Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Davis, a former Congressman, mayoral candidate, candidate for governor of Alabama, and federal prosecutor, is Black. In 2016, he became Executive Director of LSA, a non-profit law firm serving low-income Alabamians. Davis experienced problems with some of his subordinates and colleagues; some complained to LSA’s Executive Committee. On August 18, 2017, as Davis left work, he was informed that the Executive Committee had voted to suspend him with pay pending an investigation of those complaints. A “Suspension Letter” cited spending decisions outside the approved budget, failure to follow LSA's hiring policies and procedures, creating new initiatives without Board approval, and creating a hostile work environment for some LSA employees. LSA posted a security guard in front of its building and hired Mowery, an Alabama political consultant, to handle public relations related to Davis’s suspension. Mowery had handled one of Davis’s failed political campaigns until their relationship soured; Mowery had worked for the campaign of Davis’s opponent in another race.Days later, Davis notified the Board of his resignation. He filed suit, alleging race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and under Title VII, and defamation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Being placed on paid leave was not an adverse employment action and Davis did not raise a fact issue on his constructive discharge claim. LSA’s disclosures to Mowery did not constitute “publication”—an essential element of defamation. View "Davis v. Legal Services Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

Anderson rode with Cooper and Jackson to a Chicago sandwich shop. The trio entered the shop. Inside were customers Hazziez and Hart and several cooks, behind a glass wall. While waiting for food, Jackson sold two dime bags of crack cocaine to an unknown person outside the shop. Hart confronted Anderson’s group, stating it wasn’t their turf and they shouldn’t be selling drugs there. The argument moved outside. Anderson shot Hart three times. Hazziez, having witnessed the shooting, jumped in his car and took off. As Hazziez drove away, he heard three more shots.Anderson was convicted of first-degree murder of Hart, attempted first-degree murder of Hazziez, and aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by Hazziez. His first-degree murder conviction was affirmed. Because of an erroneous jury instruction, the attempted murder conviction was reversed. The court entered judgment on the aggravated discharge of a firearm count. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Anderson then sought federal habeas relief, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his aggravated-discharge conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Illinois Appellate Court reasonably applied U.S. Supreme Court precedent in upholding Anderson’s conviction by pointing to trial testimony supporting an inference that Anderson was shooting at Hazziez. View "Anderson v. Brookhart" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the Texas Attorney General a stay pending appeal of the permanent injunction that bars him from enforcing Texas Governor Greg Abbott's Executive Order GA-38, which prohibits local governmental entities from imposing mask mandates.After determining that plaintiffs have likely failed to demonstrate standing, the court concluded that the Attorney General has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits as a matter of law. In this case, the district court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims where plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Furthermore, even if a failure to exhaust remedies does not bar plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs likely failed to make out a prima facie case under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. The court explained that, given the availability of vaccines, voluntary masking, and other possible accommodations, the record before the court likely does not support the conclusion that a mask mandate would be both necessary and obvious under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. The court also held that it was likely erroneous for the district court to hold that GA-38 was preempted by either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. To the extent that it is even properly before the court, the court did not read the American Rescue Plan Act to preempt GA-38's prohibition of local mask mandates, as the district court did. The court further concluded that, assuming plaintiffs' claims are otherwise viable, at a minimum, the district court's blanket injunction prohibiting the enforcement of GA-38 in all public schools across the State of Texas is overbroad. Finally, the court concluded that the Attorney General has demonstrated the prospect of irreparable injury absent a stay; has shown that maintaining the status quo ante pending appeal will not risk substantial injury to plaintiffs; and that the public interest favors a stay. View "E.T. v. Paxton" on Justia Law

In 1996, two 17-year-olds, Harris and Gaines, approached soldiers at the Fort Campbell Army base. Attempting to rob them, Gaines pulled out a handgun, which discharged. A bullet struck Private Alonso-Caravia, killing him. Harris and Gaines pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 1111, aiding and abetting attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 2111, and aiding and abetting using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 924(c). The district court sentenced Harris to 420 months plus a consecutive 60-month prison term for the section 924(c) conviction.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Harris argued that the consecutive 60-month sentence must be vacated because it is possible that the court imposed that punishment under the unconstitutionally vague “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) and that the sentence cannot be saved under the “elements clause” of section 924(c)(3)(A) because neither of his other convictions could have been considered a “crime of violence” under then-existing precedent. Harris cannot establish harm that he suffered from any error. At best, Harris can show that the record of his sentencing is silent as to whether the court relied upon 924(c)(3)’s elements clause or residual clause when imposing his sentence. The 18 U.S.C. 2111 crime of aiding and abetting attempted robbery necessarily constitutes a crime of violence under the elements clause. View "Harris v. United States" on Justia Law

Erick and his tenth-grade classmates attended an end-of-year party at a park. Erick told school aide Lopez that he was going to the park’s swimming pool, which was monitored by three lifeguards. Lopez did not enter the pool area but watched Erick from a designated observation area, as required by pool rules. Lopez allegedly knew that Erick had asthma and could not swim. Lopez saw Erick leave the pool and enter the locker area. He left the observation deck to wait for Erick at the locker room exit. Unbeknownst to Lopez, Erick returned to the pool. Five minutes later, Lopez began searching for Erick. He found lifeguards trying unsuccessfully to resuscitate Erick, who had drowned.Erick’s parents sued Lopez, the school district, and others for negligence and wrongful death, with a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for deprivation of familial relationship. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The Due Process Clause generally does not provide an affirmative right to government aid, but a state’s failure to protect may give rise to a section 1983 claim under the state-created danger exception, which applies when the state places the plaintiff in danger by acting with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger. The court applied a subjective standard; because the aide was unaware that Erick was in the pool area when he drowned, the defendants cannot be liable. View "Herrera v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of deliberate homicide with a weapons enhancement, holding that there were no grounds upon which to reverse Defendant's conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in its opening and closing statement, resulting in plain error, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in several respects. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the prosecutor's challenged statements were proper; and (2) Defendant failed to establish that trial counsel provided record-based ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of Defendant's constitutional rights. View "State v. Polak" on Justia Law

Burr was convicted for the 1991 murder of an infant, “Susie.” Burr was living with Susie’s mother, Bridges, and was physically abusive to Bridges. Bridges had returned home to find Susie unconscious, having seizures, bruised, and with broken bones. Burr was sentenced to death. Burr has pursued habeas remedies before the state and federal courts. In 2020, the district court declined to grant habeas relief on the basis of claims under "Brady" and "Napue," related to transcripts of interviews with two witnesses, Susie’s brother, Scott, and Bridges.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Burr has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The state court did not unreasonably apply Brady when it concluded that “any inconsistencies between the trial testimony of [Bridges and Scott] and their pre-trial comments to the prosecutors are of de minimis significance.” Burr did not explain how the transcript would have allowed him to impeach that testimony. The jury could make its own determination of how much weight to give the statements of a young child who repeatedly stated that he could not remember key details. Burr has not pointed to any “false impression” about Scott’s testimony that prosecutors should have been aware of and flagged but that the jury would not also have been aware of after listening to that testimony. View "Burr v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Gillispie was convicted of two 1988 rapes and spent more than 20 years in prison before Ohio courts vacated his convictions, based on his claims of failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and actual innocence. Gillispie brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Moore, the police officer responsible for much of the investigation and the identification of Gillispie as the likely perpetrator. Gillispie alleges that Moore suppressed exculpatory evidence, arranged an unduly suggestive eyewitness identification procedure, fabricated inculpatory evidence, assisted in maliciously prosecuting him, and destroyed exculpatory evidence. Moore claims entitlement to qualified immunity. The district court determined that each of Gillispie’s claims should proceed to trial.The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Moore’s argument on appeal is simply a challenge to the district court’s determinations that genuine issues of material fact exist on the core claims. Defendants cannot appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity insofar as that order determines whether the pretrial record sets forth a “genuine” issue of fact for trial. “An appeal choosing to take this tack anyway delays the administration of our justice system and is a waste of judicial resources.” View "Gillispie v. Miami Township" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Ninth Circuit held that California Government Code 32310, which bans possession of large-capacity magazines that hold more than 10 rounds of ammunition, violated the Second Amendment.On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed. The court assumed, without deciding, that California’s law implicates the Second Amendment and applied intermediate scrutiny because the ban imposed only a minimal burden on the core Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Section 32310 is a reasonable fit for the important government interest in reducing gun violence. The statute outlaws no weapon, but only limits the size of the magazine that may be used. That limitation interferes only minimally with the core right of self-defense; there is no evidence that anyone ever has been unable to defend his home and family due to the lack of a large-capacity magazine. The limitation saves lives; in the past half-century, large-capacity magazines have been used in about three-quarters of gun massacres with 10 or more deaths and in 100 percent of gun massacres with 20 or more deaths. Section 32310 does not, on its face, result in a taking. The government acquires nothing by virtue of the limitation. Owners may modify or sell their nonconforming magazines; the law does not deprive owners of all economic use. View "Duncan v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Harris is charged with a violent rape that occurred in 1989. DNA from the crime scene and a vaginal swab matched Harris’s. A “pretrial services court report” indicated that Harris appeared to be an appropriate candidate for release on his own recognizance with enhanced monitoring. Harris asked for release on his own recognizance with nonfinancial conditions, e.g., a no-contact order, limitation of his use of dating websites, and GPS tracking. Harris argued that he is indigent, there is no indication he is a flight or safety risk, the alleged crimes occurred 32 years ago, he has not tried to contact the victim, he had a limited criminal history in the interim years, and he had community ties. The prosecution offered testimony by the victim that she feared for her safety, the doctor who treated the victim, and several women who reported that Harris liked to tie women up during sex and enact rape fantasies.Ultimately, the trial court denied Harris bail. finding that the charged felony offenses involved acts of violence on another person and that there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial likelihood that Harris’s release would result in great bodily harm to others. The court of appeal remanded. The court erred in failing to set out reasons on the record why less restrictive alternatives to detention could not reasonably protect the public or victim safety. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law