Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Traylor was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, 1347; conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks, 18 U.S.C. 371; and five counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. The district court initially sentenced Traylor to 135 months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to 120 months at her recent resentencing. In a pro se third motion for a sentence reduction, Traylor argued that, due to her various health ailments (e.g., diabetes, sleep apnea, asthma, obesity, being a recent organ transplant recipient, and use of immunosuppressive therapy), she is susceptible to contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19 in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Traylor did not demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction because she had received two doses of the Pfizer vaccine, significantly reducing her risk of contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19. The district court was not required to address the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion by declining to do so. View "United States v. Traylor" on Justia Law

Wilber was convicted of a 2004 murder and was sentenced to life in prison. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction in Wisconsin state court, Wilber sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2554, arguing that he was deprived of his right to due process when he was visibly shackled before the jury during closing arguments. The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision sustaining the shackling order amounted to an unreasonable application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision, “Deck v. Missouri.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Neither the trial judge nor the state appellate court ever articulated a reason why Wilber had to be visibly restrained in the jury’s presence, so the shackling decision ran afoul of Deck. Wilber was visibly restrained at a key phase of the trial, when the prosecution highlighted evidence that, in the moments leading up to the murder, Wilber’s behavior was “wild,” “crazy,” “possessed,” and “out of control,” so Wilber was prejudiced by the shackling error. The restraints would have suggested to the jury that the court itself perceived Wilber to be incapable of self-control and to pose such a danger that he must be manacled in order to protect others in the courtroom, including the jurors. View "Wilber v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Since his 2012 federal conviction, Garrett has brought at least 10 federal civil suits. In this suit, Garrett sued New Jersey's Governor and another official under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging due process and “speedy trial” violations. The district court granted Garrett in forma pauperis status. The court screened Garrett’s complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii), concluded that Garrett’s due process claim “is a string of nonsequiturs" with no facts to support any claim, and dismissed Garrett’s speedy trial claim as properly raised only in a habeas action. The Third Circuit advised Garrett to seek a final judgment to perfect his right to appeal. The district court obliged, dismissing Garrett’s complaint “with prejudice.” Garrett never filed a new or amended notice of appeal in the district court, and a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days “after the entry” of judgment, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a).The Third Circuit then denied Garrett’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis; he must pay filing fees under the three-strikes rule. 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). A suit dismissed under “Heck” is dismissed for failure to state a claim and counts as a strike. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner lacks a section 1983 “cause of action” if the prisoner is challenging an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” before having the conviction or sentence overturned. Garrett has not shown imminent danger or serious physical injury. View "Garrett v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to vacate her federal conviction and sentence on the grounds that her appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for failing to raise a claim on direct appeal under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), holding that the district court erred.Defendant and her co-defendants were convicted of various drug-trafficking offenses. In their direct appeals, Defendant's co-defendants successfully argued that the government's failure to produce several clearly relevant documents that plainly called into question the credibility of the government's key witnesses against Defendant and her co-defendants violated their due process rights under Brady. The First Circuit vacated the co-defendants' convictions and remanded for a new trial. Because Defendant did not raise the Brady violation on her simultaneous appeal, she was denied relief. Thereafter, Defendant brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) Defendant established prejudice under Strickland; and (2) the failure to raise the Brady claim was the result of deficient performance by appellate counsel. View "Flores-Rivera v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that Mother could not prevail on her ineffective assistance of counsel claim.After a hearing, the trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (6). The trial court then concluded that it would be in the child's best interest for Mother's parental rights to be terminated. On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court failed to ensure that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mother failed to demonstrate that, but for the alleged deficiency by counsel, there was a reasonable probability of a different result. View "In re Z.M.T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's order in this case, which imposed continuous GPS tracking using a small, unobtrusive ankle monitor on Defendant for life, constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment as a reasonable, continuing, warrantless search.Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and first-degree forcible rape. Upon Defendant's release from his active sentence the State filed a petition to impose lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM) on Defendant. After a hearing, the trial court filed a form order imposing lifetime SBM upon Defendant. The court of appeals reversed, and the State appealed. On appeal, Defendant argued that the imposition of lifetime SBM under the General Assembly's enacted statutory scheme governing the program was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the implementation of lifetime satellite-based monitoring was constitutionally permissible and applicable to Defendant under the Fourth Amendment under the specific facts of Defendant's case. View "State v. Strudwick" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim, procedural due process claim, and equal protection claim against the DOE and UFT for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).In regard to the fair representation claim, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice but clarified that the claim should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress has not limited the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. It has defined the requirements of a cause of action under the National Labor Relations Act to extend only to circumstances in which the employer is not a state or a political subdivision of a state. In this case, because plaintiff cannot allege that he worked for an "employer" under the Act, he fails to state a claim against UFT for violating its duty of fair representation, and his complaint is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).In regard to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the DOE, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support the inference that the alleged racial discrimination and First Amendment retaliation resulted from an official custom or policy. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the DOE deviated from New York Education Law 3020-a procedures and this amounted to a constitutional due process violation. Furthermore, plaintiff's argument that the arbitrator was biased fails because due process does not require that pre-termination hearings occur before a neutral adjudicator. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim of discrimination against public school teachers in New York City based on different procedures for selecting disciplinary hearing arbitrators. Finally, to the extent that plaintiff asserts a new equal protection claim on appeal due to treatment of public school employees represented by a different union, that claim is not properly before the court. View "Green v. Department of Education of the City of New York" on Justia Law

In May 2020, at the height of the pandemic, New York City amended its Residential and Non-Residential Harassment Laws, to prohibit “threatening” tenants based on their “status as a person or business impacted by COVID-19, or . . . receipt of a rent concession or forbearance for any rent owed during the COVID-19 period,” and added the “Guaranty Law,” which renders permanently unenforceable personal liability guarantees of commercial lease obligations for businesses that were required to cease or limit operations pursuant to a government order. For rent arrears arising during March 7, 2020-June 30, 2021, the Guaranty Law extinguishes a landlord’s ability to enforce a personal guaranty.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the plaintiffs alleged that the Harassment Amendments violated the Free Speech and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions by impermissibly restricting commercial speech in the ordinary collection of rents and by failing to provide fair notice of what constitutes threatening conduct. Plaintiffs further alleged that the Guaranty Law violated the Contracts Clause, which prohibits “State . . . Law[s] impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” The district court dismissed the suit.The Second Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the plaintiffs failed to allege plausible free speech and due process claims. The court reinstated the challenge to the Guaranty Law. The Guaranty Law significantly impairs personal guaranty agreements; there are at least five serious concerns about that law being a reasonable and appropriate means to pursue the professed public purpose. View "Melendez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the criminal proceedings against him, holding that Appellant was statutorily barred under 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) from bringing a collateral attack in his criminal proceeding.Defendant was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. 1326, which makes it a felony to unlawfully enter the United States while an order of removal is outstanding. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment against him, arguing that the government may not use his prior removal order to prove the "outstanding order of removal" element of the crime. Defendant thus sought to dismiss his indictment based on a due process-based collateral attack on the order of removal, arguing that the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's first argument had already been rejected by this Court since the district's ruling; and (2) because the removal proceeding was not fundamentally unfair Defendant did not satisfy the conditions under 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) that would permit him to collaterally attack his prior removal. View "United States v. Castillo-Martinez" on Justia Law

In 2014, Claude, convicted of bank fraud, access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, and currency offenses, was sentenced to 232 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Claude sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing “extraordinary and compelling circumstances” arising from his purported “substantial assistance to the D.E.A. of New Jersey.” Claude alleged that, four years earlier, he provided crucial assistance, which allowed the government to “bust[] someone with multiple kilos of cocaine” and “locat[e] a cell phone that was part of a child pornography indictment.” The government filed a Rule 35(b) motion on behalf of another prisoner who, Claude insists, “reap[ed] the benefits” of his efforts, resulting in a “gross disparity” between his sentence and that of the undeserving cooperator. The government asserted that his purported assistance was neither substantial nor welcomed.The district court denied Claude’s motion, stating that a reduction of sentence for post-sentencing cooperation requires a Rule 35 motion from the government’ and cannot be raised by a defendant through a section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release. While the First Step Act made substantial changes to the procedures applicable to compassionate release motiongs based on extraordinary and compelling reasons, Congress made no changes to Rule 35, which governs sentence reductions based on substantial assistance. The Third Circuit affirmed. Substantial assistance is not itself an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). View "United States v. Claude" on Justia Law