Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Buck robbed approached a mail carrier, ordered her at gunpoint to put mail in a bag, and fled. Days later, Buck, with accomplices, shot a mail carrier in the head. Buck was convicted on two counts of assaulting a mail carrier with intent to steal mail, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a); attempted murder of a mail carrier, section 1114; and using a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence,” section 924(c)(1). He was sentenced to concurrent 210-month terms on the assault and attempted murder convictions, a consecutive 60-month term for the first 924(c) conviction, and a consecutive 240-month term for the second 924(c) conviction. Section 924(c)(1) then imposed a five-year consecutive term of imprisonment for the first offense, and a 20-year term for the second. In 2016, Buck argued, under 28 U.S.C. 2255, that his 2114(a) convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence under section 924(c)(3) and that his sentence for Count 4 should be limited to 60 months, rather than 240 months. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court reasoned Buck was convicted of assault with intent to steal mail with the aggravating element of placing the mail carrier’s life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, which satisfies 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. Neither the jury instructions nor section 2114(a) contain any suggestion that mere recklessness would suffice; section 2114(a) requires intentional wrongdoing. View "United States v. Buck" on Justia Law

The Halls sued Millersville University under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, after their daughter, Karlie, was murdered in her dorm room by her boyfriend, Orrostieta. Orrostieta had previously been removed from campus at Karlie’s request and, on the night of the murder, a resident assistant heard Karlie scream but did not follow up. Despite finding genuine issues of material fact, the district court granted Millersville summary judgment, holding that Millersville lacked notice it could face liability under Title IX for the actions of a non-student guest.The Third Circuit reversed. Millersville had adequate notice it could be liable under Title IX for its deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment perpetrated by a non-student guest. Title IX’s plain terms notify federal funding recipients that they may face monetary liability for intentional violations of the statute; it is an intentional violation of Title IX’s terms for a funding recipient to act with deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment where the recipient exercises substantial control over the context in which the harassment occurs and the harasser, even if they are a third party. Millersville’s own Title IX policy thus contemplated Title IX liability could result from the actions of third parties such as “visitors” like Orrostieta. The court agreed that factual disputes preclude summary judgment. View "Hall v. Millersville University" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings in an action brought by plaintiff against Wal-Mart Stores under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Texas law. Plaintiff, a pharmacist and black man from Cameroon, West Africa, alleged that Wal-Mart intentionally subjected and/or allowed him to be subjected to discrimination based on race, color, and national origin, illegal harassment, and a hostile work environment. Plaintiff also alleged that Wal-Mart retaliated against him for complaining about discrimination and asserting his rights.The court concluded that the district court did not reversibly err in granting summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim where it is not evident that a triable dispute exists relative to whether Wal-Mart remained aware that plaintiff suffered continued harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury and in refusing to provide the specific Cat's Paw instructions that plaintiff requested. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on the retaliation claim under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981; the court rejected challenges to the jury verdict form; and the court rejected claims challenging the punitive damages award and claims of evidentiary errors. View "Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's petition for habeas relief, holding that the district court did not err in its treatment of Defendant's claim for habeas relief based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Defendant raised a Batson claim of race-based discrimination in jury selection. The state court denied Defendant's appeal. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for habeas relief based on Batson. The federal district court denied relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court case law in concluding that Defendant did not establish the prima facie case of purposeful race-based discrimination required by Batson. View "Yacouba-Issa v. Calis" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted Petitioner's petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the immigration judge's (IJ) credibility judgment was not supported by substantial evidence.The IJ rejected Petitioner's petition for relief based on an adverse credibility determination that primarily drew its support from a gang assessment database. The BIA affirmed. Petitioner then petitioned for review, arguing that the agency's reliance on the flawed gang package undermined the credibility finding and resulted in a due process violation. The First Circuit granted the petition after noting the flaws in the gang assessment database, including the database's reliance on an erratic point system built on unsubstantiated inferences, holding that neither the agency's adverse credibility determination nor its denial of Petitioner's claims was supported by substantial evidence. View "Ortiz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, filed suit against his healthcare provider and its medical staff for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law medical malpractice. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from allegations that defendants failed to diagnose him with a "likely" bacterial infection and to treat symptoms related to it. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants refused to provide him with functioning hearing aids, and refused to assess and provide reconstructive surgery for his broken ankles. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the health care provider and its medical staff.The Eighth Circuit concluded that plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims regarding non-diagnosis of the bacterial infection failed where defendants did not ignore his complaints, examined him regularly, gave him medications, and enrolled him in chronic care clinics. The court also concluded that a jury could credit plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims against defendants regarding his hearing aids, but his claims against CCS failed because he provides no evidence of any CCS policy, custom, or action by those representing official policy that inflicted a section 1983 injury. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim regarding his hearing aids. Because there is now a federal question, the court reinstated the medical malpractice claim on remand. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment, and concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claims fail because he does not establish retaliatory motive. The court denied plaintiff's pro se motion to reassign this case to another judge on remand. View "De Rossitte v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in sealing and ordering redaction of voluminous documents related to litigation challenging Louisiana's abortion laws without a proper legal basis, and therefore vacated the district court's sealing orders. The sealed or redacted documents include a transcript of proceedings held in open court, a famous Pennsylvania grand jury report that is available as a book on www.amazon.com and that was adapted as a motion picture, an arrest report from a police department's public website, articles from The New York Times and Rolling Stone, and an obituary from a public website. The court concluded that the district court misapprehended the nature and extent of the public's right to judicial records; on remand, the district court shall not seal or order redaction of any publicly available documents or information; the district court also used the wrong legal standard for sealing documents; and the district court erred by failing to evaluate all of the documents individually. The court issued a limited remand for the district court to evaluate the sealing orders under the proper legal standard within 30 days of the issuance of this opinion. View "June Medical Services, LLC v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The en banc court vacated the district court's preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of conducting such proceedings as it considers appropriate and making detailed findings and conclusions concerning abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and related caselaw, and on the effect of Senate Bill 6 on the issues in this case.The court agreed with its sister circuit that, on the appeal from a preliminary injunction, issues relating to whether there is a proper suit at all can be decided, such as the existence of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction and questions regarding abstention. The court concluded that it is possible on this record and briefing to make limited holdings now about whether any defendant was acting on behalf of Dallas County and about standing. In regard to abstention, the court concluded that briefing exists but is cursory. Therefore, the court ordered a limited remand for the district court to conduct such proceedings as it finds appropriate and decide whether abstention is required. Once that decision is made, the court will complete its review. View "Daves v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, holding that the errors committed during Defendant's trial did not affect the jury's verdict.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) there was no error in the admission of an autopsy photograph; (2) the prosecutor erred in closing argument by repeatedly use the phrase "we know" before discussing controverted facts, but the error was harmless; (3) presuming that the district court erred in not instructing the jury on the limited purpose for which the judge admitted some evidence, the error did not affect the verdict; (4) there was no error when the district court listed the jury's choice of finding Defendant guilty before listing the option of not guilty on the verdict form; and (5) the cumulative errors in this case did not affect the outcome. View "State v. Alfaro-Valleda" on Justia Law

Burgess left the apartment he shared with Howard, texting threats to kill her and burn down the apartment. That night, Burgess set a fire that destroyed the building and all of Howard’s and her children’s belongings. Burgess fled and eluded law enforcement for four months, during which Burgess walked into a Metro store, displayed a semi-automatic handgun, and told the clerk he was not “playing.” The clerk opened the register and Burgess stole $650. Metro had a security camera; a citizen identified Burgess and told Milwaukee Police. Burgess was arrested at his sister’s house; police recovered a handgun and the clothing Burgess wore during the Metro robbery.The government presented evidence Burgess had contacted Howard extensively while in custody, discouraging her from cooperating and encouraging her to change her story. A magistrate entered a no-contact order. Burgess nonetheless consistently and repeatedly contacted Howard. Burgess unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest, arguing MPD lacked probable cause to believe he was inside his sister’s house, then pled guilty The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 174-month sentence and the application a 2-level adjustment for obstruction of justice based on Burgess’s perjurious testimony at his suppression hearing and on his violations of a no-contact order. The factual findings upon which the district court relied established by a preponderance of the evidence that Burgess’s violations of the no-contact order amounted to obstruction. View "United States v. Burgess" on Justia Law