Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic, petitioner Robert Williams filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) arguing that the conditions of his confinement constituted cruel punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutions. While confined in Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities, Williams asked the Washington Supreme Court to order his sentence be served in home confinement at his sister’s home in Florida until COVID-19 no longer posed a threat to him. The Supreme Court issued an order recognizing that article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution was more protective than the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution regarding conditions of confinement and that Williams’s then current conditions of confinement were cruel under the state constitution: specifically, the lack of reasonable access to bathroom facilities and running water, as well as DOC’s failure to provide Williams with appropriate assistance in light of his physical disabilities. The Court granted Williams’s PRP and directed DOC to remedy those conditions or to release Williams. DOC later reported that it had complied with this court’s order and had placed Williams in a housing unit designed for assisted living care. Williams was relocated to a single cell with no roommates and a toilet and sink, and was given access to Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant restrooms and a readily available medical staff, an assigned wheelchair pusher/therapy aide, and an emergency pendant allowing him to call for assistance. To this, the Supreme Court concluded these actions remedied the unconstitutional conditions and declined to order Williams’s release. By this opinion, the Supreme Court explained its reasoning underlying its grant of Williams' PRP. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Williams" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division reversing the orders of Supreme Court denying Defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint against them pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(8) on the ground that New York courts lacked personal jurisdiction, holding that that New York courts lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants.At issue was whether a foreign corporation consents to the exercise of general jurisdiction by New York courts by registering to do business in the state and designating a local agent for service of process. Plaintiffs were the estates of three passengers who died in and the surviving passengers of an accident caused by a New York resident, who was operating a Ford Explorer on an interstate highway in Virginia and the vehicle's Goodyear tire allegedly failed. Ford and Goodyear moved to dismiss the complaint against them under section 3211(a)(8). Supreme Court denied the motions. The appellate division reversed, concluding that a corporation's compliance with the existing business registration statutes does not by itself constitute consent to the general jurisdiction of New York courts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants' motions to dismiss were properly granted. View "Aybar v. Aybar" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remanded with directions to grant Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment against him insofar as it sought to dismiss the count in the indictment charging manslaughter in the second degree, holding that this count required dismissal.Defendant was indicted on charges of manslaughter in the second degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds that the evidence presented to the jury was legally insufficient. County Court granted the motion in part and dismissed the charge of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed and denied Defendant's motion in its entirety. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally insufficient to establish the requisite mens rea for second-degree manslaughter or the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide. View "People v. Gaworecki" on Justia Law

Taliani was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (12-4.2(a)(1)) in relation to the 1994 shooting death of his girlfriend and the shooting and injury of her mother. His direct appeal, two postconviction petitions, and a motion for relief from judgment were all unsuccessful. Taliani sought leave to file a second successive postconviction petition, in which he asserted that he has set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence based on “a change in the law that allows for a new affirmative defense [which] constitutes newly discovered evidence for purposes of an actual innocence claim.” An actual innocence claim must be supported by “newly discovered evidence” and evidence that Taliani took prescription medications that could cause serotonin syndrome was not “newly discovered.” Taliani argued that the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication based on unwarned side effects from prescription medication was not recognized in Illinois until 2006 and that this newly available affirmative defense constituted “newly discovered evidence.”The circuit court, appellate court, and Illinois Supreme Court denied relief. A new defense is a new theory; it is not new evidence. Taliani presented no newly discovered evidence, such as witness affidavits or other contemporary documentation, that would persuasively show that, at the time of the shootings, he was involuntarily intoxicated and, therefore, lacked the substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law. View "People v. Taliani" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of armed robbery. The evidence at trial established that a 9-millimeter pistol and a BB pistol were discovered on the premises where he was arrested after the offense. The 9-millimeter was swabbed but the swabs were never tested for DNA. Johnson argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the swabs be tested. The appellate court panel granted him a new trial.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, affirming Johnson’s conviction. Johnson was unable to demonstrate prejudice for purposes of “Strickland” to establish ineffective assistance. It is unknown whether the swabs contain DNA sufficient for testing, let alone whether the results would be exculpatory. Because there is no exculpatory evidence to consider, any opinion that could be made with respect to prejudice would be advisory. Prejudice under Strickland cannot be based on “mere conjecture or speculation.” View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

California’s AB 5 codified the “ABC test” for ascertaining whether workers are classified as employees or independent contractors. The ABC test permits businesses to classify workers as independent contractors only if they meet certain conditions. If a business cannot make that showing, its workers are deemed employees, and the business must comply with specific requirements and state and federal labor laws. AB5 and its amendments, California Labor Code 2778, establishes certain occupational exemptions. Freelance writers, photographers, and others received a narrower exemption than offered to certain other professionals. The Association sued, asserting that AB5 effectuates content-based preferences for certain kinds of speech, burdens journalism, and burdens the right to film matters of public interest.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Section 2778 regulates economic activity rather than speech. It does not, on its face, limit what someone can or cannot communicate. Nor does it restrict when, where, or how someone can speak. The statute is aimed at the employment relationship—a traditional sphere of state regulation. Although the ABC classification may impose greater costs on hiring entities, which could mean fewer overall job opportunities for certain workers, such an indirect impact on speech does not necessarily rise to the level of a First Amendment violation. The court rejected an assertion that the law singled out the press as an institution and was not generally applicable. The legislature’s occupational distinctions were rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. View "American Society of Journalists and Authors, Inc. v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Illinois’s Firearm Concealed Carry Act creates a scheme for licensing individuals to carry concealed firearms in public. White was twice denied a concealed carry license. White unsuccessfully appealed the first denial in Illinois state court. Following the second denial, White and the Illinois State Rifle Association (ISRA) filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. ISRA lacks Article III standing. White’s facial challenges to the Act are precluded by the state court judgment. The Act does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to the denial of White’s second application. White has two criminal convictions—including one for unlawful use of a firearm—and multiple gun-related arrests. Illinois’s individualized determination that White’s criminal history renders him too dangerous to carry a concealed firearm in public survives intermediate scrutiny. View "White v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law

In 2008, Arnold was convicted of repeated sexual assault of his son, M.A., the principal witness at trial. As a persistent repeater, Arnold was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In 2011, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the denial of Arnold’s first post‐conviction petition. M.A. then signed a notarized affidavit, recanting his trial testimony. Nearly two years later, Arnold filed a pro se petition seeking a new trial. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the petition, reasoning that the affidavit was not newly-discovered evidence but was cumulative of evidence presented at trial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court again denied review.In December 2015, Arnold filed a federal habeas petition, claiming actual innocence. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. Under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), a petitioner must seek habeas relief within one year of the date that his conviction became final. On remand, the district court heard testimony from M.A., a child psychologist, and M.A.’s former counselor. The Seventh Circuit then affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Arnold failed to meet the rigorous standard for overcoming the time bar. The court properly applied that probabilistic standard on remand; it was not the court’s charge on remand to independently determine whether it found M.A.’s recantation credible or reliable. The court employed the proper standard in viewing the new evidence through the eyes of a reasonable juror. View "Arnold v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of six counts of capital felony, among other crimes, holding that Connecticut's individual voir dire process protected Defendant's right to a fair trial by assessing and mitigating the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity about this notorious case.The State charged Defendant with six counts of capital felony, three counts of murder, four counts of kidnapping, and other crimes. Following extensive pretrial motions practice, Defendant's case was tried to a jury, which returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The trial court subsequently sentenced Defendant to six consecutive death sentences. On appeal, Defendant claimed, among other allegations of error, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to change the venue of his trial given the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the pretrial publicity did not result in actual jury prejudice that deprived Defendant of a fair trial; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "State v. Komisarjevsky" on Justia Law

Specht, employed as a New York City fire marshal, alleged that after he refused to file a false report concerning the circumstances of a fire he was investigating and publicly discussed misconduct on the part of his supervisors, he was the subject of retaliation. The fire had resulted in serious damage to a building where a motion picture was being filmed and the death of a firefighter. Sprecht had reported a tentative conclusion that the fire was caused by the movie crew. He was reassigned after he refused to comply with instructions to report a faulty boiler as the cause. Specht sued, alleging First Amendment retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and other claims. The district court dismissed the suit.The Second Circuit reversed in part Specht alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim but failed to state a New York State Civil Service Law claim or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Sprecht’s report to the Department of Investigation, his meeting with the District Attorney’s office, and his communications with local press touched on matters of public concern. Specht’s refusal to file a false report and his complaints to outside agencies constituted speech as a citizen, rather than only as a public employee. View "Specht v. City of New York" on Justia Law