney Moore's undisclosed, unreviewable determination that plaintiffs' petition was untimely denied them a meaningful opportunity to be heard by an unbiased adjudicator.In regard to the biased enforcer claims, the panel agreed with the district court that the Navajo County Drug Task Force was not amenable to suit under Arizona law, and thus dismissal was proper. However, both the biased adjudicator and biased enforcer nominal damages claims against Moore and Moore's supervisor for violations of Arizona due process could proceed. Finally, the panel rejected Arizona's invitation on cross-appeal to issue an advisory ruling that its civil forfeiture scheme is facially constitutional. Accordingly, the panel reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Platt v. Moore" on Justia Law

Providers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Medicaid Act, alleging that the Department violated constitutional and statutory law in retroactively recalculating their Medicaid reimbursement rates for the three-month period of January through March 2016.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the Providers' procedural due process claim, concluding that, at this early stage in the litigation, the allegations are sufficient to allege a violation of procedural due process. First, the court explained that the Providers retain a legitimate entitlement to a rate determined according to that formula, and any action to alter the rate must be conducted with due process. In this case, according to the amended complaint, the auditors failed to provide any notice of the alleged deficiencies prior to the final decision, and the Providers had no opportunity to submit additional documentation or other evidence following that decision. The court stated that the burden on the Department in providing such notice is no impediment, given that the procedures are already in the Code. The court explained that the Department need only follow those procedures rather than routinely bypass them. Therefore, in the absence of that basic and fundamental protection against unfair or mistaken findings, the court concluded that the Providers have sufficiently alleged a violation of due process. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rock River Health Care, LLC v. Eagleson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against University officials, alleging that the University's then-existing events policy was unconstitutional facially and as applied to them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In this case, after Students for a Conservative Voice (SCV) brought Ben Shapiro to speak at the University, officials rejected various proposed venues for the event, citing security concerns. Ultimately, the officials approved a smaller, more remote venue than what SCV had requested.The Eighth Circuit concluded that SCV's facial challenges and requests for injunctive relief are now moot and that plaintiffs lack standing to maintain their as-applied claim. The court explained that the University's "Large Scale Event Process" policy had been replaced with a new "Major Events" policy, which was more detailed and pertains to the entirety of the University's campus, and plaintiffs failed to show that it is "virtually certain" that the prior policy will be reenacted. In regard to plaintiffs' as-applied claim, they have failed to show that the policy was in fact applied to them. The court stated that the record reflects that the officials' decisions were independent of the Large Scale Event Process and made within the scope of each officials' position at the University, but plaintiffs' complaint presents no First Amendment challenge to the officials' actions apart from the application of the now repealed policy. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's orders with respect to those claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. View "Young America's Foundation v. Kaler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to indictments charging robbery, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief.After learning of Annie Dookhan's misconduct in falsifying drug test results at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Defendant's drug conviction was subsequently vacated. The superior court then denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas with respect to the non-drug-related charges. The superior court judge denied the motion, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where a plea agreement involved multiple charges, some drug-related and others not, the presumption of governmental misconduct applies only to the tainted drug convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Henry" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment on Count I of Plaintiff's complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 but reversed the entry of summary judgment on Count IX, holding that unconstitutional conduct of police officers violated the clearly established law of the Supreme Court, as set forth in Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013).Plaintiff brought this complaint against the Town of Orono, the chief of the Orono Police Department, and four police officers with whom he interacted during two encounters in 2016 - one in February and one in September - both of which resulted in his being arrested without a warrant on charges that were subsequently dropped. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly granted summary judgment on Count I relating to the February incident; but (2) erred in granting summary judgment on Count IX relating to the September incident. View "French v. Merrill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court concluding that Defendant's counsel was not ineffective during his criminal proceedings, holding that counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance.Defendant, who was fifteen years old at the time, was charged as an adult and convicted of murder as an accomplice with a gang enhancement after his friend shot and killed a toddler while firing on a rival during a gang dispute. Defendant sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective. View "Bradbury v. State" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff, an inmate at the Dixon Correctional Center, alleging that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by refusing to grant him an exemption to wearing a restrictive security device, a black box, when he left the facility for medical appointments.In regard to claims against Dr. Mesrobian, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Mesrobian acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to plaintiff's health where the doctor concluded that an exemption was not necessary because the amount of force used was minimal and the security concerns significant. In regard to claims against Wexford Health, the court concluded that Wexford Health did not have a policy or practice of per se denials of black box exemptions or of failing to perform assessments to determine whether an exemption was warranted. In regard to claims against Assistant Warden Steele, the court concluded that prison administrators were not indifferent by depending on medical personnel to make medical assessments and that the IDOC, through Steele in his official capacity, did not fail to implement policies in a way that added up to deliberate indifference. Furthermore, the court did not find sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the IDOC had an unconstitutional custom or practice of not giving black box exemptions to inmates with conditions like that of plaintiff. View "Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit withdrew a per curiam opinion filed August 4, 2021; filed an amended per curiam opinion affirming the district court's dismissal of the 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition; denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc where petitioner challenged two sentencing enhancements—under 18 U.S.C. 2251(e) and 18 U.S.C. 3559(e)(1)—applied after his conviction on multiple counts of federal sex offenses.The panel held that petitioner's claim is foreclosed because he relies on Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), and United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2016), to challenge his sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 3559(e)(1), yet he concedes that both of those decisions came down before he had exhausted his original section 2255 motion. The panel concluded that the legal basis for petitioner's claim arose before he had exhausted his section 2255 motion, and thus he cannot show that he did not have an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his challenge to the section 3559(e)(1) sentencing enhancement. The panel rejected petitioner's claim for an extension of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), in the context of a section 2241 petition as foreclosed under Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). Finally, because petitioner cannot show he lacked an unobstructed procedural shot with respect to the section 3559(e)(1) mandatory life sentencing enhancement, the panel did not need to reach the actual innocence prong for that enhancement or either prong for the section 2251(e) enhancement. The panel granted respondent's motion for judicial notice. View "Pavulak v. von Blanckensee" on Justia Law