Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief and petitioner's accompanying request for supplemental expert funding. The court granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on five issues.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's supplemental expert funding request. In regard to petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), the court concluded that petitioner's jury sentencing claim was without merit and there is no flaw in the district court's conclusion that the record establishes that petitioner was fully advised of his rights to a jury trial and sentencing, as well as the possibility that a jury could sentence him to life; the district court did not err in denying relief on petitioner's mitigation evidence claim where petitioner could not overcome the procedural bar for his defaulted subclaims and the evidence does not fundamentally alter his claim; counsel's performance in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence was not deficient and petitioner failed to establish prejudice; the record leaves no doubt that petitioner admitted to two aggravating circumstances in his guilty plea and knowingly and voluntarily waived any challenge to judicial factfinding by the trial court and that challenge would have been futile; and petitioner procedurally defaulted his guilty plea claim. View "Mahdi v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that the trial court's instructions in this criminal case, while improper, did not impact Defendant's due process right to a fair trial, holding that the appellate court did not err.Defendant was convicted of three counts of robbery in the first degree, two counts of felony murder, and other offenses for her involvement in two murders. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court's instructions on robbery and felony murder were improper but provided the jury with a legally valid but factually unsupported basis for finding Defendant guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's instructions provided the jury with a legally valid and factually supported alternative basis for finding Defendant guilty of robbery and felony murder; and (2) therefore, Defendant could not establish that the trial court's error more probably than not affected the jury's verdict. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

Lange drove past California Highway Patrol Officer Weikert, who noticed Lange was blaring music and honking unnecessarily. Weikert followed Lange, activating his overhead lights to signal that Lange should pull over. Seconds later, Lange arrived at the driveway of his home and drove into his attached garage. Weikert followed Lange into the garage and began questioning him. Lange appeared intoxicated. Weikert conducted field sobriety tests, which Lange failed. Lange’s blood-alcohol content was over three times the legal limit. Lange, charged with DUI and operating a vehicle’s sound system at excessive levels, unsuccessfully moved to suppress all evidence collected after Weikert entered Lange’s garage.In 2019, the court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, reasoning that an officer’s hot pursuit into the house to prevent the suspect from frustrating the arrest is always permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the “flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home”; an “officer must consider all the circumstances in a pursuit case to determine whether there is a law enforcement emergency,” and vacated for reconsideration.The court of appeal again affirmed the denial of the motion. Weikert followed binding state appellate law when he entered the garage in pursuit of Lange. The exclusionary rule does not require exclusion of the evidence seized in Lange’s home, even though under the Supreme Court’s new pronouncement. View "People v. Lange" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's Arizona conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder. Petitioner contends that his counsel did not investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, including evidence of diffuse brain damage, childhood abuse, and substance abuse.The panel applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and concluded that petitioner has not shown either that his trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient or that the deficiencies were prejudicial. In this case, there is no showing that the education records nor the incarceration records contain meaningful mitigation evidence; petitioner has not met his burden of showing that counsel erred by not investigating and presenting evidence of his childhood abuse; petitioner's allegation that counsel erred by not investigating and presenting evidence of his substance abuse fails because counsel was not timely informed of his substance abuse; and petitioner has not shown that counsel erred by not seeking a psychological evaluation. View "Washington v. Shinn" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the conditions of petitioner's supervision program render her "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2241, such that the district court had jurisdiction to consider her habeas petition. The court also concluded that petitioner did not validly self-execute the 1995 deportation order when, shortly before it was entered, she voluntarily left the United States. Whether the court resolved 8 U.S.C. 1101(g)'s ambiguity through the principle of lenity or through Chevron deference, the court reached the same conclusion: Section 1101(g)'s two conditions operate successively. In this case, petitioner left the Untied States before she was ordered removed and thus she was not "deported or removed" within the meaning of Section 1101(g). Accordingly, the government may lawfully deport her under the still-operative 1995 order. View "Argueta Romero v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

This case, involving a dispute about the effect of provisions in the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act on the contraceptive mandate found in the Affordable Care Act, became moot with issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs no longer have a cognizable injury and the underlying dispute is moot. The court also concluded that Nevada did not cause the case to become moot; it was moot after the ruling in Little Sisters, and vacatur serves public interests in that it vacates a permanent injunction that Nevada never had proper opportunity to litigate the merits of before the district court; and, regardless, plaintiffs conceded Nevada was entitled to vacatur at oral argument. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss as moot. View "DeOtte v. Nevada" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the execution of a no-knock search warrant at the apartment where he and his girlfriend lived, holding that the district court did not err.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his backpack because his backpack was not properly subject to search and erred in failing to find that there was insufficient justification for the no-knock provision of the warrant. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was nothing improper about the search; and (2) the district court did not commit plain error by not ruling that the no-knock provision was unsupported. View "United States v. Congo" on Justia Law

Based on his perception that Cole was following another vehicle too closely, Illinois Trooper Chapman stopped Cole. The initial stop lasted 10 minutes. Chapman spent about six minutes questioning Cole, then told Cole that he would get a warning but that, for safety reasons, they had to go to a gas station to complete the paperwork. Chapman testified later that he had already decided that he was not going to release Cole before searching the car. Chapman requested a drug-sniffing dog and learned that Cole had been arrested for drug crimes 15 years earlier. At the gas station, Cole’s answers became contradictory; 30 minutes after the stop, Chapman told Cole that he could not leave because he suspected Cole was transporting drugs. The dog arrived 10 minutes later and alerted. Chapman found several kilograms of methamphetamine and heroin in a hidden compartment. The Seventh Circuit initially reversed the denial of Cole’s motion to suppress. On rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed the denial. Travel-plan questions ordinarily fall within the mission of a traffic stop but, like other police inquiries during a traffic stop, must be reasonable under the circumstances. Here they were reasonable. The trooper inquired about the basic details of Cole’s travel, and his follow-up questions were justified given Cole’s less-than-forthright answers. The stop itself was lawfully initiated, and the trooper developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity before moving to the gas station for the dog sniff. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a firearm, holding that Defendant's claims on appeal were unavailing.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court improperly admitted portions of a written statement from one of the state's witnesses and unduly restricted the cross-examination of another state witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to demonstrate that the admission of the witness's written statement substantially swayed the jury's verdict; and (2) assuming that partial restrictions placed on defense counsel's cross-examination of the second witness infringed on the minimum of cross-examination guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, such infringement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Joanne R., a conservatee subject to a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, contends that the trial court provided her an inadequate jury trial waiver advisement and improperly induced her to waive her right to a jury trial by stating she could either have a court trial that day or a jury trial nine months later.The Court of Appeal concluded that, although it is concerned by the delay in providing conservatees jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic, there was no violation of Joanne's statutory right to a jury trial. However, the court cautioned the superior court that a nine-month delay for a conservatee to have a jury trial where the conservatorship would otherwise end in a year, absent a health emergency, raises serious constitutional concerns in light of the significant liberty interests at stake. The court urged the superior court to dedicate the necessary additional resources to LPS jury trials so that conservatees may exercise their right to a jury trial in a timely manner. The court noted that failure to do so likely violates a conservatee's constitutional right to due process. View "Stusser v. Joanne R." on Justia Law