Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' joint motion to dismiss the charges against them on retrial, holding that the district court did not err.Defendants - Raymond Garraway and Cordwell Bennett - were convicted for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Defendants moved for a mistrial. The district court granted the motion on the basis of the prosecution's improper arguments made at closing. When the prosecution began to retry them, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court denied the motion, finding that the prosecution did not intend to provoke a mistrial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the record amply supported the district court's decision. View "United States v. Garraway" on Justia Law

Officers stopped a Cadillac with an expired registration. Jenkins, a passenger, showed no signs of distress. When the officers discovered that Jenkins was subject to an arrest warrant, they handcuffed her and put her in a cruiser, where Jenkins vomited. Officers called for paramedics and asked Jenkins if she was detoxing. Jenkins responded: “No … I’m pregnant.” The call for paramedics was then canceled. During transport, Jenkins groaned and screamed for help. After fingerprinting Jenkins at the police station, officers returned her to the cruiser. Several minutes later they found her unconscious, called for paramedics, and began CPR. Jenkins fell into a coma and died nine days later.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit. The district court validly exercised its discretion in choosing to review a bodycam video that was incorporated by reference into the amended complaint and did not assign the video too much weight. The complaint did not plausibly allege that any city policy or custom “was the moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violations but suggested that that the moving force was the officers’ failure to heed their training. The complaint failed to establish either objective unreasonableness or objective deliberate indifference by individual officers. The alleged violative nature of their conduct, in failing to recognize and respond to Jenkins’ serious medical need, was not clearly established in the specific context of this case, so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. View "J. J. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2002, Munoz digitally penetrated his daughter. He later pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14, acknowledging that “the Court will include as part of [his] sentence . . . lifetime supervision.” A Nevada state court sentenced Munoz to 48–144 months’ imprisonment, required him to register as a sex offender, and imposed a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Munoz filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the lifetime supervision under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The lifetime supervision consists of a $30 monthly fee to defray the costs of his supervision; electronic monitoring; and a requirement that Munoz may reside only at a residence approved by his parole officer, and that he keep his parole officer informed of his current address.The Ninth Circuit vacated the denial of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The conditions, individually and collectively, do not severely and immediately restrain Munoz’s physical liberty, so Munoz is not challenging his “custody,” and his claims are not cognizable in federal habeas. On remand, the district court may determine whether to allow Munoz to file an amended habeas petition that could secure jurisdiction or consider whether it would be appropriate to construe Munoz’s habeas petition to plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Mounoz v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant, a police officer, on a motion to dismiss an unlawful seizure claim based on his shooting two dogs during a residential security check. Accepting the complaint's allegations as true, the court concluded that the officer did not act reasonably in shooting the dogs. In this case, defendant shot both dogs when they presented no imminent danger and were not acting aggressively. Furthermore, it was clearly established that an officer cannot shoot a dog in the absence of an objectively legitimate and imminent threat of harm to himself or others. The court rejected defendant's contention that the court should consider other materials because the materials defendant wishes the court to consider, when properly viewed, do not settle whether the shootings were objectively reasonable. View "LeMay v. Mays" on Justia Law

This case concerns OSHA's November 5, 2021 Emergency Temporary Standard requiring employees of covered employers to undergo COVID-19 vaccination or take weekly COVID-19 tests and wear a mask.The Fifth Circuit granted petitioners' motion for a stay pending review, holding that the Nken factors favored a stay. The court concluded that petitioners' challenges to the Mandate are likely to succeed on the merits. The court stated that, on the dubious assumption that the Mandate does pass constitutional muster, it is nonetheless fatally flawed on its own terms. The court wrote that the Mandate's strained prescriptions combine to make it the rare government pronouncement that is both overinclusive (applying to employers and employees in virtually all industries and workplaces in America, with little attempt to account for the obvious differences between the risks facing, say, a security guard on a lonely night shift, and a meatpacker working shoulder to shoulder in a cramped warehouse) and underinclusive (purporting to save employees with 99 or more coworkers from a "grave danger" in the workplace, while making no attempt to shield employees with 98 or fewer coworkers from the very same. The court found that promulgation of the Mandate grossly exceeds OSHA's statutory authority and found arguments to the contrary unavailing.The court also concluded that it is clear that denial of petitioners' proposed stay would do them irreparable harm where the Mandate threatens to substantially burden the liberty interests of reluctant individuals, companies, and the States. In contrast, the court stated that a stay will do OSHA no harm whatsoever. Finally, the court concluded that a stay is firmly in the public interest. View "BST Holdings, LLC v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration" on Justia Law

During an investigation into whether Elmore sexually abused a seven-year-old girl, officers obtained and executed a warrant to remove Elmore’s vehicle from his stepmother’s home and search the vehicle. Elmore’s stepmother gave officers a key fob for Elmore’s car. Searches of the car and of a storage unit revealed no evidence. Weeks later, Elmore’s stepmother found that Elsmore had two more key fobs and notified the officers of her nagging suspicions that Elmore was hiding child pornography on one of the fobs. The officers also had a tip from Elmore’s fellow inmate. Aided by a warrant, a subsequent search of the fobs revealed a memory card containing child pornography. Elmore was indicted for knowingly possessing child pornography. Elmore twice unsuccessfully moved to suppress the memory card evidence, then pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the suppression rulings.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Elmore’s conviction (18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2)) and the revocation of his earlier term of supervised released (based on a prior child pornography conviction). Elmore’s suppression argument rests on his view that his stepmother’s actions were the “tainted consequences of law enforcement’s unlawful searches and seizures” but the search of the key fobs was separated from the earlier searches. The affidavit passes constitutional muster. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that there was no error.Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. In his petition for postconviction relief, Petitioner alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to develop the defense of provocation, among other things. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's finding that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel was not clearly erroneous. View "Coakley v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that Petitioner failed to raise allegations that warranted coram nobis relief.Petitioner was found guilty of the rape of his minor daughter and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his petition for coram nobis relief, Petitioner argued that his daughter had recanted her trial testimony, his daughter perjured herself, and his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that he was entitled to the writ. View "Chunestudy v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming Defendant's convictions of three distinct crimes in connection with his attack on a single victim over the course of an eight-hour period on a single day, holding that there was no error.Defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, and strangulation in the second degree. On appeal, Defendant argued that his constitutional right to a jury trial was violated when the trial court, rather than the jury, determined that the charges of assault and unlawful restraint were not "upon the same incident" as that giving rise to the charge of strangulation. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's determination at sentencing that the offenses of strangulation, assault, and unlawful restraint were not "upon the same incident" did not implicate the constitutional principles underlying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 490 (2000), or double jeopardy concerns. View "State v. Watson" on Justia Law

Dean, incarcerated since 2012, developed kidney cancer. Seven months after he first presented symptoms, Dean had kidney-removal surgery. The cancer had already spread to his liver, Dean remains terminally ill. Dean sued his doctors and their employer, Wexford, a private corporation that contracts to provide healthcare to Illinois inmates, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Dean cited delays in his diagnosis and treatment, caused by his doctors’ failure to arrange timely off-site care, and on a policy that requires Wexford’s corporate office to pre-approve off-site care.A jury awarded $1 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages, which was reduced to $7 million. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Dean has endured great suffering, but he did not produce enough evidence to hold any of the defendants liable for violating the Eighth Amendment. Dean’s claim against Wexford hinged on two expert reports from another case that critique the medical care, and process for medical care, that Illinois provides, through Wexford, to its prisoners. Those reports are hearsay, but the district court allowed Dean to use them for a non-hearsay purpose: to prove that Wexford had prior notice of the negative assessments of its review policy. One report postdated all events relevant to Dean and could not have given Wexford prior notice. The other report alone was insufficient to hold Wexford liable under the exacting “Monell” requirements in this single-incident case. View "Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law