Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Acting Warden of the California Institute for Men petitioned a Superior Court for authorization to perform electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) on inmate Rudy Terraza. Convicted of first-degree murder at age 17, Terraza was a 44-year-old with a history of mental illness. According to a prison psychiatrist, Terraza has a “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type . . . characterized by auditory hallucinations, delusions, and impairment in thought processing, volition and motivation, and social functioning, as well as significant mood swings, depression, and mania.” Despite medication and psychiatric treatment, his mental health had grown worse over time, and he had resided in a psychiatric hospital since September 2019. He had been “consumed” by voices, with no desire to socialize or “practice self-care.” He occupied a single hospital room and was unable to function in standard prison housing. A psychiatrist averred that ECT was the “gold standard” treatment for patients like Terraza; seizures produced by the treatment would "help the brain return to normal functioning." The trial court authorized ECT after making several findings required by the Penal Code, including that ECT would be beneficial and that there was a compelling justification for it. In this habeas proceeding, the inmate argued the state constitutional right to privacy required the appointment of a surrogate to make a consent determination for him, beyond trial court findings of ECT’s suitability. Upon consideration of precedent, the Court of Appeal concluded the state constitutional right to refuse medical treatment did not require appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a court’s authorization of ECT therapy had to include a consideration of whether the inmate, when he or she was competent, expressed any preferences, views, or beliefs that would operate to preclude consent to the procedure. "By statute, such consideration is required for most medical procedures performed on incarcerated persons lacking capacity to consent." Because the statutory balancing test for ECT did not do so, the Court granted the writ to allow further consideration. View "In re Terraza" on Justia Law

Rasho, on behalf of a class of mentally ill inmates in Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) custody, sued IDOC officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for failing to provide constitutionally adequate mental health care. The parties reached a settlement requiring IDOC to meet certain benchmarks across several areas of treatment. A year later IDOC had failed to substantially comply with portions of the agreement. Under the agreement, the plaintiffs needed to prove that the breach itself caused an Eighth Amendment violation. The judge held that they made that showing in five areas of treatment, noting that IDOC’s deficiencies were primarily attributable to chronic, severe staff shortages. Because IDOC knew about its staffing problem for several years, the judge concluded that IDOC was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm. He entered a permanent injunction requiring IDOC to hire and maintain a specific number of staff members and other specific measures on a mandatory timetable.The Seventh Circuit reversed. IDOC officials took reasonable steps to cure the identified deficiencies, particularly understaffing, which is inconsistent with the finding of deliberate indifference. Even if those steps were not fully successful, the reasonable efforts indicated that IDOC did not recklessly disregard the risks. The court’s order also exceeds remedial limitations under the Prison Litigation Reform Act; prospective corrections remedies must be “narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and [be] the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,” 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A). View "Rasho v. Jeffreys" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in an excessive force action brought by plaintiff. During a routine traffic stop, plaintiff repeatedly challenged defendant's reasons for stopping him, refused to comply with his orders, batted his hand away, called him a liar, warned him to call in backup, and dared him to use his taser.The court concluded that defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment by tasing plaintiff one time in order to arrest him. Even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, the court concluded that it was not clearly established at the time that defendant's single use of the taser was constitutionally excessive. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Betts v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Two churches sued Illinois Governor Pritzker after he issued an executive order that limited to 10 the number of people who could attend a religious service during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court declined to enjoin enforcement. By the time the appeal reached the Seventh Circuit, Pritzker had rescinded the order. The court held that the case was not moot but that the order did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The churches nonetheless requested that the district court issue an injunction, citing recent Supreme Court decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the request. The court noted that the Governor will likely consider recent legal developments in crafting any new order in response to the recent surge. The court further noted that Pritzker is entitled to qualified immunity and that an award of damages is not available. View "Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a defamation case against defendant, alleging that defendant falsely told independent insurance agents that plaintiff is dishonest and unethical in her business practices and falsifies insurance documents. Defendant and Auchel World filed an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure 426.16, which the trial court granted.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect defendant's statements because they squarely fall within the commercial speech exemption set forth in section 425.17, subdivision (c). Courts are admonished to examine section 425.17 as a threshold issue before proceeding to an analysis under section 425.16. Section 425.17 expressly provides that speech or conduct satisfying its criteria is entirely exempt from anti-SLAPP protection even if "the conduct or statement concerns an important public issue." In this case, the trial court also erred in finding that plaintiff's claims arose from protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). The court explained that defendant's alleged slander of a competitor in a private setting to solicit business is neither speech in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition nor the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue. View "Xu v. Huang" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of warrantless search of his apartment, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.In this case, three probation officers and a deputy federal marshal made a warrantless entry into Defendant's apartment without his consent to investigate his reported methamphetamine use and possible drug overdose in violation of the law and Defendant's probation. The district court concluded that the warrantless entry into Defendant's apartment was a constitutional search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that the warrantless entry and probation search of Defendant's apartment was lawful on reasonable suspicion under the probation search exception to the warrant requirement of Mont. Const. art. II, 10-11; and (2) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress based on the manner in which the officers entered the apartment or treated Defendant thereafter. View "State v. Peoples" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' action for declaratory relief against the Governor of Rhode Island and various Rhode Island officials and agencies (collectively, Rhode Island), holding that the district court did not err.On behalf of a putative class of Rhode Island students attending K-12 schools, Appellants brought this action under the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Republican Guarantee Clause of U.S. Const. art. IV, 4, claiming that Rhode Island failed to provide them with an adequate education to function productively in civic activities. The district court dismissed the action. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that an adequate civics education is not a fundamental constitutional right and that Rhode Island's approach to civics education satisfies rational basis review. View "A.C. v. McKee" on Justia Law

In Ohio, to place an advertising billboard on a highway, you must apply for a permit from the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT). Under the “compliance rule,” ODOT will not process a permit application if the applicant has outstanding fees, changes his billboard without prior approval from ODOT, or maintains an illegal advertising billboard. ODOT put Kenjoh’s billboard permits on hold under the compliance rule, alleging that Kenjoh was maintaining an illegal billboard.Kenjoh sued, asserting that the compliance rule was an unconstitutional prior restraint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed his claims for damages and injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit vacated. While the case was pending on appeal, the Ohio legislature amended a key definition in the statute, which changes how the regulation applies. Before the amendment, a person needed a permit from ODOT to erect a billboard that was “designed, intended, or used to advertise.” Now, a person needs a permit if he will be paid for placing a message on the billboard, regardless of the message. The court affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to an ODOT supervisor on a claim for damages despite the amendment, based on the law as it existed at the time of the official action. View "Kenjoh Outdoor, LLC v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

In 1995, Buck robbed approached a mail carrier, ordered her at gunpoint to put mail in a bag, and fled. Days later, Buck, with accomplices, shot a mail carrier in the head. Buck was convicted on two counts of assaulting a mail carrier with intent to steal mail, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a); attempted murder of a mail carrier, section 1114; and using a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence,” section 924(c)(1). He was sentenced to concurrent 210-month terms on the assault and attempted murder convictions, a consecutive 60-month term for the first 924(c) conviction, and a consecutive 240-month term for the second 924(c) conviction. Section 924(c)(1) then imposed a five-year consecutive term of imprisonment for the first offense, and a 20-year term for the second. In 2016, Buck argued, under 28 U.S.C. 2255, that his 2114(a) convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence under section 924(c)(3) and that his sentence for Count 4 should be limited to 60 months, rather than 240 months. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court reasoned Buck was convicted of assault with intent to steal mail with the aggravating element of placing the mail carrier’s life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, which satisfies 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. Neither the jury instructions nor section 2114(a) contain any suggestion that mere recklessness would suffice; section 2114(a) requires intentional wrongdoing. View "United States v. Buck" on Justia Law

The Halls sued Millersville University under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, after their daughter, Karlie, was murdered in her dorm room by her boyfriend, Orrostieta. Orrostieta had previously been removed from campus at Karlie’s request and, on the night of the murder, a resident assistant heard Karlie scream but did not follow up. Despite finding genuine issues of material fact, the district court granted Millersville summary judgment, holding that Millersville lacked notice it could face liability under Title IX for the actions of a non-student guest.The Third Circuit reversed. Millersville had adequate notice it could be liable under Title IX for its deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment perpetrated by a non-student guest. Title IX’s plain terms notify federal funding recipients that they may face monetary liability for intentional violations of the statute; it is an intentional violation of Title IX’s terms for a funding recipient to act with deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment where the recipient exercises substantial control over the context in which the harassment occurs and the harasser, even if they are a third party. Millersville’s own Title IX policy thus contemplated Title IX liability could result from the actions of third parties such as “visitors” like Orrostieta. The court agreed that factual disputes preclude summary judgment. View "Hall v. Millersville University" on Justia Law