Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A felony defendant normally must be present in the courtroom at sentencing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a)(3). The 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 134 Stat. 281, permits district courts to conduct felony plea and sentencing proceedings by videoconference if the defendant consents and the judge finds “for specific reasons” that the sentencing “cannot be further delayed without serious harm to the interests of justice,” In March 2020, just before the CARES Act was adopted, Coffin pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. Sentencing was postponed several times.Coffin eventually consented to a sentencing hearing by videoconference under the Act. The district judge confirmed Coffin’s consent on the record and found that further delay would seriously harm the interests of justice, noting several reasons why that was so. The judge asked if there were any objections to his findings. Coffin’s attorney said, “No, thank you.” The judge imposed 60-month concurrent sentences. The Seventh Circuit rejected Coffin’s challenges to the judge’s CARES Act findings as “far too late.” He expressly consented to the videoconference sentencing and confirmed that he had no objection to the judge’s findings under the Act. “That’s a waiver.” View "United States v. Coffin" on Justia Law

Nadendla, a physician, is of Indian origin. Nadendla was a member of WakeMed’s hospital's medical staff where she was granted clinical privileges in 2010, In 2017, citing “clinical concerns,” WakeMed informed Nadendla that she would not be reappointed clinical privileges; her appointment on the medical staff would expire. Nadendla requested a hearing, pursuant to the Bylaws. She alleges that WakeMed’s actions during the hearing process “exhibited an abject lack of fairness” and deprived her of adequate process in contravention of the Bylaws.Nadendla sued the hospital under 42 U.S.C. 1981, which guarantees to all persons in the United States “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.’” The district court initially ruled that Nadendla sufficiently stated a section 1981 claim and state-law claims for breach of contract and for arbitrary and capricious conduct, but subsequently dismissed Nadendla’s section 1981 claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part. The district court had the discretion to revisit its prior order and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The complaint contained extensive, specific allegations regarding WakeMed’s failure to abide by the Bylaws but details regarding race are conspicuously absent. The court reversed the dismissal of Nadendla’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Nadendla v. WakeMed" on Justia Law

Pennywell delivered his petition for direct review of his state conviction—which resulted in multiple life sentences—to prison guards for mailing. Through some unknown fault in the mailing process, the Louisiana Supreme Court never received the petition. Once Pennywell discovered the petition had never arrived at the Louisiana Supreme Court, he promptly refiled it. As a result of the untimeliness caused by the mailing failure of his first petition, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court dismissed his renewed petition for direct review as untimely. That decision was the basis for all subsequent denials of state and federal post-conviction relief.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Pennywell’s petition, holding that Pennywell was entitled to equitable tolling. The failure to timely deliver the petition to the Louisiana Supreme Court was through no fault of Pennywell; by the failure of the mail system, Pennywell was “prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Given the undisputed facts, Pennywell demonstrated due diligence and an extraordinary circumstance that justify equitable tolling. View "Pennywell v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Detectives Roseman and Hunt stopped Goodwill for a window tint violation. After asking Goodwill to sit in the squad car, Roseman began the paperwork while both detectives asked Goodwill questions. A canine unit arrived minutes later, before Roseman finished the warning form. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. A search revealed two kilograms of cocaine. Goodwill, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officers unlawfully prolonged the search by asking unrelated questions and conducted the dog sniff without his consent.The district court found that the questioning did not extend the stop and denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Roseman needed to check the driver’s license and vehicle information—which involved typing in the motorist’s name and date of birth or driver’s license number plus the vehicle’s registration information—then complete, by hand, the warning—which included the date, time, vehicle information, driver’s information, and the location. Roseman’s testimony at the suppression hearing and the traffic-stop video indicated that he worked expeditiously. Roseman worked on the ticket continuously without any breaks. An officer does not need a driver’s consent to conduct a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop, if it does not prolong the stop. View "United States v. Goodwill" on Justia Law

Martin’s state conviction became “final” in April 2002, triggering the one-year limitations period on state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The clock ran for 193 days, until October 21, 2002, when Martin filed a petition for state post-conviction relief (PCR). The clock was paused until June 14, 2004, the last day on which Martin could have appealed (but did not) the trial court’s denial of his petition—and expired 172 days later, on December 3, 2004. In June 2015, Martin filed a petition seeking federal habeas relief. The state appellate court had accepted Martin’s April 2012 motion for leave to appeal “as within time” the denial of his 2002 PCR petition; he argued that the ruling retroactively tolled the limitations period. Martin essentially argued that a “properly filed” PCR petition is “pending” under section 2244(d)(2) for the period between the expiration of time under state law in which a prisoner could have timely appealed the denial of a PCR petition, and the prisoner’s submission of a motion for leave to file a PCR appeal “as within time.”.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition as untimely. Section 4 2244(d)(2)’s tolling mechanism looks forward, not backward, and a state court’s acceptance of an appeal “as within time” does not rewind the one-year clock. View "Martin v. Administrator New Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's death sentence imposed in connection with his conviction for capital murder, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on the penalty phase issues before the Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Carr, 477 U.S. 108 (2016).In its previous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his death sentence, concluding that the trial court violated Defendant's Eighth Amendment right to an individualized sentencing determination by refusing to sever the trial's penalty phase from that of his codefendant brother. On remand, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's death sentence, holding (1) the record supported the findings that one or more aggravating circumstances existed and that any mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances; and (2) Defendant received a fair trial. View "State v. Carr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence of death imposed in connection with his conviction for capital murder, holding that the sentence was not "imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor." See Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6619(c)(1).Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the death sentencing, holding that the failure to sever the penalty phase violated Defendant's right to an individualized sentencing determination under the Eighth Amendment. However, in Kansas v. Carr, 477 U.S. 108 (2016), the United States Supreme Court held that the trial court's failure to Defendant's penalty phase did not implicate either the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause. On remand, the Supreme Court addressed penalty phase issues that remained unresolved. The Court then affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding that Defendant received a fair trial and that any mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. View "State v. Carr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a detective with the Nassau County Police Department for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and New York state law. Plaintiff also filed suit against Nassau County under the theory of respondeat superior. The district court vacated the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff and dismissed the claims against both defendants.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the detective where the detective's actions, though wrong, were not so wrong that no reasonable officer could have determined that the challenged action was lawful. Therefore, the detective is entitled to qualified immunity in regard to the section 1983 claim. In regard to the New York state law claim, the court concluded that the record could only support a finding of callousness or indifference in making the arrest, and such a finding does not preclude the legal conclusion that the detective acted in subjective good faith.However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the County because the County remains vicariously liable under New York law for the compensatory damages because (1) municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity, (2) municipal employers may be vicariously liable on state law claims brought against their police officer employees, (3) a principal remains liable for damages caused by its agent, even when that agent is individually immune, and (4) the detective was acting within the scope of his employment when he arrested plaintiff. The court explained that, even if the detective is shielded from personally paying for the damages he caused by falsely arresting plaintiff, the County remains liable for those damages under New York state law. The court remanded for entry of judgment in plaintiff's favor against the County in the amount of $150,000 and for such other proceedings as may be appropriate. View "Triolo v. Nassau County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of harassment in the first degree, holding that the district court did not err on remand in denying Defendant's motion challenging the representativeness of the jury pool under the fair-cross-section requirements under the Sixth Amendment.On appeal from his conviction, Defendant, an African-American, argued that his constitutional right to an impartial jury had been violated because his jury panel contained only one Africa-American out of forty-nine potential jurors that appeared at the courthouse for trial. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to give Defendant an opportunity to develop his impartial jury arguments, but the district court rejected Defendant's more developed claims on remand. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in holding on remand that Defendant failed to prove a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. View "State v. Plain" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit treated the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing; granted the petition for panel rehearing; and withdrew its prior opinion in this case.Plaintiffs, two Planned Parenthood entities and three Jane Does, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Louisiana Department of Health is unlawfully declining to act on Planned Parenthood's application for a license to provide abortion services in Louisiana. The district court denied the Department's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); the Department filed an interlocutory appeal; and plaintiffs moved to dismiss.The court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal because the Department asserted sovereign immunity in the district court. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. The court further concluded that at least one of the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief is a valid invocation of federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young. In this case, because plaintiffs' requested injunction to "promptly rule" on the license application satisfies the requirements of Ex parte Young, the court concluded that plaintiffs have survived the Department's Rule 12(b)(1) motion and the case may proceed. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Phillips" on Justia Law