Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

During an automobile stop in Richmond, Virginia, Ball struggled with a Virginia law enforcement officer, pulled out a gun, and shot the officer in the forehead at close range, killing him. Virginia prosecutors charged him with capital murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with all but 36 years suspended. Following community outrage over the sentence, federal prosecutors charged Ball with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Ball to the statutory maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment and, as a variance, required that the 10 years be served consecutive to the state sentence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the federal indictment should have been dismissed because that prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, was unnecessarily delayed within the meaning of FRCP 48(b), having been initiated more than two years after the shooting, and constituted vindictive prosecution under the Due Process Clause because the federal prosecution and sentence were “intended to punish him for negotiating a favorable deal with state prosecutors.” The federal government articulated valid federal interests in prosecuting Ball for his violation of federal law, pointing to its prioritization of felon-in-possession cases, and the serious nature of Ball’s conduct. View "United States v. Ball" on Justia Law

Walters entered his ex-girlfriend’s home, struck her with a hammer, and left with her cell phone and $700. Walters was arrested and charged in West Virginia state court with first-degree robbery, malicious assault, and burglary. Public defender Stanley represented him. In March, the state extended a plea offer. Stanley’s office timely received the offer, set to expire in April, but failed to communicate it to Walters until July. Despite Walters’s requests for a new attorney, Stanley continued to represent Walters. In July, the state extended another plea offer. Stanley communicated that offer to Walters and secured a 30-day extension. The July plea offer lapsed.Walters filed an ethics complaint. Stanley explained that Walters refused to respond to the July plea offer and had indicated that he would only “plead[] guilty to a misdemeanor, serve a year in jail, and make restitution." After negotiating a plea with new representation Walters pleaded guilty to reduced charges. The court sentenced Walters to 43-65 years’ incarceration, citing Walters’ criminal history, the seriousness of the offense, and the danger he posed to the community,After exhausting state remedies, Walters sought federal habeas relief. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The state court appropriately concluded that Walters failed to show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the March plea offer had Stanley timely communicated it. Walters cannot demonstrate prejudice. View "Walters v. Martin" on Justia Law

Hale, charged with failing a drug test while on pretrial diversion in Boyle County, was detained at the Marion County Detention Center ahead of her trial. The Boyle County Sheriff’s Office transported Hale between the counties for her monthly court appearances. Court Security Officer Pennington was the driver. Hale and Pennington repeatedly performed oral sex on each other and had unprotected penetrative vaginal sex in Pennington’s van. Before and during the encounters, Pennington showered Hale with perks—she rode cuffless in his van’s front seat, he bought her sodas, and he allowed her to smoke. He also offered to intervene in Hale’s pending criminal case. Hale gave birth to their child.Hale filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Pennington, Boyle County, and Sheriff Robbins. The district court found that Hale’s consenting to sexual contact and intercourse with Pennington negated her constitutional claims, and granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hale’s assertions against Pennington are properly viewed as an excessive-force claim that should be evaluated under an objective test. Hale asserted intimidation and coercion. She presented a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the encounters with Pennington were consensual. View "Hale v. Boyle County" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in determining plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for false imprisonment and unlawful search and seizure are time barred under Arkansas's three-year personal injury statute of limitations. In this case, the alleged Fourth Amendment violations -- false imprisonment and seizure of property based on fabricated evidence -- occurred before legal process began and are time-barred, despite plaintiffs' claim that the unlawful seizures continued even after the criminal charges were nolle prossed. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court improperly applied summary judgment standards in granting defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and in denying plaintiffs' motion to vacate or set aside the dismissal. Rather, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to vacate or set aside its initial dismissal order because plaintiffs failed to state plausible section 1983 malicious prosecution claims under controlling Eighth Circuit precedent. View "Martin v. Julian" on Justia Law

The Illinois State Police (ISP) revoked Brown’s Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card due to Brown's 2001 California conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV). On his application, Brown had answered “no” to the question of whether he had ever been convicted of domestic battery or a substantially similar offense. A domestic violence conviction precludes possession of firearms under federal law, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9).The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated an order granting Brown’s petition and ordering ISP to issue Brown a FOID card. Under section 10(c) of the FOID Card Act, a circuit court may grant relief to a petitioner whose FOID card has been revoked if the petitioner has not been convicted of a forcible felony under the laws of any jurisdiction within 20 years of the application or at least 20 years have passed since the end of any period of imprisonment imposed in relation to that conviction; the circumstances regarding a criminal conviction, the applicant’s criminal history, and his reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety; granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest; and granting relief would not be contrary to federal law.Brown satisfied the federal law test for the “civil rights restored” exception because he lost his right to possess firearms under California law and those rights were subsequently automatically restored by virtue of California law 10 years after his conviction. View "Brown v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of one count of murder with special circumstances and imposing a mandatory sentence under Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-35a(1)(B) of life imprisonment without the possibility of release, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court (1) correctly instructed the jury on the "in the course of a single transaction" element of murder with special circumstances; (2) did not commit plain error by failing to provide the jury, sua sponte, with a special credibility instruction with respect to one of the State’s witnesses, who Defendant claimed was the actual perpetrator of the murders; and (3) did not violate Defendant's state and federal constitutional rights to counsel and to present a defense by precluding defense counsel from making a certain argument in closing argument. View "State v. Silva" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence recovered during a traffic stop, holding that the district court did not err when it denied the motion to suppress.Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress both statements he made at the scene of his traffic stop and the physical evidence obtained during the stop. In denying the motion to suppress, the district court concluded that the law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's car. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the officer had a reasonable basis to believe Appellant had committed a traffic infraction and thus to perform a traffic stop. View "United States v. Miles" on Justia Law

After a steady buildup of performance problems, Sweet lost her job as a customer service representative in the Bargersville, Indiana clerk-treasurer’s office. Months before she was fired, Sweet criticized Longstreet, the elected clerk-treasurer, for reconnecting the utility service of a delinquent customer who was Longstreet’s wealthy business partner. Arguing that she was fired for vocalizing her opposition to the reconnection, she sued Longstreet and the town alleging retaliation in violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Sweet cited “suspicious timing” in the form of a five-month gap between her criticism and the termination of her employment; an ambiguous affidavit from a fellow employee; and the fact that her former employer offered several reasons for her termination rather than a single, consistent explanation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Even if Sweet’s criticism of Longstreet was constitutionally protected, she lacks sufficient evidence to support an inference that it was a motivating factor in the termination of her employment. The evidence, considered as a whole, indicates that Sweet was fired for multiple reasons, including “her long documented history of deficient performance, failure to improve on requested areas, incidences of bullying and repeated mistakes.” View "Sweet v. Town of Bargersville" on Justia Law

Sergeant Callahan was a shift supervisor at Bertie Correction Institution (BCI). Wissink, a murderer serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, was housed in the medium custody unit that she supervised. Callahan wrote a disciplinary report for Wissink. Later that day, Wissink started a trashcan fire. Callahan put the fire out with a fire extinguisher. Wissink then threw boiling liquid, that he had heated up in the microwave, in Callahan’s face. After Callahan fell, Wissink grabbed her fire extinguisher and repeatedly beat her with it. Callahan died from the attack. Callahan’s father sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his daughter’s substantive due process rights, alleging that approximately a week before Callahan’s murder, Wissink warned “BCI officials that he had homicidal thoughts and needed help for his mental health conditions” but no one at BCI took any action and Wissink remained in medium custody. Callahan alleged that BCI’s policies required four officers per shift but on the day of the murder, only three officers were on duty and only Callahan was fully trained, so state-created danger led to Sergeant Callahan’s death.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Callahan’s complaint. A plaintiff alleging state-created danger must plausibly allege more than a mere failure to protect. The substantive due process claim failed to adequately allege how the individual defendants created or substantially enhanced the danger which resulted in Callahan’s death and failed to plead “intent to harm.” View "Callahan v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

In 1992, Michigan voters, wanting to amend Michigan’s Constitution to establish term limits for state legislators, state executives, and members of Congress, got a petition on the ballot; 58.8% of voters approved the measure. Term limits became part of the Michigan Constitution (six years in Michigan’s House of Representatives; eight years in the Michigan Senate). Some voters sued, arguing that the term limits violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit upheld the term limits. About 20 years later, a bipartisan group of veteran legislators challenged the term-limit provision, making many of the same ballot-access and freedom-of-association claims, and citing two procedural provisions of the Michigan Constitution.The district court granted Michigan summary judgment. After determining that it had jurisdiction because the legislators raise claims under the Federal Constitution, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent bars their claims as voters. Voters have no fundamental right to “vote for a specific candidate or even a particular class of candidates.” As candidates, the legislators hold no greater protection than the voters they wish to represent. Candidates do not have a fundamental right to run for office. Michigan has several legitimate government interests in enacting term limits, including its sovereign interest in structuring its government as it sees fit. View "Kowall v. Benson" on Justia Law