Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

June’s son, Brenden, suffers from severe bipolar disorder and is prone to violent outbursts. He has repeatedly been jailed and institutionalized. In 2017, he was involuntarily admitted to Greystone, a New Jersey state-run psychiatric hospital, where Brenden’s condition worsened. He stalked the halls, made an aggressive sexual comment to a staffer, and attacked other patients, sending one to the intensive care unit. Greystone staff encouraged June’s visits as part of Brenden’s treatment. Before one visit, June asked if it was safe to visit Brenden. Though Brenden had severely beaten another patient days earlier, his psychiatrist, Dr. Young, assured her that it was safe. Greystone employees were supposed to supervise all patient meetings but no one was assigned to monitor June’s visit. Initially, Brenden’s head nurse, Oglesby accompanied June, During June’s visit, Oglesby left the room. Brenden then attacked June, who suffered brain trauma, broken ribs, and PTSD.The district court dismissed June’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Sovereign immunity barred the claims against Greystone and state officials in their official capacity. The Third Circuit reversed as to Oglesby, who abandoned June mid-visit. June’s injury was fairly direct as well as foreseeable. Oglesby’s affirmative act endangered June; her departure deprived June of the freedom to avoid an unsupervised visit or to take other precautions. Dr. Young took no affirmative acts. View "Mears v. Connolly" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court that re-sentenced Defendant, for purposes of appeal, to an indeterminate term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years in connection for his conviction of one count of sexual abuse by a parent or person in a position of trust to a child, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to suppress his recorded confession and allowing Defendant's interview at the police department to be played for the jury; (2) the circuit court did not err by failing to give two jury instructions proffered by Defendant; and (3) Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not properly before this Court on direct appeal. View "State v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Two months after he turned 18, Doe was caught having sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend. Doe could have been charged with “carnal knowledge of a child,” a Class 4 felony but instead pleaded to “taking indecent liberties with children,” which only prohibits behavior like propositioning a child for sex, which resulted in a shorter prison sentence. Both crimes generally put an offender on the highest tier of the sex-offender registry for life, but for carnal knowledge convictions, an offender less than five years older than his victim may be removed from the registry in time. Doe, in his 30s, sought removal from the registry, raising an equal protection claim and an Eighth Amendment claim, arguing that a lifelong registration is not an appropriate sanction for a single nonviolent crime committed by a high-school student.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Virginia’s sex-offender registry complies with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even if Doe is similarly situated to an offender convicted of carnal knowledge, the differential treatment between the offenders satisfies rational-basis scrutiny. The government has a legitimate interest in not imposing its harshest collateral consequences on children. The registry is a regulatory scheme, not a punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. View "Doe v. Settle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence but vacated the portion of the court's postconviction order prematurely addressing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were either insufficiently raised or affirmatively refuted by the record.In pro se motions, Defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and asked for appointment of counsel. After appointing counsel for Defendant the court granted as relief a new direct appeal. Defendant's notice of appeal, motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and poverty affidavit were filed within thirty days after the final order granting the new direct appeal. The property affidavit, however, had been executed by Defendant more than forty-five days before the filing of the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated the postconviction order addressing Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims unrelated to the request for relief of a new direct appeal, holding that, with one exception, Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the new direct appeal were either insufficiently raised or affirmatively refuted by the record. View "State v. Blake" on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged that during the September 17, 2017 protests of the acquittal of a St. Louis police officer on murder charges, police officers violated his civil rights when they boxed or "kettled" him in with other protestors and then pepper-sprayed him, arrested him, and restrained him with zip ties. In the plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to indicate his seizure was unreasonable. With respect to the excessive force claims, based on the record and plaintiff's allegations, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that the force used against the plaintiff was objectively reasonable. The plaintiff's claim of excessive force against the supervising police officers was sufficient at this stage of the case to defeat the officers' claims of qualified immunity. "There are simply too many unknowns and factual disputes" to determine as a matter of law that the subordinate police officers reasonably relied on their superiors' orders to arrest the crowd at the downtown intersection. View "Baude v. Leyshock" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, holding that Appellant's claims lacked merit.Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment without parole. In his postconviction petition, Appellant argued, among other things, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

Reeves is scheduled to be executed in January 2022. Alabama Act 2018-353 gave “death row inmates a single opportunity to elect that their execution be carried out by" nitrogen hypoxia, instead of Alabama’s default method, lethal injection. Reeves had until June 30, 2018, to elect nitrogen hypoxia in writing. An election form was distributed to every death row inmate. Reeves made no election. In 2020, Reeves filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging that “with IQ scores in the upper 60s and low 70s, his general cognitive limitations and severely limited reading abilities rendered him unable to read and understand the election form without assistance” and that prison officials failed to provide a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Reeves’s execution other than by nitrogen hypoxia while his ADA claim remains pending. Reeves has standing, having demonstrated an injury in fact by alleging that lethal injection is significantly more painful than nitrogen hypoxia. Reeves showed that he was substantially likely to succeed on the merits by proving that he is a qualified individual with a disability; he lacked meaningful access to the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities by reason of his disability; and the public entity failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. Reeves could only comprehend at a first-grade level. The election form required an eleventh-grade reading level to be understood. View "Reeves v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In an action brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the district court entered an injunction, requiring Nevada prison officials to allow the plaintiff to possess no more than a half-ounce of scented oil in his cell for personal use with his prayers.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Noting RLUIPA's expansive protections for religious liberty, the court concluded that Nevada’s regulation banning personal possession of scented oil substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious exercise and that Nevada failed to show that the regulation was the least restrictive means of serving compelling interests in general prison security and minimizing contraband. The plain language of RLUIPA prohibits courts from evaluating the centrality of a religious practice or belief, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-5(7)(A); a court can only scrutinize the sincerity of the prisoner’s beliefs. The court, therefore, rejected assertions that scented oil was not “really that important” to the plaintiff’s worship practice or that plaintiff needed to point to textual support or oral history proving that the Prophet Mohammad used scented oil in prayer. The court noted that the regulation prohibited the plaintiff from using scented oil for prayer—the way the plaintiff believes the Prophet Muhammed prayed—for 34 out of his 35 prayers per week. View "Johnson v. Baker" on Justia Law

Metropolitan State University of Denver (MSU) student Rowan Thompson had a classroom dispute with her chemistry professor that ultimately prompted Thompson to drop the professor’s class. But when Thompson emailed her former classmates to express her displeasure with the professor and to suggest that her classmates leave “honest” end-of-term evaluations. Thomas Ragland, MSU’s Associate Director for Student Conduct, allegedly prohibited Thompson from further contacting the professor or even discussing the professor with any students taking any of the professor’s classes. Thompson sued Ragland under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that he violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Ragland had not violated clearly established law and therefore was entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. "Because one can infer from the allegations in the complaint that there was no proper justification for Ragland’s actions, the complaint states a violation of clearly established law governing the regulation of student speech." View "Thompson v. Ragland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for felony murder, second-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and possession of a deadly weapon but remanded the cause for correction of an illegal sentence, holding that the sentence for first-degree felony murder was improper.After convicting Defendant, the district court sentenced Defendant to life in prison for felony murder and ten to fifteen years for aggravated burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but remanded for correction of a sentencing error, holding (1) defense counsel's failure to secure a second psychological evaluation and failure to timely recognize that Defendant had not performed testing did not prejudice Defendant's defense; and (2) the imposition of multiple punishments for felony murder and the underlying felony violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Wyoming constitutions. View "Steplock v. State" on Justia Law