Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for his second-degree intentional homicide conviction, holding that Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court relied on an improper sentencing factor in mentioning Defendant's lawful gun ownership and conceal-carry (CCW) permit.Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional homicide. After a sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced Defendant to fourteen years of initial confinement followed by six years of extended supervision. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the court's statements at sentencing demonstrated that Defendant was not being punished for exercising his Second Amendment rights but, rather, for his belief that he could unlawfully and lethally shoot an unarmed individual. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the record did not indicate that Defendant received a longer sentence because he purchased a gun or applied for a CCW permit or that those activities formed the basis for Defendant's sentence. View "State v. Dodson" on Justia Law

Nine parents of students with disabilities who attend South Carolina public schools and two disability advocacy organizations filed suit challenging a South Carolina provision in the South Carolina state budget that prohibits school districts from using appropriated funds to impose mask mandates. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the parents and the disability advocacy organizations lack standing to sue the governor and the attorney general, and thus vacated the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction as to those defendants. In this case, although plaintiffs have alleged a nexus between their claimed injuries and the Proviso, they have not established that such injuries are fairly traceable to defendants' conduct or would be redressed by a favorable ruling against defendants. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss defendants from this case. View "Disability Rights South Carolina v. McMaster" on Justia Law

King ran a heroin distribution ring focusing on San Francisco housing projects in 1976-1980. King was convicted of first-degree murder and firearms crimes in California state court in 1981 and was sentenced to serve 27 years to life in prison. Later that year, King was convicted of federal drug trafficking crimes and was sentenced to 45 years of incarceration in 1982. King began serving his federal sentence in 2019 after completing his separate California sentence.Shortly thereafter, King directly filed a motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), arguing that compassionate release was appropriate because he is 77 years old, highly vulnerable to COVID-19 while incarcerated, and has a wife who is struggling with cancer. The district court denied this motion as procedurally improper because it had been filed by King. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Inmates who committed crimes before November 1, 1987, cannot move for compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1) but are instead subject to the Sentencing Reform Act and can gain compassionate release only if the Bureau of Prisons requests it on the prisoner’s behalf under 18 U.S.C. 4205(g). View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the Arc of Iowa and Iowa parents whose children have serious disabilities that place them at heightened risk of severe injury or death from COVID-19, filed suit to enjoin enforcement of Iowa's law prohibiting mask requirements in schools. The district court concluded that the law violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, granting a preliminary injunction completely enjoining the law.After determining that it has jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction because mask requirements are reasonable accommodations required by federal disability law to protect the rights of plaintiffs' children. However, the court concluded that the injunction imposed by the district court sweeps more broadly than necessary to remedy plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded to allow the district court to enter a tailored injunction prohibiting defendants from preventing or delaying reasonable accommodations and ensures that plaintiffs' schools may provide such reasonable accommodations. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Maldonado and Hill filed suit in Florida state court, asserting violations of their federal and state constitutional rights to the free exercise of their religion. After plaintiffs were granted in forma pauperis status by the state court, the case was removed to federal court where plaintiffs did not seek in forma pauperis status. The district court dismissed Maldonado's claims under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)—the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)—and dismissed Hill's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.In regard to Maldonado, the Eleventh Circuit held that a case commenced in state court by a prisoner and removed by a defendant to federal court—with the defendant paying the filing fee after removal—is not subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). In regard to Hill, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Maldonado v. Baker County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Gooch alleged that correctional officers Young and Wilson falsely informed another inmate that Gooch had stolen from him and directed the inmate to “take action”; the inmate then attacked Gooch with a weapon. When Gooch defended himself, Wilson intervened and instructed Gooch to lie on the floor, where the inmate attacked him again. Gooch asked his correctional counselor for the form on which to file a grievance against the officers. Gooch asserts that his counselor refused to give him the form, stating “you better watch out snitching on staff.” Over the next two days, “multiple guards” walked by his cell, calling him a “rat” and making threats.Three days later, Gooch filed a “Bivens action,” which was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. Exhaustion is not required when the responsible prison officials refuse to give a prisoner the necessary grievance form or thwart a prisoner from filing a grievance through threats or intimidation. Gooch attested that he feared for his life if he continued with the administrative-remedy process. The government did not contest his assertion and failed to meet its burden of showing that remedies were “available” to Gooch. View "Gooch v. Young" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for qualified immunity in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that police officers used excessive force when they removed plaintiff from a city council meeting where she and others were protesting. When the protest prevented the meeting from continuing, the officers warned the protesters that they had to leave the meeting room or would be arrested. After the protestors refused and passively resisted, the officers handcuffed them and carried or pulled them by their arms from the meeting room.The panel concluded that the officers did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the type and amount of force used by the officers was minimal. In this case, the officers did not strike plaintiff, throw her to the ground, or use any compliance techniques or weapons for the purpose of inflicting pain on her. Rather, they held her by her arms and lifted her so they could pull her out of the meeting room after she went limp and refused to leave on her own or cooperate in being removed. Furthermore, the inherent risk of two officers pulling someone who has gone limp and refuses to move by her own power is not significant. The panel also concluded that although the City's interest in forcibly removing plaintiff was low, it was not nonexistent, and the balance of interests favors defendants. Consequently, plaintiff's Bane Act claims also failed. View "Williamson v. City of National City" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the confiscation of his mail violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The panel concluded that genuine issues of material fact exist both as to whether the Arizona Department of Corrections applied its order inconsistently as to the CDs, in violation of plaintiff's free speech rights, and whether the exclusion of his Nation of Islam texts substantially burdened his religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Slade" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions for conspiring to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base, holding that neither Defendant was entitled to relief on his claims of error.Defendants Juan Pena and Rosnil Ortiz were convicted for conspiring to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base. On appeal, Defendants argued that the district court erred in allowing the jury to consider certain video recordings and the "out-of-court" statements captured therein. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not commit reversible error in admitting certain portions of two videos and the audio statements therein; (2) did not deny Defendants' constitutional rights to confront witnesses and to present a complete defense by excluding certain statements, as Defendants intended to use them; and (3) did not deprive Defendants of their right to an impartial tribunal by instructing the jury mid-cross-examination that it was proper for law enforcement agents to use confidential informants and to take drug weight into account when directing controlled drug purchases. View "United States v. Pena" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court summarily denying as time-barred Defendant's second petition for postconviction relief, holding that even if the facts alleged in the petition were proven at an evidentiary hearing, Defendant still would not be entitled to relief.Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. The Supreme Court affirmed both Defendant's conviction on direct appeal and the denial of his first postconviction motion. In his second postconviction petition, Defendant argued the the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that he had discovered new evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's claims either failed on the merits or were time barred. View "Martin v. State" on Justia Law