Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court conditionally affirmed Defendant's convictions of three misdemeanor drug offenses and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that remand was required for the district court to apply the standard set forth in State v. Wright, 961 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 2021).Last term, in Wright, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers conducted an unconstitutional seizure and search when they seized and searched garbage bags left out for collection without first obtaining a warrant. In the instant case, Defendant argued that a sheriff's deputy violated his constitutional rights by seizing and searching his trash without first obtaining a warrant. The Supreme Court conditionally affirmed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for the district court to hold a hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress evidence without consideration of the evidence obtained during the trash pull. View "State v. Kuuttila" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's second pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis and seeking the appointment of postconviction counsel, holding that Petitioner failed to raise a cognizable claim for issuance of the writ.Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment plus a term of 180 months. The Supreme Court affirmed. In the instant coram nobis petition, Petitioner argued that he was entitled to relief due to a coerced guilty plea, the failure of the prosecutor or his counsel to advise him of the spousal privilege in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and ineffective assistance of both trial counsel and postconviction counsel. The Supreme Court denied the writ and denied Petitioner's motion for appoint of counsel as moot, holding that Petitioner's claims were not cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding. View "Gordon v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Falun Gong practitioners, filed suit claiming that defendants harassed them in violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACEA). On interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that "a place of religious worship" means anywhere that religious adherents collectively recognize or religious leadership designates as a space primarily to gather for or hold religious worship activities. In this case, the sidewalk tables plaintiffs used for their protests do not qualify because the undisputed record shows that plaintiffs and their fellow practitioners treated the tables primarily as a base for protesting the Chinese Communist Party's alleged abuses against Falun Gong, rather than for religious worship. Furthermore, because plaintiff's 18 U.S.C. 248(a)(2) claim fails on this statutory ground, the court did not reach the constitutional issues. The court reversed the district court's partial grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs and its denial of summary judgment to defendants, remanding for further proceedings. View "Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance Inc." on Justia Law

Follies, an adult entertainment nightclub, filed suit against the City of Chamblee, challenging Ordinance 754, which amended section 6-152(a) of its Alcohol Code to require establishments selling liquor for consumption on the premises to stop alcohol sales by 2:00 a.m. Monday through Saturday and by 11:59 p.m. on Sunday.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that although Follies had a vested right in its 2018 liquor license, that vested right did not extend to the hours in which alcohol could be sold. The court explained that the 2018 liquor license issued to Follies did not specifically guarantee that alcohol could be sold during certain set hours. Consequently, Follies had no more than a unilateral expectation that it would be able to sell alcohol during specific hours. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, tenants living in substandard conditions in a "Section 8" housing project, filed suit seeking to compel HUD to provide relocation assistance vouchers. The Fifth Circuit held that, because 24 C.F.R. 886.323(e) mandates that HUD provide relocation assistance, its alleged decision not to provide relocation vouchers to plaintiffs is not a decision committed to agency discretion by law and is therefore reviewable. Furthermore, the agency's inaction here constitutes a final agency action because it prevents or unreasonably delays the tenants from receiving the relief to which they are entitled by law. Therefore, the district court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims and erred in dismissing those claims.However, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted on their Fifth Amendment equal protection claim. In this case, plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim of intentional race discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hawkins v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

Canton’s 2006 Tree Ordinance prohibits the unpermitted removal, damage, or destruction of trees of specified sizes, with exceptions for agricultural operations, commercial nurseries, tree farms, and occupied lots smaller than two acres. If Canton issues a permit, the owner must replace removed trees on its own or someone else’s property or pay into Canton’s tree fund. For every landmark tree removed, an owner must replant three trees or pay $450. For every non-landmark tree removed as part of larger-scale tree removal, an owner must replant one tree or pay $300.In 2016, Canton approved the division of F.P.'s undeveloped property, noting the permitting requirement. The parcels were bisected by a county drainage ditch that was clogged with fallen trees and debris. The county refused to clear the ditch. F.P. contracted for the removal of the trees and debris and clearing other trees without a permit. Canton determined that F.P. had removed 14 landmark trees and 145 non-landmark trees. F.P. was required to either replant 187 trees or pay $47,898. F.P. filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for F.P. on its as-applied Fifth Amendment claim; although the ordinance, as applied to F.P., was not unconstitutional as a per se physical taking, it was unconstitutional as a regulatory taking and as an unconstitutional condition. Canton has not made the necessary individualized determination; the ordinance fails the “rough proportionality” required by Supreme Court precedent. View "F.P. Development, LLC. v. Charter Township of Canton" on Justia Law

Giron, a Colombian national federal prisoner acting pro se, sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. The application notes for U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 identify four general categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction: medical, age, family, and a “catch-all ‘other reasons’ category.” Section 1B1.13 constrains district courts’ authority to identify when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist and any sentence reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements.” Under the governing policy statement, medical conditions rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling only if the medical condition is a terminal illness or “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within” prison. The court found that Giron’s high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease were manageable in prison, despite the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court was not required to analyze 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; the finding of no “extraordinary and compelling reasons” was sufficiently supported. View "United States v. Giron" on Justia Law

Americans and co-conspirators based in China schemed to obtain EB-1C work visas fraudulently for Chinese nationals. Their clients each deposited about $300,000 into a client-owned American bank account. The government did not prosecute the Chinese clients but sought forfeiture of the funds. The Chinese nationals filed claims for the funds.The State Department denied visa requests to allow certain Chinese nationals to attend the forfeiture trial. The U.S. Attorney unsuccessfully worked with their attorney and DHS to obtain parole letters granting them entry without a visa. The Chinese argued that their inability to attend violated the Due Process Clause by preventing them from presenting an “innocent owner” defense, 18 U.S.C. 983(d)(1). The district court denied the motion, noting other means to present their testimony, such as by video conference, and that counsel could present their defenses. All the Chinese were represented by counsel at trial; four attended and testified. The court instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proving that the “funds made the . . . visa fraud scheme easy or less difficult or ensured that the scheme would be more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.”The jury found that the government had satisfied its burden of proof as to all the funds, that five Chinese nationals—four of whom had testified—had proved that they were innocent owners, and rejected the remaining innocent-owner defenses. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation. View "United States v. Approximately $281,110.00 Seized from an East-West Bank Account, ending in the number 2471" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of interfering with an officer, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-167a(a), holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress on the grounds that he was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when a marked police cruiser blocked the egress of his vehicle, which was parked with its engine running and Defendant asleep in the driver's seat. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred because the responding officer was checking on Defendant's well-being pursuant to the officer's community caretaking function and was not engaged in an investigatory stop involving criminal activity. View "State v. Pompei" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sands was 24 years old when he committed special circumstance murder (Penal Code 187, 190.2(a)(10)) and was sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court denied his motion, seeking to develop a record of mitigating circumstances for an eventual youth offender parole hearing under “Franklin.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting his Equal Protection argument. The statute provides an opportunity for release (via youth offender parole hearings) to most persons convicted of crimes committed before the age of 26 in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the sentence imposed for their “[c]ontrolling offense,” sections 3051(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4). The statute excludes offenders who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes they committed at age 18-25. The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment but the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26. The Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further. View "People v. Sands" on Justia Law