Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

WCI holds an Ohio liquor license and does business as Cheeks Gentlemen’s Club. In 2014, the Ohio Department of Public Safety sent undercover agents to Cheeks. During the investigation, a female dancer offered an agent a private lap dance. She took the agent to a private room, disrobed, and performed the lap dance fully nude. Ohio Administrative Code Rule 52 prohibits a business with a liquor license from allowing nude performances on its premises. The Liquor Control Commission held a hearing and required WCI to pay a fine of $25,000 or give up its liquor license. Ohio courts upheld the order.WCI filed suit in federal court, alleging First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the First Amendment and equal-protection claims. On remand, the district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit, WCI lacks standing to pursue an injunction, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars all of WCI’s claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sovereign immunity bars WCI’s claim for damages. Neither the bare threat of potential, future sanctions nor the effect of those potential sanctions on WCI’s current business is sufficient to establish standing for injunctive relief. View "WCI, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Edmonson County Sheriff’s Deputy Meredith attempted to initiate a traffic stop on an automobile for an unilluminated license plate and the failure of a passenger to wear a seatbelt. The automobile was being driven by Embry, with M.S. and C.S. (minors), as passengers. Embry attempted to flee. Deputy Jones joined the pursuit, which lasted 12 minutes (18 miles), with the vehicles reaching speeds of almost 130 mph. Jones learned that the initiating offense was an unilluminated license plate, that there were multiple passengers, and that at least one passenger was unbelted. Jones saw Embry’s vehicle fishtail and almost lose control and crash. Jones and Meredith observed objects being thrown out of the car. Another officer radioed that he had found ammunition where objects had been thrown from the vehicle. Embry’s vehicle made an abrupt turn and severely crashed into another vehicle. Jones tased C.S., then unconscious, after C.S. failed to respond to Jones’s order to show his hands. M.S. had to be mechanically extracted from the vehicle.The district court denied Jones’s motion for summary judgment on C.S.’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 and battery claims, and denied both Jones’s and Sheriff Doyle summary judgment on state-law negligence and gross negligence claims, ruling that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, agreed that Jones is not entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 and battery claims. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under Kentucky law on the state-law negligence and gross negligence claims. View "Browning v. Edmonson County" on Justia Law

Gray claims that officers came to his cell, attacked Gray without provocation, took him to a shower, where, despite complying with all orders, he was sprayed with a chemical agent, and passed out. Upon waking up, he was placed in restraints and dragged to a transportation van. Officers continued to beat him. Gray’s injuries included a broken nose and a bruised kidney. These allegations are contradicted by the disciplinary reports indicating that officers went to Gray’s cell for a targeted search. Gray was intoxicated. There was vomit on the floor and Gray failed to answer questions. The officers moved Gray to the shower area, where he resisted by kicking and spitting, necessitating the use of a chemical agent to gain compliance. He knocked a radio from an officer's belt, breaking it. The prison disciplinary board found Gray guilty of intoxication, defiance, aggravated disobedience, property destruction, and having synthetic marihuana in his cell. Gray sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit vacated in part. Gray’s claims cannot be deemed to be Heck-barred because it is impossible to know which of his allegations might necessarily contradict his disciplinary convictions. The allegations of excessive force after Gray left the shower area were properly dismissed because Gray failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C. 1997e. View "Gray v. White" on Justia Law

Santos alleges that he witnessed six prison officers beating another inmate. Santos intervened. He claims that he was then knocked to the ground, hit, kicked, choked, handcuffed, and dragged so that his head hit poles. He was then placed in a shower cell, where Captain Wells sprayed him in the face, genitals, and anus with a chemical agent. Wells allegedly cut Santos with a knife and threatened to kill him. Santos was ultimately transferred to a medical center where, he alleges, he was denied adequate attention. According to prison officials, Santos physically attacked them. Despite initially being restrained, he hit Wells hard enough to break his dentures. His actions necessitated the use of a chemical agent to gain compliance. A prison disciplinary board concluded that Santos was guilty of defiance, aggravated disobedience, property destruction, and unauthorized area.Santos sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, determining that Santos’s claims were barred by “Heck” because prison disciplinary reports contradicted Santos’s allegations. The Fifth Circuit upheld the decision to admit the disciplinary reports, rejecting a hearsay argument, but remanded with regard to the application of Heck. The reports were offered to demonstrate that the disciplinary board found Santos guilty, not to prove the truth of the assertions. Whether the board’s findings related to the assault on Wells bar the corresponding claims by Santos must be determined by a fact-specific analysis. View "Santos v. White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of aggravated assault and battery, holding that prosecutorial misconduct did not prejudice Defendant.At trial, Defendant requested that the jury be instructed on self-defense. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct at trial when she misstated the law of self-defense to the jury three different times. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prosecutor in this case did not misstate the law and that Defendant failed to show how the prosecutor's comments, considered cumulatively, prejudiced him. View "Mendoza v. State" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict and a retrial on damages, awarding $90,000 in compensatory damages and $355,000 in punitive damages to plaintiff on his excessive force claims against police officers. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleged that the officers subjected him to unprovoked, excessive force, and then took substantial coordinated steps to cover up their misconduct. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the jury's $355,000 punitive damages award after retrial and that the damages were reasonable in light of the officers' misconduct. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remitting the compensatory damages award after the first trial to $115,000. Therefore, the compensatory award of $90,000 after retrial stands. View "Jennings v. Yurkiw" on Justia Law

Fisher was stopped for reckless driving and officers found, in his car's trunk, three pipe bombs that could cause serious injury to anyone holding them when lit. Fisher was released on bail. The friend who facilitated his release found chemicals in Fisher's garage and called the police, who found chemical powders and an AR-15 rifle, with no serial number, capable of accepting a magazine. Fisher was convicted of five destructive device felonies. Three offenses were subject to sentences served in county jail (Penal Code section 1170(h)) but Fisher was also convicted of two felony counts of simple possession of a destructive device, a “wobbler” offense that is not county jail eligible under section 1170(h). The court ordered that Fisher’s entire sentence be served in state prison.Fisher argued the disparate punishment of offenders convicted of the simple possession crime violates constitutional equal protection principles by treating similarly situated classes of offenders differently with no rational basis for the disparate treatment. The court of appeal found that persons charged with the various destructive device offenses are similarly situated and that there is no realistically conceivable legislative purpose to require a state prison sentence for those convicted of possession while affording the benefits of county jail incarceration for the 1170(h)-eligible offenses. The court concluded that the proper remedy is to reform section 18710 by making its violation punishable under section 1170(h). View "People v. Fisher" on Justia Law

In 2017, Langley pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to time served and 10 years of supervised release. As required by 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), the conditions of Langley’s supervised release included that he “not commit [a] federal, state or local crime,” “not illegally possess a controlled substance,” and “refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance.” In 2017, Langley unsuccessfully sought amendment of the conditions of supervised release to permit him to use medical marijuana as allowed by California state law, to alleviate pain stemming from the amputation of his lower leg. Langley renewed the motion in 2020. Langley, who submitted a physician's opinion that marijuana was the best medical solution for his pain issues, argued that he has a fundamental Due Process Clause right to use medical marijuana.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Langley’s renewed motion. The court held that it is bound by precedent that rejected the identical substantive due process claim. Even if state laws decriminalizing marijuana could constitute additional evidence under the test for determining whether a right is protected by the Due Process Clause, the court concluded that it is bound by its 2007 decision until it is overturned by a higher authority. View "United States v. Langley." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was convicted of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in a Georgia state court, he brought suit against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law claims.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. In regard to plaintiff's excessive force claim against the civilian bystander that assisted the police in subduing plaintiff, the court held that a civilian's rendering of brief, ad hoc assistance to a law enforcement officer is not state action, absent proof of a conspiracy to violate the constitutional rights of another. In regard to Deputy Thacker, the court applied the Graham factors and concluded that the deputy did not use excessive force where plaintiff suffered only de minimus injuries that were entirely consistent with a routine takedown. In regard to Deputy Brantley, the court again applied the Graham factors and concluded that the taser was not clearly excessive under the circumstances where two crimes were at issue by the time the taser was deployed: plaintiff had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and he had already begun his active and loud obstruction of the arrest. In regard to Sheriff Johnson, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. View "Charles v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Moreland, convicted of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance, unsuccessfully appealed. On August 11, 2013, his direct review ended when the opportunity to file a certiorari petition in the U.S. Supreme Court expired. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, he had one year from that date to file a federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Moreland sought collateral postconviction relief in state court on July 30, 2014. On March 7, 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Moreland’s petition for review. All 586 days of the state postconviction process were tolled.Moreland filed a federal habeas petition on March 28, 2016, nine days after the one-year statute of limitations elapsed; 374 untolled days had elapsed since the end of Moreland’s direct review. Moreland’s petition raised claims related to due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to a fair and impartial jury. Moreland alleged that the time for filing his petition should be equitably tolled because he suffered from schizophrenia, and on several occasions, was unable to research his case due to lack of access to the prison library.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Moreland has not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence to warrant equitable tolling. The court rejected claims that the district court should have tolled the time connected with motions for postconviction discovery and for reconsideration. View "Moreland v. Eplett" on Justia Law