Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, holding that the district court did not err by not granting Defendant's motion to suppress.In his motion to suppress, Defendant sought to suppress evidence obtained after the execution of a search warrant at his residence, asserting errors and omissions in the underlying search warrant affidavit. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion, holding that the various motions that Defendant filed ultimately seeking to suppress the evidence seized from his residence were correctly denied. View "United States v. Maglio" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court entering summary judgment against the political discrimination claims brought by Plaintiffs, former Automobile Accident Compensation Administration (AACA) employees, against Defendants, the AACA and its former executive director, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiffs were laid off pursuant to an agency-wide, facially-neutral layoff plan based on seniority. Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of their rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with violations of Puerto Rico law. The district court adopted Puerto Rico court decisions concluding that it was the Board of Directors, and not the Executive Director, that was responsible for the layoff plan, and then granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs were barred from arguing in this litigation that the executive director was responsible for the layoff plan. View "Diaz-Baez v. Alicea-Vasallo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sex trafficking of a child under eighteen years of age, first-degree kidnapping, living from the earnings of a prostitute, and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment, holding that the trial court's Faretta canvass was in appropriate in this case.Defendant, who represented himself at trial, was found guilty of sex trafficking of a child under eighteen years of age, first-degree kidnapping, living from the earnings of a prostitute, and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction on the basis that the waiver of his right to counsel was invalid, holding (1) the trial court's determination that Defendant validly waived his right to counsel was unreasonable in light of the inadequate inquiry into Defendant's understanding of the sentences he faced if convicted; and (2) the trial court should refrain from disparaging Defendant's choice to waive counsel. View "Miles v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions entered upon his conditional guilty plea to the charges of possession of a firearm without a license and possession of a large capacity feeding device, holding that the superior court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.On appeal, Defendant argued that the officers that stopped him after a routine traffic stop and then conducted a pat frisk did not have reasonable suspicion that he might be armed and dangerous. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the facts, when taken together, warranted a reasonably prudent person's belief that Defendant was armed and dangerous. View "Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey" on Justia Law

Cory died in her bed in 2006. Although young, Cory was severely alcoholic, bulimic, and had been sick with flu-like symptoms. An autopsy revealed “marked steatosis of the liver” and no signs of trauma. Investigators verified her husband, Curt’s, timeline and interviewed their three children, who had seen Cory alive before Curt took them to school. Dr. Bowman, who conducted the autopsy, indicated that the cause of death was inconclusive and did not suggest foul play.Seven years later, Detective Gibson, reviewing old files, noticed a photo of Cory’s body and concluded that Curt had suffocated Cory with a pillow the evening before her death was reported. The photos had been taken after Cory’s arms were repositioned. Gibson launched a murder investigation. Coroner Keller joined Gibson’s effort, claiming without corroboration, that Cory’s body had been in full rigor and that the room had smelled bad. The two “searched” for experts until finding Dr. Turner, to whom they provided limited information. Turner prepared a report supporting the suffocation hypothesis. Curt was arrested and spent 21 months in jail, followed by nine months under house arrest. After a mistrial, FOIA requests revealed undisclosed evidence. In 2017, a jury acquitted Curt. Curt sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment claim premised on fabrication and manipulation of evidence and on violations of his “Brady” right to be provided with exculpatory evidence, and a Fourth Amendment “malicious prosecution” claim premised on Curt’s detention, without probable cause. The district court denied the officials’ motions, seeking qualified immunity . The Seventh Circuit dismissed in part, citing lack of jurisdiction over the Fourth Amendment claim. Curt withdrew his Fourteenth Amendment claim as precluded by circuit precedent. View "Lovelace v. Gibson" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff on drug-interdiction duty in central Illinois observed an RV with a dirty license plate traveling on I-72 and followed it, exiting the freeway and pulling into a truck-stop parking lot. The driver, Ahmad, entered the convenience store with one of his passengers. A store employee informed the deputy that the men were acting strangely. The officer asked to speak with them. They agreed. After a few preliminary questions, the deputy asked for Ahmad’s driver’s license and the vehicle's rental agreement. Ahmad produced the documents. The deputy then asked for consent to search the RV. Ahmad agreed. The deputy did not immediately conduct a search but called for a K-9 unit, which arrived minutes later. Ahmad agreed to a dog sniff of the RV. The dog alerted about 15 minutes into the encounter. The deputy searched the RV, where a large quantity of marijuana was discovered.Ahmad moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that his consent to search was involuntary because he had already been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the deputy retained his driver’s license and the RV rental agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The deputy’s brief possession of Ahmad’s license and rental agreement did not transform this otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure. Ahmad voluntarily consented to both the external dog sniff and the search of the RV. View "United States v. Ahmad" on Justia Law

In 2014, Detroit Police Officers arrested Jones and others as they demonstrated outside a city water contractor’s facility, blocking the building’s entrance. A police bus took the protestors to a police station. Jones could not board it because he uses a wheelchair, which the bus was not equipped to handle. Officers called for a cargo van, which did not have a wheelchair lift, and lifted Jones into the van; the ceiling height made it difficult for him to sit up straight and the van lacked restraints. An officer braced his feet against the chair to prevent it from moving. Jones claims that the entry into the van and the jostling of the ensuing trip exacerbated existing injuries and damaged his spine. The state declined to prosecute Jones for disorderly conduct.Jones sued the city and police officers in their individual capacities under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, with a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the officers used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit previously granted qualified immunity to the officers with respect to the excessive-force claims and later affirmed summary judgment in the city’s favor on Jones’s failure-to-accommodate claims. Neither the Americans with Disabilities Act nor the Rehabilitation Act permits a claim of vicarious liability. View "Jones v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Taylor, on probation, was found to be in possession of drugs, a firearm, and cash, and moved to suppress the evidence. Before the scheduled hearing, his court-appointed lawyer (Carey) moved to withdraw because Taylor would not permit him to withdraw pro se motions in which Taylor refused to “accept that the laws of the United States govern him.” Taylor contended that “the United States is not a country. It is a corporation.” The court denied Carey’s motion Taylor filed more documents. Carey again moved to withdraw, explaining that Taylor “desires to proceed pro se.” Carey acknowledged substantial concerns about Taylor’s legal competency.” Taylor acknowledged that he “d[id not] understand law” and requested that the court “deal with [him] commonly.” The court stated that his pro se filings were rambling and not founded on any legal principles. Taylor repeatedly attempted to challenge the jurisdiction of the court.The court denied his request to represent himself, denied his motion to suppress, and, later (twice) appointed new counsel. Taylor was convicted and sentenced to 264 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to self-representation if he “knowingly and intelligently” waives his right to counsel. When Taylor invoked that right, the district court bore “the weighty responsibility of conducting a sufficiently penetrating inquiry to satisfy itself that” Taylor could make such a waiver. The court did not complete the requisite inquiry. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition against Appellees - Judge Dale A. Crawford and the Hocking County Common Pleas Court - but affirmed the denial of her motion for disqualification of attorney Randall L. Lambert, holding that the court of appeals erred in part.Appellant was found guilty of assaulting a police officer. At a sentencing hearing at which Appellant appeared without counsel, Appellant refused to sign a waiver-of-counsel form. Judge Crawford conducted the sentencing hearing, at the end of which he imposed a six-month sentence in the county jail and ordered Defendant to pay a fine, restitution, and court costs. Appellant filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition alleging that Judge Crawford lacked jurisdiction to hold the sentencing hearing because she had not waived her right to counsel. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint and denied the motion to disqualify Lambert. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Appellant stated a colorable claim that Judge Crawford violated her Sixth Amendment rights when he ordered her to not communicate with any lawyer and then sentenced her and that this error rendered the sentencing entry void. View "State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief and petitioner's accompanying request for supplemental expert funding. The court granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on five issues.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's supplemental expert funding request. In regard to petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), the court concluded that petitioner's jury sentencing claim was without merit and there is no flaw in the district court's conclusion that the record establishes that petitioner was fully advised of his rights to a jury trial and sentencing, as well as the possibility that a jury could sentence him to life; the district court did not err in denying relief on petitioner's mitigation evidence claim where petitioner could not overcome the procedural bar for his defaulted subclaims and the evidence does not fundamentally alter his claim; counsel's performance in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence was not deficient and petitioner failed to establish prejudice; the record leaves no doubt that petitioner admitted to two aggravating circumstances in his guilty plea and knowingly and voluntarily waived any challenge to judicial factfinding by the trial court and that challenge would have been futile; and petitioner procedurally defaulted his guilty plea claim. View "Mahdi v. Stirling" on Justia Law