Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Augustin asked Jordan to “find somebody” who sold cocaine. “Hoss,” subsequently sold Augustin six ounces of cocaine for $5,100. The deal went bad and Augustin kidnapped Jordan at gunpoint. Augustin’s associate released Jordan. Augustin was arrested. From prison, Augustin tried to arrange for a hitman to kill Jordan. The district court ultimately sentenced Augustin to a 380-month term for seven counts of conviction plus a consecutive 120-month term under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence. After an unsuccessful appeal, Augustin unsuccessfully moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255.Later, Augustin filed a second or successive section 2255 motion, arguing that his section 924(c) conviction was unlawful under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision. The district court agreed. Rather than resentencing Augustin, the court corrected his sentence by vacating the section 924(c) conviction and its consecutive 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Augustin’s section 924(c) sentence played no role in the district court’s calculation of his other sentences. View "United States v. Augustin" on Justia Law

Muhammad, serving a 210-month sentence at FCI Loretto based on his convictions for conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing cocaine base, sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), asserting that his increased risk for severe illness from COVID-19 due to his age and medical conditions (chronic hypertension and cardiac arrhythmia) constituted extraordinary and compelling circumstances supporting his immediate release. Muhammad filed his motion for a sentence reduction 149 days after asking the warden to file the motion on his behalf and 132 days after the warden denied his request. Muhammad did not appeal the warden’s denial through the Bureau of Prison’s administrative remedy program. The district court held that because the warden responded to the request within 30 days, Muhammad had to exhaust his administrative remedies before he could file a motion on his own behalf.The Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal. The district court erred in its interpretation of section 3582(c)(1)(A), which plainly provides that a defendant may file a motion on his own behalf 30 days after the warden receives his request, regardless of whether the defendant exhausted his administrative remedies. Moreover, section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s threshold requirement is non-jurisdictional and subject to waiver. View "United States v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of a regulation promulgated by Maine's Center for Disease Control requiring all workers in licensed healthcare facilities to be vaccinated against COVID-19, holding that the district court did not err.Under Maine law, a healthcare worker may claim an exemption from the vaccination requirement only if a medical practitioner certifies that vaccination "may be medically inadvisable." Appellants - several Maine healthcare workers and a healthcare provider - brought this action alleging that the vaccination requirement violated their rights under 42 U.S.C. 1985 and the Free Exercise Clause, Supremacy Clause, and Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court denied Appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Appellants were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. View "Does v. Mills" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress illegal drug evidence seized as a result of a protective pat-down search for weapons and in a subsequent search of his vehicle, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the protective pat-down search of Defendant was justified.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erroneously held that the pat-down search of Defendant was justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Mont. Code Ann. 46-5-401(2)(b), whether incident to a valid Terry investigative stop or analogous community caretaker doctrine stop, but did not err in concluding that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the illegal drug evidence seized in the warrantless pat-down and vehicle searches at issue; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in his coat pocket as a result of the initial pat-down search but correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in the subsequent consent search of his vehicle. View "State v. Laster" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting admission of evidence regarding other acts and statements made by Defendant.Defendant filed a motion in liming to preclude the admission of evidence involving the occurrence of any other sexual acts or statements regarding the victim. The district court denied the motion, concluding that evidence of Defendant's sexual conduct with the victim, apart from the conduct alleged in the information, was relevant and admissible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. View "State v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress based on its determination that Defendant had not been seized, holding that the district court clearly erred when it concluded that Defendant was not seized.Defendant was found guilty of felony possession with intent to distribute. The district court order denying Defendant's motion to suppress concluded that Defendant voluntarily engaged with the law enforcement officer and was not seized because a reasonable person would have felt free to disengage and leave. Further, the order concluded that Defendant validly consented to the officer searching his vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was seized in this case; and (2) the officer did not have particularized suspicion to justify the seizure. View "State v. Pham" on Justia Law

In 1981, a Georgia federal district court concluded that Atlanta’s zoning regulations for adult businesses were constitutionally overbroad in their entirety and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Atlanta did not appeal. Cheshire operates an Atlanta adult novelty and video store, Tokyo Valentino, and sued, asserting that the definitions of “adult bookstore,” “adult motion picture theater,” “adult mini motion picture theater,” “adult cabaret,” and “adult entertainment establishment” in the current Atlanta City Code are facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.On remand, the district court granted Atlanta summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in providing a narrowing construction of certain terms (the term “patron” in the definitions of “adult motion picture theater” and “adult mini-motion picture theater”) in the challenged provisions. The phrase “intended, designed, or arranged” suggests that the challenged provisions do not apply to isolated or intermittent uses of the property. Cheshire failed to show that any overbreadth in the provisions is “substantial” as required by Supreme Court precedent. The challenged provisions do not purport to ban the activities or conduct they define or describe but are part of a zoning scheme regulating where covered establishments can locate or operate. View "Cheshire Bridge Holdings, LLC, v. City of Atlanta," on Justia Law

Miranda got into an argument with his son, Matthew who was driving Miranda’s truck. Matthew stopped the truck in traffic near the family’s home. Neighbors called 911. Officers found Miranda in the driver’s seat. At the police station, Miranda admitted to having consumed six beers. He submitted to a portable breath test, which revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.137%. Officers read him a standardized “implied consent affidavit.” Miranda responded three times, “No, I will not," and was told: “If you do not expressly agree to testing ... your Arizona driving privileges will be suspended for 12 months. Officers prepared a search warrant for Miranda’s blood draw. Miranda then stated that he would do a blood draw, but the officers obtained a warrant and told Miranda, “your license is suspended.” The test revealed a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Miranda pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and failure to comply with law enforcement in exchange for dismissal of the DUI.The Ninth Circuit the summary judgment rejection of Miranda’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging that an officer lied during the driver’s license suspension proceeding. There is no constitutional guarantee or federal right to a driver’s license so that its deprivation does not violate substantive due process. Even assuming the officer testified falsely at the administrative hearing as to whether Miranda consented to a blood test, Arizona provided sufficient post-deprivation due process. Miranda was granted a second administrative hearing before a new ALJ, who voided the suspension. Additionally, he was pursuing a state law claim in Arizona state court. View "Miranda v. City of Casa Grande" on Justia Law

Rollice’s ex-wife called 911. Rollice was in her garage, intoxicated, and would not leave. Three officers responded to the call and spoke with Rollice through the garage’s doorway. Rollice began fidgeting with something in his hands; he appeared nervous. Rollice refused a request for a pat-down. Police body-camera video captured Rollice conversing with the officers as he turned around and walked toward the back of the garage where his tools were hanging. No officer was within six feet of Rollice. The officers state that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice kept walking, grabbed a hammer, and turned toward the officers, grasping the hammer's handle with both hands and pulling it up to shoulder level. The officers backed up, drawing their guns. They yelled at Rollice to drop the hammer. Rollice took steps toward Officer Girdner, raised the hammer behind his head, and took a stance as if he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the officers. Two officers fired their weapons, killing Rollice. Rollice’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit. The officers did not violate any clearly established law and are shielded by qualified immunity. None of the decisions cited by the Tenth Circuit established that the officers’ conduct was unlawful. Officers engaged in a conversation with Rollice, followed him into a garage at a distance, and did not yell until after he picked up a hammer. Precedent did not “clearly establish” that their conduct was reckless or that their ultimate use of force was unlawful. View "City of Tahlequah v. Bond" on Justia Law

Union City, California officer Rivas-Villegas responded to a 911 call reporting that a woman and her children were barricaded in a room for fear that Cortesluna, the woman’s boyfriend, was going to hurt them. After confirming that the family had no means of escape, Rivas-Villegas and other officers commanded Cortesluna outside and onto the ground. Officers saw a knife in Cortesluna’s pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and another officer were removing the knife and handcuffing Cortesluna, Rivas-Villegas briefly placed his knee on the side of Cortesluna’s back.Cortesluna sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law. Even assuming that controlling Circuit precedent clearly established the law for purposes of section 1983, Ninth Circuit precedent did not give Rivas-Villegas fair notice that he was using excessive force. This is not an obvious case. The officers, in this case, were responding to a serious alleged incident of domestic violence possibly involving a chainsaw and Cortesluna had a knife protruding from his pocket for which he had just previously appeared to reach. Cortesluna does not dispute, that Rivas-Villegas placed his knee on Cortesluna for no more than eight seconds and only on the side of his back near the knife that officers were in the process of retrieving. View "Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna" on Justia Law