Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Bass, a Michigan “drug kingpin,” was convicted of conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 50 or more grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, and firearms murder during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime 18 U.S.C. 924(j). Bass had murdered a hitman whom Bass had hired to kill Bass’s half-brother. The government sought the death penalty. Bass was ultimately sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. In 2020, Bass moved for compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the pandemic. Bass claimed that as a 51-year-old African-American male suffering from morbid obesity, he faced a higher risk of severe illness.The district court granted Bass’s request in January 2021 and ordered his immediate release. In March, the Sixth Circuit imposed an emergency stay; the court then reversed on the merits. The district court committed legal errors when it compared Bass’s federal sentence to his co-defendant’s state sentence and gave little weight to the concern that Bass’s release might endanger the public. By analogizing its role to that of a parole board, the court framed the legal question in a manner that Congress expressly condemned when it shifted away from the rehabilitation focus of criminal sentencing. On remand, the court must reevaluate the request based on current circumstances, which have materially changed; in April 2021, Bass was offered the COVID-19 vaccine but refused it. View "United States v. Bass" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Bank, alleging that the Bank violated 42 U.S.C. 1981 by taking retaliatory employment actions against him because he opposed racial discrimination occurring within his department.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant leave to amend his complaint where he failed to offer any grounds as to why his leave should be granted or how deficiencies in his complaint could be corrected. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1981 when it concluded that he did not engage in a protected activity. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concluded that plaintiff has successfully pleaded facts that could support a reasonable belief. In this case, plaintiff alleged that he overheard a supervisor state that "he intended to terminate four (4) African American employees." The court explained that a supervisor's considering of the race of an employee when deciding to terminate that employee is an unlawful employment practice. Furthermore, after plaintiff gave a statement to a human resources investigator, he alleges that the company began to retaliate against him by denying his loans, giving him multiple warnings, sending him to unnecessary training, and ultimately terminating him. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Scott v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of indecent exposure to a minor, sexual abuse of children in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-625(1)(c) and (4), and sexual abuse of children, in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-625(1)(c) and (2)(b), holding that Defendant's counsel provided record-based ineffective assistance of counsel that required reversal and remand for a new trial.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the statutory basis for Count I when the statute upon which the charge was based did not go into effect until after one of the alleged incidents occurred; and (2) the ex post facto application of Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-625(1)(c) for Count II and Count III required remand for a new trial. View "State v. Tipton" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the federal convictions challenged on appeal by the two defendants in this case - Noel de Leon-De la Rosa and Juan Batista Johnson-Debel - holding that vacatur was required of Defendants' challenged convictions for different reasons.Defendants were both convicted of destruction of a controlleded substance while on a vessel and conspiracy to destroy a controlled substance while on a vessel (counts five and six). The First Circuit vacated Defendants' of counts five and six, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) the admission of Johnson's statement in the defendants' joint trial violated De Leon's rights under the Confrontation Clause to the Federal Constitution; and (3) as to Johnson's convictions, the district court constructively amended the indictment through its instructions to the jury. View "United States v. De Leon-De la Rosa" on Justia Law

Kapordelis notified the prison medical unit that he broke his CPAP mask. After Kapordelis twice refused to leave the medical unit, an incident report was filed, including charges for destroying, altering, or damaging government property in excess of $100, 28 C.F.R. 541.3(b). Kapordelis contended that he did not deliberately break the mask. The prison's physician and a CPAP representative indicated that the mask was unlikely to break accidentally. The Discipline Hearing Officer sustained the charge and sanctioned Kapordelis with a loss of 27 days of good conduct time. Kapordelis administratively appealed, claiming that the broken part was the plastic “flexible spacebar,” which is “designed to bend when the mask is removed” and that replacing the spacebar “would likely cost less than $20.” Kapordelis’s administrative appeal was denied.Kapordelis filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2241, asserting that his due process rights were violated because no evidence was presented that he intentionally destroyed his CPAP mask. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. Kapordelis’s admission that the mask broke in his possession, coupled with the statements from the CPAP representative and the doctor, were sufficient to support the disciplinary conviction under the “some evidence” standard and there was “some evidence” to support the finding that Kapordelis caused damage in excess of $100. View "Kapordelis v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and probation officers who were involved in his criminal case and confinement. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the dismissal of one claim, which relates to the probation officer defendants' public disclosure of sensitive information about his substance abuse treatment.The court held that 42 U.S.C. 290dd-2(a) does not itself confer upon patients who receive substance abuse treatment a personal right to confidentiality enforceable in an action under section 1983. The court explained that the confidentiality provision "encourages voluntary participation in such programs" on the part of drug users and benefits the public, but it does not create a personal right to privacy. Furthermore, while personal rights could in principle be derived from criminal statutes, courts normally infer a private right of action from a criminal statute only if the relevant factors weigh with force in that direction. In this case, they do not. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit. View "Schlosser v. Kwak" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against various LPD officers, Webb County prosecutors, Webb County, and the City of Laredo, alleging a pattern of harassment and retaliation by various local officials, culminating in her arrest, in violation of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff is a journalist who regularly reports on local crime, missing persons, community events, and other news on her Facebook page. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from her arrest under Texas Penal Code 39.06(c), which prohibits obtaining information from a public servant that is nonpublic for personal benefit. The district court dismissed all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The Fifth Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not permit government officials to invoke patently unconstitutional statutes like section 39.06(c) to avoid liability for their actions. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment infringement claim against various officials on official qualified immunity grounds, concluding that it should be patently obvious to any reasonable police officer that locking up a journalist for asking questions of public officials violates the First Amendment. However, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a First Amendment retaliation claim. Just as the First Amendment violation alleged in the complaint was obvious for purposes of qualified immunity, the court concluded that so too was the Fourth Amendment violation alleged here. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the Fourth Amendment claim. The court also concluded that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's selective enforcement claim for failure to identify similarly situated individuals; given the court's conclusion that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court also remanded her conspiracy claim; and the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the municipal liability claim against the City. View "Villarreal v. City of Laredo" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Fifth Circuit reversed Davis’s convictions for health care fraud and conspiracy to commit health care fraud because the convictions were based on insufficient evidence. Davis had been incarcerated for approximately one year before the reversal. Davis sought a certificate of innocence arguing that she fulfilled the requirements in 28 U.S.C. 2513 (Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Statute) and, in the alternative, that the statute is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Nelson v. Colorado.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of Davis’s motion. Under the Statute, Davis had to prove that she “did not commit any of the acts charged” and that she “did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about [her] own prosecution.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Davis did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she “did not commit any of the acts charged.” The 2018 decision “went no further than concluding that the government did not implicate Davis in the scheme with proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Nelson is inapplicable because it did not involve a request for compensation. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Detained, separated from his family, speaking no English, and having diligently pursued representation, asylum applicant Usubakunov finally connected with a pro bono attorney at Catholic Charities who agreed to represent him. When that attorney was unavailable on the date of his merits hearing, Usubakunov requested his first continuance of that hearing. The IJ denied a continuance, leaving Usubakunov unassisted.The Ninth Circuit remanded. Under these circumstances, the IJ’s refusal to grant a continuance of Usubakunov’s merits hearing deprived him of his right to counsel and was an abuse of discretion because it was tantamount to a denial of counsel. The immigrant illustrated diligence, not bad faith, coupled with very difficult barriers. This was not a case of indefinite continuances, nor was it a case where Usubakunov was trying to game the system. View "Usubakunov v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ochoa was convicted in a 1988 trial for violent crimes against three female victims, including murder, kidnapping, forcible rape, and assault with a deadly weapon. The California state court imposed the death penalty.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition, first rejecting Ochoa’s “Brady” claim the prosecutor failed to disclose that jailhouse informants told officers that Ramage had implicated himself in the murder. Ochoa argued ineffective assistance during the penalty phase for failure to further investigate the conditions in which Ochoa lived as a child and his family’s history of mental health issues and violence. The court rejected a separate Eighth Amendment argument based on that failure to present additional mitigation evidence.Rejecting “cruel and unusual punishment arguments,” the court stated that no clearly established federal law required the court to instruct the jury as to family sympathy; nothing precluded the jury from considering family sympathy evidence, and the court did not prohibit Ochoa from arguing family sympathy. Precedent barring the admission of a defendant’s suppression hearing testimony as evidence at trial on the issue of guilt does not dictate that suppression hearing statements cannot be considered in proceedings outside the guilt phase or for purposes other than establishing substantive guilt. The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include the fact that the penalty phase jury instructions failed to direct the jury that it was required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravating circumstances existed and outweighed the mitigating circumstances. View "Ochoa v. Davis" on Justia Law