Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for two counts of armed assault with intent to murder and other crimes, holding that denying superior court defendants the statutory right to a defendant-capped plea does not violate equal protection principles under either the Federal or State Constitutions.Defendant was charged, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced in the superior court. Defendant sought to withdraw his plea on the basis of a facial challenge to the procedural scheme laid out in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 18 and rule 12(c)(4)(A), arguing that denying superior court defendants the statutory right to a defendant-capped plea violates constitutional equal protection principles. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the procedural scheme of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 18 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 survives rational basis scrutiny. View "Commonwealth v. Roman" on Justia Law

DiDonato fell and seriously injured her head in the bathroom of Panatera’s home Panatera, a Chicago paramedic, found DiDonato disoriented and badly bleeding but allegedly only rinsed the blood from DiDonato’s head, wrapped it in a towel, moved her to his bed, and sexually assaulted her. When DiDonato regained consciousness the next afternoon, Panatera drove her home. DiDonato went to an emergency room. She had sustained head trauma and a concussion.DiDonato filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Panatera violated her due process rights by failing to provide medical care, with state law claims for assault, battery, and negligence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of DiDonato’s section 1983 claim. DiDonato had to allege that a state actor failed to adhere to a duty to protect and care for a person with whom the state had a “special relationship.” States and municipalities are not in a “special relationship” with all residents and do not shoulder a constitutional duty to provide medical care to anyone needing help. There was no allegation that DiDonato was ever in the city’s care or custody. DiDonato also failed to plausibly allege that Panatera acted “under color of state law.” Section 1983 does not cover disputes between private citizens; an individual’s employment by the state does not render any and all action by that person state action. DiDonato’s need for help and medical care arose during entirely private interaction. View "Didonato v. Panatera" on Justia Law

Williams and Burton each filed civil rights complaints in the Western District of Pennsylvania against employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Burton alleged that the defendants retaliated against him after he filed a grievance, concerning his use of the law library. Williams alleged that prison staff refused to accommodate his special dietary needs. Both plaintiffs consented to have their cases heard by magistrate judges, who dismissed the cases before the defendants consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.The Third Circuit vacated. A magistrate judge can acquire jurisdiction to decide a case only by the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. 631(c)(1); “consent of the parties” does not mean consent just of the prisoner-plaintiff. The jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived by the parties. If the requirements of Section 636(c)(1) are not satisfied, the “magistrate judge [is deprived] of jurisdiction over the case” and the appellate court is statutorily deprived of appellate jurisdiction over the magistrate judge’s orders. Consent could not be implied in this case and retroactive, post-judgment consent cannot satisfy the statutory requirement. View "Burton v. Schamp" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of intentional or knowing murder, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with the Interstate Compact on Detainers and violated his constitutional rights by holding bench conferences in the hallway and by denying his motion to represent himself. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the Compact; (2) Defendant failed to show obvious error on his argument that holding bench conferences in the hallway violated his public trial rights; and (3) the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's mid-trial request to represent himself. View "State v. Reeves" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court summarily denying Appellant's sixth successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily denying Appellant's postconviction motion.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual battery, and burglary. The trial judge sentenced Appellant to death. In his sixth successive postconviction motion Appellant asserted two claims, including a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court rejected both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily denying Appellant's sixth postconviction motion. View "Booker v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven inmates in Connecticut state prison facilities, filed suit against DOC alleging that the 2012 revised Administrative Directive, which limits access by inmates to pictorial sexually explicit materials, violates their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also allege that the prison regulation's exception for material that qualifies as "literary, artistic, educational or scientific in nature" is unconstitutionally vague.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in favor of the DOC, discerning no clear error as to the district court's factual findings in light of the trial record. The court also concluded that the district court, based upon its factual findings, properly held that A.D. 10.7 is reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives—namely, promoting a non-hostile work environment for DOC staff, enhancing the safety and security of DOC facilities, and facilitating the rehabilitation of sex offender inmates—and does not violate the First Amendment. Furthermore, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the regulation, including the exception, is neither unconstitutionally vague on its face, nor unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs. View "Reynolds v. Quiros" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for rape, holding that Defendant did not suffer any violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecution violated his right to confrontation by failing to produce as a witness a police officer who translated for a police detective at the crime scene. At trial, the Commonwealth offered the testimony of a different police officer who, separately, translated the exchange between Defendant and the detective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no constitutional requirement for the officer at issue to be confronted at trial. View "Cortez-Rivas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Wisconsin inmate Zimmerman filed a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Though “far from clear and very abbreviated,” the complaint seemed to contend that Corrections Officer Bornick had it out for him because of grievances Zimmerman had filed concerning Bornick. Zimmerman also seemed to allege that he had received an undeserved warning from Bornick, who also confiscated about $100 worth of Zimmerman’s property and issued a conduct report that led to 16 days of disciplinary confinement.The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) and determined that Zimmerman failed to state a claim; the complaint did not establish a causal relationship between Bornick’s actions and any protected speech. Deciding that any amendment to the complaint would be futile because Zimmerman’s allegations were thorough, the district court dismissed it with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court was wrong not to dismiss the complaint but absent a clear indication of futility or some extraordinary circumstance, litigants, including prisoners, should have the opportunity to try again by filing an amended complaint. The district court may have held Zimmerman to a pleading standard beyond that required by the Federal Rules and, regardless, should have given him a second try. View "Zimmerman v. Bornick" on Justia Law

Sanders, a severely mentally ill inmate, has been in the custody of the Illinois Department of Correction since 2004. For eight years, he was in solitary confinement, where his mental health deteriorated. Sanders has attempted suicide and engaged in self-harm multiple times. He claims that self-mutilation was a pre-condition for solitary confinement inmates to speak with a mental health person. Sanders filed suit and applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows indigent prisoners to bring suits without prepaying the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner who has three strikes—actions or appeals dismissed for being “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim”—can only proceed without prepayment if he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Sanders cited the “imminent danger exception.”The district court initially granted his IFP application but later revoked its grant, finding that none of Sanders’s allegations demonstrated that he was in imminent danger. The Seventh Circuit reinstated his IFP status. Sanders adequately alleged his belief that certain practices at the Pontiac Correctional Center would lead him to self-harm. The district court erroneously determined that the allegations were fraudulent and did so without explicitly considering whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate. View "Sanders v. Melvin" on Justia Law

West Virginia State Troopers Elliott and Cornelius received three 911 calls about Crumbley. Two different callers stated that Crumbley was armed and dangerous and keeping his family hostage. Another caller stated Crumbley made threats about shooting the police. The troopers, heading to Crumbley’s property, discussed Crumbley’s rumored drug connections. Crumbley came out of the house screaming and threatened a shootout. He had nothing in his hands but threatened to get a weapon. Crumbley went between the yard where the troopers were and the house, threatening to get a weapon and shoot the troopers. Crumbley pulled down his pants to expose his genitals while spinning in a circle. Crumbley then got a shovel, threatened the troopers with it, then ran, throwing the shovel. Cornelius fell in the snow. When Elliott turned a corner, he saw Crumbley turned away from him. Crumbley then abruptly turned toward Elliott and began to raise his hands, causing Elliot to believe that he might have a gun. Elliott fatally shot him. Crumbley did not have a gun.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Elliott. Crumbley was shot in the back, raising a genuine dispute about Elliot’s version of events. The facts might show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. View "Stanton v. Elliott" on Justia Law