Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in a drug dog sniff search during a traffic stop of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, holding that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress.In reversing the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, the court of appeals concluded that the investigating officer unconstitutionally extended the duration of the traffic stop to accommodate the dog-sniff search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish that the extension of the traffic stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. View "Commonwealth v. Conner" on Justia Law

Anthony Timpa's family filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging that five officers of the Dallas Police Department violated Timpa's Fourth Amendment rights by causing his death through the prolonged use of a prone restraint with bodyweight force during his arrest. Plaintiffs asserted claims of excessive force and of bystander liability.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers as to the excessive force claims. Viewing the facts in the light most positive to plaintiffs, the court concluded that none of the Graham factors justified the prolonged use of force. In this case, a jury could find that Timpa was subdued by nine minutes into the restraint and that the continued use of force was objectively unreasonable in violation of Timpa's Fourth Amendment rights. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the use of a prone restraint with bodyweight force on an individual with three apparent risk factors—obesity, physical exhaustion, and excited delirium—created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. Furthermore, the record supports that Timpa was subdued nine minutes into the continuing restraint and did not pose a threat of serious harm. Finally, the court held that the state of the law in August 2016 clearly established that an officer engages in an objectively unreasonable application of force by continuing to kneel on the back of an individual who has been subdued.In regard to bystander liability claims, the court concluded that genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on these claims against Officers Mansell, Dominguez, and Vasquez. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment as to these claims. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the bystander liability claim against Officer Rivera. View "Timpa v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a writer, filed suit against the CAA parties for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging they had mishandled their representation of him in several different ways.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying the CAA parties' special motion to strike allegations in the complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. Although the court agreed that the challenged conduct arises from protected speech activity, the court concluded that when the context and content of the specific allegedly wrongful statements are considered, their degree of connection to a topic of public interest is insufficient to warrant protection under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). In this case, the creative aspects of his work that plaintiff claims were misappropriated, privately communicated to a targeted audience of one, did not contribute to the public conversation about a matter of public interest. View "Musero v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC" on Justia Law

Following the October 1, 2017 tragedy in Las Vegas where a gunman fired several semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks and killed 58 people and wounding 500 more, the ATF promulgated a rule stating that bump stocks are machineguns for purposes for the National Firearms Act (NFA) and the federal statutory bar on the possession or sale of new machine guns.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of plaintiff's challenge to the rule, agreeing with the district court that the rule properly classifies a bump stock as a "machinegun" within the statutory definition and that the rule of lenity does not apply. The court need not address plaintiff's contentions that the ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing the rule or that the rule violates constitutional principles of separation of powers as resolution of these issues will not affect the outcome of the case. View "Cargill v. Garland" on Justia Law

The events were recorded by Officer Bierenga’s dashcam and the White Castle surveillance system. Bierenga attempted a traffic stop. After failing to pull over for several blocks, Gordon came upon a red light at a busy intersection and stopped. Bierenga approached Gordon’s car and spoke to him through the window. Bierenga perceived that Gordon was under the influence of something. When the light turned green and the traffic moved forward, Gordon accelerated. Approximately 15 minutes later, Bierenga spotted Gordon's car at the White Castle drive-thru. Bierenga parked in front of Gordon’s car and walked around Gordon’s car with his weapon drawn. Gordon reversed, bumped the car behind him, and drove forward, crashing into Bierenga’s car while Bierenga stood stuck between the cars and the building. As Gordon maneuvered his vehicle. Bierenga approached Gordon’s rolled-down window, pointing his gun. Gordon backed up, turned his wheels away from Bierenga, then attempted to flee. Bierenga yelled “stop,” fired four shots at Gordon, reentered his vehicle, and followed Gordon. Gordon presumably lost consciousness, then crashed into another car. Gordon later died.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Bierenga’s for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed; precedent cited by the district court is not similar enough to this case to define “clearly established” law. The plaintiff is unable to point to a case that would place every reasonable officer in Bierenga’s position on notice that his use of force in this specific situation was unlawful. View "Gordon v. Bierenga" on Justia Law

Georgia law generally required a person to apply for and receive a valid weapons carry license from a probate judge before carrying a handgun or other weapon in public. The General Assembly identified specific categories of people to whom “[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued,” including people with certain criminal convictions. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a probate judge could deny an application for a weapons carry license under OCGA 16-11-129 based on a determination that the applicant’s criminal history records report failed to show the outcome of an arrest that could have resulted in a disqualifying conviction. Applying the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that a probate judge had no such authority. It therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary. View "Bell v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

Santiago, a severely disabled Chicago resident, would leave her van parked on the street near her home for extended periods of time. In 2018, pursuant to the Chicago Municipal Code, her van was towed, impounded, and destroyed. She sued the city on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, challenging the constitutionality of various aspects of the ordinance. The district court granted, in part, her motion to certify her suit as a class action. With respect to the “Tow Class,” the court concluded that Santiago “is asserting only a facial challenge: the ordinance is unconstitutional because it fails to require adequate notice before a vehicle has been towed.” Concerning the Vehicle Disposal Class, the court rejected Chicago’s assertion that state law requires the class to show prejudice from the city’s failure to strictly follow its ordinance.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The class certification order does not fully demonstrate the “rigorous analysis” required by FRCP 23 and constituted an abuse of discretion. Considering whether questions of law or fact common to class members predominate begins with the elements of the underlying cause of action. The district court did not discuss any of the elements of the underlying causes of action or what the causes of action are. View "Santiago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Maple’s girlfriend, Vinsek, told him that Teck had tried to rape her. Later, they found her apartment ransacked and blamed Teck and his friend, Altman. Maple tracked them down at a bar, where he brawled with them. Vinsek called the police to report the burglary. Maple stated, “maybe I’ll just handle it my way.” Hours later, Maple found Teck and Altman and shot at them, killing Teck. Detectives went to talk to Maple and Vinsek, identified themselves as police, and stated that Maple was not under arrest but asked to talk with him about the murder. Maple agreed. Officers failed to read his Miranda rights. After about an hour, Maple confessed. He was then arrested and read Miranda warnings. He waived those rights and confessed again, on tape. At trial, Maple confessed again, claiming he was drunk at the time. The prosecution produced a “mountain of evidence” that proved his intent. Altman and three witnesses testified to the shooting. Maple was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief. E Even if the trial court should have suppressed his confession before Miranda warnings, any error was harmless; other evidence overwhelmingly incriminated him. Maple doubtless would have been convicted of first-degree murder of Teck and trying to murder Altman. View "Maple v. Superintendent Albion SCI" on Justia Law

Orange County jail inmates brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal claims based on alleged failure to combat COVID-19. The district court granted provisional class certification and issued a preliminary injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which automatically expired 90 days after being issued.The Ninth Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot because the injunction and provisional class certification are no longer in effect. While the Supreme Court’s emergency stay of the preliminary injunction may have prevented the injunction from having any further effect, it did not toll the 90-day limit unambiguously detailed in the PLRA. The court rejected the County’s assertion that the appeal fell within an exception to mootness because the issue was capable of repetition but evading review, noting that circumstances had changed since the original injunction issued, Given the Supreme Court’s stay of the injunction, the chance that plaintiffs would successfully acquire another preliminary injunction, at least without significantly worse conditions than previously existed, is remote. The provisional class certification expired along with the preliminary injunction. View "Ahlman v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Telcy, convicted of drug and firearms offenses, was sentenced to life imprisonment due to his armed career criminal enhancement. His 2010 section 2255 habeas petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, was rejected. In 2013 and 2016, Telcy unsuccessfully sought permission to file second or successive section 2255 habeas petitions. In 2019, under the First Step Act, the district court. reduced Telcy’s sentence to a term of 235 months without holding a hearing or revisiting its previous factual findings.Telcy again sought permission to file a second or successive 2255 habeas petition, arguing that, because his guideline range was based on the ACCA enhancement and the district court considered this guideline range when it imposed a reduced sentence, he would suffer adverse collateral consequences if he were not allowed to challenge the enhancement in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. For purposes of the bar on second or successive 2255 motions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a First Step Act sentence reduction is not a “new judgment” that resets the clock, allowing a defendant to file a new, “first” habeas petition. When a district judge reduces a sentence under the First Step Act, the court is not authorized to conduct a plenary, de novo resentencing; the sentence reduction does not affect the validity or lawfulness of the underlying sentence. View "Telcy v. United States" on Justia Law