Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After an officer fatally shot O'Shea Terry, who was trying to drive his SUV away while the officer stood on the vehicle's running board, Terry's estate and Terrance Harmon, a passenger in the car, sued the officer under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for using excessive force.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the officer, concluding that plaintiffs did not plausibly allege an unconstitutional use of excessive force by the officer to rebut his qualified immunity. In this case, even if plaintiffs could allege sufficient facts showing a constitutional violation, they did not show that the officer violated any clearly established law that would place beyond doubt the constitutional question in this case, whether it is unreasonable for an officer to use deadly force when he has become an unwilling passenger on the side of a fleeing vehicle. Furthermore, Harmon's excessive force claim fails not only because the officer is entitled to qualified immunity, but also because, as a passenger, the officer failed to state a valid Fourth Amendment claim in his own right. Finally, because plaintiffs failed to allege a predicate constitutional violation by the officer, plaintiffs' municipal claims also failed. View "Harmon v. City of Arlington" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court denying the Commission of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaints against her, holding that Plaintiffs' allegations of error were without merit.Plaintiffs were (1) a class of individuals who claimed to have been held against their will without due process on the basis of a certification of their need for emergency mental health treatment, and (2) a group of hospitals who claimed to have been forced to retain persons certified to be in need of such treatment. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the claims based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and Plaintiffs' asserted lack of standing. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no merit to the Commissioner's challenges to the district court's standing and Eleventh Amendment immunity rulings. View "Doe v. Shibinette" on Justia Law

Mandawala attended a medical sonography program at Baptist School. After failing to graduate, Mandawala sued, alleging that he failed because the school did not staff its clinics adequately. He later added claims under education and privacy laws and that the school had failed him out of racial animus. The state judge dismissed Mandawala’s amended petition.Mandawala then sued in federal court, alleging racial and sex discrimination, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, conversion, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the First and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. He also claimed that the school’s attorney conspired with the state judge to deny him his civil rights and his right to a fair trial. Mandawala later attempted to add defendants. The district court dismissed with prejudice nearly all the claims; only Mandawala’s sex discrimination and breach-of-contract claims against Baptist School survived. The court ordered the parties to mediate. Mandawala unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus, demanding the replacement of the district judge. Mandawala then filed an unsuccessful recusal motion and told the court that he would not participate in mediation. The district court stayed the caseThe Third Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence of bias on the part of the district judge and noting several false statements and procedural errors made by Mandawala. The district court carefully examined Mandawala’s civil rights claims and correctly decided that they merited dismissal with prejudice. View "Mandawala v. NE Baptist Hospital" on Justia Law

Turnage, claiming that on September 21, 2016, he fell from an upper bunk at Cook County Jail and suffered a broken ankle, sought damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). He argued that the Jail knew that he has seizures but failed to enforce his lower-bunk permit (which had been issued to reduce his risk of falling).Federal law requires prisoners to pursue administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), prescribed by the institution. The Jail requires prisoners to file grievances within 15 days of an “incident, problem, or event” and to appeal any adverse decision. Turnage filed a grievance on September 27 and filed an immediate appeal after that grievance was denied. The district court dismissed his suit, observing that Turnage could have filed a grievance when he was forced to take an upper bunk.The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal. Turnage encountered a “problem” on August 30 but he experienced an “incident” on September 21; these were separate occasions for grievances. A grievance that is timely with respect to an injury satisfies section 1997e(a) when the suit seeks damages for that injury. View "Turnage v. Dart" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against various federal officials in their official capacities, in an action alleging Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, as well as claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Plaintiff contends that ever since he refused to be an informant for the FBI a decade ago, he has been placed on a watchlist, leading to "extreme burdens and hardship while traveling."The court concluded that plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims fail to plausibly allege that his injury is fairly traceable to defendants. In this case, plaintiff bases his Fourth Amendment claims on TSA and CBP agents' searching him and seizing his electronics. However, instead of suing these agents directly, plaintiff brought his Fourth Amendment claims against the heads of DHS, TSA, and CBP. The court concluded that it cannot reasonably infer that the heads of DHS, TSA, or CBP will immediately cause or ever have caused this kind of Fourth Amendment violation. The court also concluded that plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim fails because he failed to allege some kind of deprivation of his due process rights. The court explained that plaintiff has no right to hassle-free travel. Furthermore, plaintiff's allegation that defendants have deprived him of his right to freely practice his chosen profession and of his liberty interest in his reputation also fail. Likewise, plaintiff failed to plausibly plead his APA claims.Finally, in regard to plaintiff's contention that the Attorney General, FBI Director, and TSC Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously by placing him on the Selectee List, the court concluded that these allegations do not permit a reasonable inference that these defendants violated typical review processes to retaliate against plaintiff. View "Ghedi v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' request to enjoin Harris County's administration of drive-thru voting in the November 2020 election is moot. The court explained that, since plaintiffs' appeal, the November 2020 election has been completed; the results have been certified; and new officeholders have been sworn in. The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to identify any evidence in the record before the district court demonstrating that Harris County will offer drive-thru voting again in the future, let alone that it will offer it in such a way as to evade judicial review.Furthermore, while this appeal was pending, the Legislature passed S.B. 1, which addresses drive-thru voting. The court concluded that the challenge raised in last year's case before the district court is moot as to elections after December 2, 2021. Even if the court considered the argument that candidates have standing and assumed arguendo that candidates do have standing to challenge election procedures, that standing would pertain only to their claim as to the November 2020 election, the only election in which they claimed to be candidates. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief and the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for want of jurisdiction. The court also vacated the district court's advisory discussion of the legality of drive-thru voting without offering any opinion as to the merits of that reasoning. View "Hotze v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law

House was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on his participation in 1993 abductions and shooting deaths of two teenagers. House was 19 at the time of the crimes. He claimed that he had no idea of the larger plan when the victims were driven to the deserted location and that the victims were killed after he left. The circuit court sentenced him to a mandatory natural life term for the murder convictions and 60 years for each aggravated kidnapping conviction, to run consecutively.In 2001, House’s sentence for the kidnappings was reduced to consecutive 30-year terms. House filed a post-conviction petition, asserting actual innocence based on a witness’s recantation of her trial testimony; newly discovered evidence of police misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel; and that his mandatory sentence of natural life violated the Eighth Amendment and the Illinois constitution's proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court vacated House’s sentence, finding that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the Illinois proportionate penalties provision as applied because it precluded consideration of mitigating factors, specifically House’s age, level of culpability, and criminal history.The Illinois Supreme Court directed the appellate court to vacate its judgment and to reconsider the effect of its 2018 Harris opinion. On remand, the appellate court denied an agreed motion seeking remand and again vacated House’s sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. The appellate court erroneously held that House’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the as-applied constitutional challenge. The court vacated the dismissal of the actual innocence claim. View "People v. House" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court in this criminal case repudiated the sweeping language of its opinion in State v. James, 13 P.3d 576 (Utah 2000), and held that it can no longer be said that it makes no constitutional difference, as regards community caretaking concerns, whether a police officer opens a car door or asks a driver to do so.Defendant was charged with felony DUI and possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered after an officer looked inside his pickup truck, which was parked in a store parking lot, opened the truck door, and saw evidence of drug paraphernalia between Defendant's feet. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed on alternative grounds, holding that the officer was justified in opening the car door incident to a lawful traffic stop under the standard in James. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the identity of the door-opener may well affect the reasonableness of a given police encounter; and (2) the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress was proper under the authority of Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011). View "State v. Malloy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the postconviction court denying Defendant's petition for postconviction relief as to the guilt phase of his trial and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief.Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for two of the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising sixteen claims. The trial court granted in limited part Defendant's motion for postconviction relief as to a new penalty phase under Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the postconviction court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief as to the guilt phase; and (2) Defendant failed to establish that he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

In 2013, Crane was studying in a GED class at the High Desert State Prison. Inmate Dolihite approached Crane from behind and stabbed him in the neck with a pencil. Crane was taken to the prison’s emergency clinic. Crane alleges that after he was released from administrative segregation, he was assaulted by other prisoners and prison guards. He sued the correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Crane contends the assaults were retaliation against him for previously suing the warden and two captains for denying outdoor exercise and staging assaults on inmates.Crane, self-represented, sued Dolihite. The suit was dismissed for failure to serve the summons and complaint within the time prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., 583.210(a). Dolihite had been transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison; for a time, Crane was unable to identify his location. The superior court advised Crane to use the sheriff’s office to effect service but the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office refused to serve the summons and complaint. The litigation coordinator at Salinas Valley refused to accept service on behalf of Dolihite.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal. The litigation coordinator’s refusal contradicts Penal Code 4013(a) and Code of Civil Procedure 416.90, which have been interpreted as authorizing state prison litigation coordinators to accept service on behalf of inmates. Crane’s statutory right to initiate and prosecute a civil action was infringed. View "Crane v. Dolihite" on Justia Law