Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, formerly employed as deputy sheriffs, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that defendants violated their First Amendment rights based on Defendant Cole's retaliatory employment actions taken after plaintiffs supported his political opponent. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaints.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in interpreting Curtis v. Christian County, 963 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2020), by concluding that even if plaintiff is a first responder and other provisions of Missouri law protect against discharge for engaging in political activity, because he was a Missouri deputy sheriff, plaintiff was legally terminated and Cole did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. The court explained that whether Cole violated plaintiffs' state statutory political activity rights is an inquiry separate from whether he violated their First Amendment rights. The court's conclusion that Cole committed no unconstitutional act necessarily resolves the municipal liability issue involving Christian County and the Christian County Commissioners, sued in their official capacities. Because Cole is entitled to qualified immunity under Curtis, the court did not address plaintiffs' second argument about affirmative defenses. View "Burns v. Cole" on Justia Law

Teachers and school administrators challenge the denial of motions to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of an order issued by the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene mandating that individuals who work in New York City schools be vaccinated against the COVID-19 virus.The Second Circuit concluded that the Vaccine Mandate does not violate the First Amendment on its face. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs have established their entitlement to preliminary relief on the narrow ground that the procedures employed to assess their religious accommodation claims were likely constitutionally infirm as applied to them. The court explained that the Accommodation Standards as applied here were neither neutral nor generally applicable to plaintiffs, and thus the court applied a strict scrutiny analysis at this stage of the proceeding. The court concluded that these procedures cannot survive strict scrutiny because denying religious accommodations based on the criteria outlined in the Accommodation Standards, such as whether an applicant can produce a letter from a religious official, is not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's orders denying preliminary relief and concurred with and continued the interim relief granted by the motions panel as to these fifteen individual plaintiffs. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Kane v. De Blasio" on Justia Law

The City of Albuquerque, New Mexico (“Albuquerque” or “the City”) enacted a city-wide ordinance that, in pertinent part, prohibited pedestrians from: (1) congregating within six feet of a highway entrance or exit ramp; (2) occupying any median deemed unsuitable for pedestrian use; and (3) engaging in any kind of exchange with occupants of a vehicle in a travel lane. Plaintiffs-Appellees, residents of Albuquerque who engaged in a variety of expressive activities (like panhandling, protesting, or passing out items to the needy), sued the City in federal court, alleging that the Ordinance impermissibly burdened the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The City argued the Ordinance was necessary to address persistent and troubling pedestrian safety concerns stemming from high rates of vehicular accidents throughout Albuquerque, and, in relation to this pressing interest, the Ordinance was narrowly tailored and did not burden substantially more speech than necessary. The district court disagreed, finding that those provisions of the Ordinance violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights because they were not narrowly tailored to the City’s interest in increasing pedestrian safety and, more specifically, reducing pedestrian-vehicle collisions. On appeal, the City argued the district court erred in concluding the Ordinance did not pass First Amendment muster, and it specifically focused on the question of narrow tailoring, arguing that the City did, indeed, appropriately tailor the Ordinance. After review, the Tenth Circuit rejected the City’s position, holding that the Ordinance was not narrowly tailored and, therefore, violated the First Amendment. View "Martin, et al. v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

CSI, which won a contract to perform road work on state highways across three Minnesota counties, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Mahnomen County and its Engineer, Jonathan Large, after Large stopped two of CSI's trucks for exceeding the posted weight limit on the road on which they were traveling.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the constitutional claims, concluding that, under the unique circumstances of this case, it was not clearly established that Large, a county engineer tasked with oversight of all county roads, could not prevent trucks that he had reason to believe were operating above the posted weight limit from passing over and damaging the roadway or could not call law enforcement to investigate compliance with the new, reduced weight restrictions. The court also concluded that it was not clearly established at the time that defendants could not change the weight restrictions in response to CSI's stated intentions to use the road despite the fact it had not been designated as a haul road or that the engineer could not seek law enforcement's assistance in investigating the trucks' weights. Furthermore, because CSI's complaint failed to allege any policy or custom of the county related to the engineer's conduct, claims against the county failed. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on CSI's state law claim for tortious interference with contract, and the engineer did not exercise the dominion and control over plaintiff's trucks required to support a trespass to chattel claim. View "Central Specialties, Inc. v. Large" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions on charges arising from two separate incidents between him and officers of the Clinton Police Department in July 2015, holding that Defendant's conviction in the case relating to events of July 19, 2015 must be reversed and the conviction in the case relating to the events of July 22, 2015 is reversed with respect to one assault count.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) evidence of certain events during the first incident should have been suppressed because those events were the result of an unconstitutional investigatory detention, and (2) his convictions of two counts of assault of public safety personnel related to the second incident was infirm because the evidence was insufficient and the trial court erred in instructing the jury. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; and (2) a new trial was required with respect to one of the assault charges due to instructional error. View "State v. Haughwout" on Justia Law

Dennis was convicted of a 1991 robbery and first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. In 2013, the district court granted Dennis’s habeas petition, vacated his conviction, and ordered a new trial on all charges, finding that Dennis’s prosecutors withheld material impeachment evidence. The Third Circuit, en banc, affirmed. On remand, Dennis accepted a deal. In exchange for a time-served sentence, he pleaded nolo contendere to reduced charges. Dennis then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging fabrication of evidence and deliberate deception, civil rights conspiracy, failure to intervene, supervisory liability, and municipal liability.The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Dennis has alleged the violation of his due process rights clearly established at the time of the detective’s conduct on which the claims are based. Dennis’s deliberate deception claim not only alleges that the detectives withheld exculpatory and impeachment evidence that would have supported his alibi and defense, but that they also failed to correct testimony they knew was false and concealed from the defense the evidence that revealed that trial testimony as false. The court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal, consideration of a ruling that the Heck bar does not apply. View "Dennis v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction on several counts related to the possession of firearms and controlled substances, holding that reversal was required because no Frye hearing was held on the admissibility of statistical evidence generated by the forensic statistical tool (FST) developed by the New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner, where it was alleged that Defendant was a contributor to a multiple-source DNA profile.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his motion to suppress should have been granted because the "pedigree exception" to the Miranda requirement did not apply under the facts of his case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a police officer's question to Defendant regarding where he lived fell within the pedigree exception to Miranda, and therefore, Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for a Frye hearing with respect to the admissibility of the evidence derived from the FST on the multiple-source DNA sample. View "People v. Wortham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Petitioners' applications for postconviction relief, holding that Petitioners' challenges to the State's allocation of its resources in the prison system were without merit.Petitioners were several male inmates serving time for sex-related offenses. Due to limits on resources, inmates were eligible for the sex offender treatment program, the completion of which was a requirement to be considered meaningfully for parole, only as the inmate neared his tentative discharge date. Petitioners brought applications for postconviction relief, arguing that this circumstance violated their constitutional due process rights. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the existing waiting list prioritizing admission to treatment based on tenantive discharge date, was a reasonable way to decide when an offender gets admitted to treatment and that the district court did not err in denying Petitioners' applications for postconviction relief. View "Bomgaars v. State" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to overturn his 2010 New Hampshire conviction for aggravated felonious sexual assault, holding that the district court properly rejected Petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim.In his habeas petition, Petitioner asserted that his Sixth Amendment right to autonomy to determine the objectives of his defense when his counsel took certain actions to present a defense at trial, despite Petitioner's instructions not to do so. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not denied autonomy to direct the objectives of his defense when his trial counsel presented an active defense contrary to Petitioner's express wishes. View "Kellogg-Roe v. Gerry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her now-adult son K.S., a former high school student with a specific learning disability, filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), alleging that the school district neither provided K.S. with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) nor complied with procedural safeguards meant to ensure such.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision affirming two administrative decisions concluding that the school district did not violate the IDEA's substantive and procedural requirements. The court reviewed the voluminous record and the magistrate judge's thorough report that the district court adopted, discerning no reversible error in the district court's holding that: (1) the school district did not violate its obligation to identify and evaluate K.S. as a student with a suspected disability; (2) the individualized education programs and transition plan created for K.S. complied with IDEA's substantive requirements; and (3) the school district's procedural foot-faults in failing to include K.S. for the first manifestation determination review and failing to consider certain relevant information were not actionable. View "H v. Riesel Independent School District" on Justia Law