Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of disturbing the peace and of assault or menacing threats, both in violation of city ordinances in Lincoln, Nebraska, holding that there was no error in Defendant's convictions or sentences.Defendant's conviction arose from his acts of shouting in a loud, menacing, and persistent manner from his apartment's balcony at persons across the street. Defendant appealed his convictions and their resulting ten-day jail sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if Defendant's speech was constitutionally protected, the State may regulate it through reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech; and (2) Defendant's conviction for assault or menacing threats was supported by sufficient evidence. View "State v. Grant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine and affirmed her conviction of interference with official acts, holding that the warrantless entry into Defendant's apartment to arrest her was unlawful.After Defendant was charged, she filed a motion to suppress, alleging that law enforcement officers made an illegal entry into her home and then used the information obtained from the legal entry to secure a search warrant. The motion to suppress was denied, and the trial court found Defendant guilty of the interference charge and possession of cocaine charge. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) evidence related to Defendant's conviction of possession of cocaine obtained from the unlawful warrantless entry into her apartment must be suppressed; and (2) Defendant's conviction of interference with official acts was sufficiently attenuated from the officers' unlawful entry to permit admission of Defendant's own illegal conduct under the "new crime exception" to the exclusionary rule. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a jailer at the Shelby County Jail sexually assaulted him and other detainees, and that the sheriff violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural and substantive due process. On appeal, the sheriff challenges the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss.The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the alleged connection between the jailer's prior termination from the Shelby County Jail for abusing detainees and the alleged abuse of plaintiff and other detainees in the Shelby County Jail is sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference in rehiring. However, plaintiff failed to allege any facts regarding the lack of a training program, nor are there allegations that the alleged abusive conduct occurred with such frequency that the sheriff was put on notice that training or supervision was needed. Whether the sheriff is liable for punitive damages is not part of the qualified immunity analysis, and this court does not have jurisdiction to consider this question in this interlocutory appeal. Finally, the court granted the sheriff's motion to strike. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Parker v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

In 1982, Sanders was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Sanders’s attorney, Hoover, had never represented a capital defendant before and conducted a minimal penalty phase investigation. Sanders told Hoover that he viewed a life without parole (LWOP) sentence as unacceptable and that he did not want Hoover to present a penalty defense. Hoover presented no evidence and made no argument during the penalty phase.The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief and remanded for a penalty phase trial. Hoover performed deficiently by failing to perform even a rudimentary investigation into Sanders’s social history, failing to obtain reasonably available records, and failing to ensure that Sanders’s decision to forego a penalty phase defense was informed and knowing. Hoover failed to adequately advise Sanders about the penalty phase. There is a reasonable likelihood that Sanders would have changed his mind had Hoover informed and advised him about the penalty phase, and that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one juror would have changed her mind and voted to impose an LWOP sentence. View "Sanders v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the bail schedule set by the San Francisco Superior Court, an arm of the state, violated their equal protection and due process rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983 because it failed to take into account pre-arraignment detainees’ inability to pay pre-set mandatory bail amounts. Following years of litigation, the district court enjoined the Sheriff, who had Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages, from enforcing the bail schedule and any other state determination that made the existence or duration of pre-trial detention dependent on the detainee’s ability to pay. The court then awarded a reduced lodestar amount of attorney’s fees ($1,950,000.00) to the class and held California responsible for payment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the award, rejecting arguments that the state was not liable for fees because it was dismissed from the case on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity and did not otherwise participate in the litigation. Despite Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Sheriff could be sued in her capacity as a state official for injunctive relief, and the state could be assessed a reasonable attorney’s fee under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The state had the necessary notice and an opportunity to respond to claims that the official-capacity suit against the Sheriff could properly be treated as a suit against California. View "Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

After attempting without success to raise her concerns about unsafe medical practices with her employer (ENTA), Armstrong filed a complaint with the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NOSHA). Armstrong alleges that ENTA retaliated against her, leading her to file a second complaint. When Armstrong withdrew her complaint before ENTA learned of it, fearing further retaliation, NOSHA notified ENTA about the complaint. More retaliation followed. When she filed a third whistleblowing complaint, NOSHA ended the investigation. ENTA fired Armstrong.The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Armstrong’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 procedural due process claim. Although Armstrong was an at-will employee, Nevada's whistleblower protections can support a property interest in continued employment. Armstrong might be able to plausibly allege a relationship between Nevada officials and her termination sufficient to sustain a “direct participation” or “setting in motion” theory. Armstrong had a property right in the investigation of her complaint; she plausibly alleged that the process she received was essentially nonexistent. Armstrong did not sufficiently allege a substantive due process claim based on a liberty interest. Armstrong did not plausibly allege that the defendants’ actions entirely precluded Armstrong’s ability to work as a human resources professional elsewhere. The court erred in dismissing a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. View "Armstrong v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that counsel's overt interjection of racial stereotypes into Appellant's criminal trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. In his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for introducing racial issues into the trial. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) counsel's statements impermissibly tainted the jury pool by introducing racial invective into the proceedings; and (2) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defense. View "Dean v. Narvaiza" on Justia Law

Porter was convicted of capital murder in Virginia state court for killing a police officer in 2005. He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully pursuing direct and collateral review of his conviction and sentence in state court, Porter filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition in 2012, asserting claims of actual juror bias and that juror Treakle failed to disclose in response to voir dire questioning that his brother, Pernell was a law enforcement officer. The district court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing or any further discovery. The Fourth Circuit remanded. The district court again dismissed without an evidentiary hearing or any discovery. The Fourth Circuit again remanded. Discovery following remand revealed that Juror Treakle also withheld information in response to other voir dire questions about being the victim of a violent crime and about whether relatives had ever been arrested or prosecuted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, deferring to the district court’s finding that the juror was credible when he testified that he did not intentionally withhold information in response to those questions. Porter did not establish that Juror Treakle would have been dismissed for cause if he had not withheld any information in response to the voir dire questions. View "Porter v. White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming Defendant's conviction, holding that the warrantless canine sniff conducted by law enforcement officers of the exterior door to a motel room for the purpose of detecting the presence of illegal drugs inside the room violated the warrant requirement of Conn. Const. Art. I, 7.After Defendant was charged with several drug-related offenses he filed a motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized from his motel room pursuant to a search warrant. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, Defendant entered a conditional plea of solo contenders. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court erred in concluding (1) the canine sniff was not a search that violated Defendant's rights under article 1, section 7; and (2) the visual sweep of Defendant's motel room was justified by the exigencies of the situation. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Correa" on Justia Law

A 12-year-old girl called 911 to report that her mother's boyfriend, Cortesluna, was threatening her and her family with a chainsaw and that they were hiding from him in a bedroom that he was trying to enter. Cortesluna subsequently brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claims concerning his arrest.In 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of officer Leon. Even taking Cortesluna's version of the facts as true, a reasonable jury would find that Leon's acts were objectively reasonable in the circumstances. Leon faced an immediate threat; Cortesluna had a knife in his pocket and had lowered his hands towards the knife when the first shot came from the beanbag shotgun; his hands remained near the knife in his pocket at the time of the second beanbag shot. The court found that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the force that officer Rivas-Villegas used when he kneeled on Cortesluna's back was excessive. Officer Kensic lacked any realistic opportunity to intercede or to stop the excessive force.On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal claims against Rivas-Villegas and remanded for consideration of the other elements of a Monell claim. With respect to state-law claims relating to Rivas-Villegas’s conduct, and other remaining claims, including against other defendants, the 2020 opinion remains intact. View "Cortesluna v. Leon" on Justia Law