Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Wood wore a shirt bearing the words “Fuck the Police” to the county fair. According to Wood, police officers ordered him to leave and escorted him from the fairgrounds because of his shirt. While leaving, Wood made several coarse insults directed to the police and the fairground’s administrator. The officers then arrested Wood for disorderly conduct. After the charges were dismissed, Wood filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the officers, alleging false arrest and retaliation. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity on the false arrest claim and insufficient evidence of retaliation.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Wood’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. With respect to the retaliation claim, the court held that a reasonable jury could conclude the officers were motivated to surround Wood and require him to leave in part because of his shirt. While Wood’s speech was profane, the circumstances did not create a situation where violence was likely to result. Neither proximity nor Wood’s demeanor and volume provided probable cause for arrest. Because there was no probable cause to arrest Wood for disorderly conduct, and because Wood’s right to be free from arrest was clearly established, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Wood v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Defendant, a police sergeant who was at the wrong house because of imprecise dispatch directions, shot and killed William David Powell, who was innocent of any crime and standing in his driveway. Powell was holding a pistol because he and his wife thought they had heard a prowler. Powell's wife filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendant in his individual capacity, alleging that he violated her husband's constitutional right to be free from excessive force.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that plaintiff has not identified case law with materially similar facts or with a broad statement of principle giving defendant fair notice that he had to warn Powell at the earliest possible moment and before using deadly force. Therefore, she has not met her burden of showing qualified immunity is not appropriate. The court stated that plaintiff has not shown that defendant's actions were unreasonable for qualified immunity purposes. View "Powell v. Snook" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's application to reopen his appeal, holding that Appellant's application showed that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was deprived of the effective assistance of appellate counsel.Appellant pleaded guilty to several sex-related offenses. On appeal, the court of appeals reasoned that, due to an incomplete record, it was compelled to presume regularity in the lower-court proceedings and affirmed the trial court's judgment. Represented by new appellate counsel, Appellant timely filed an application to reopen his direct appeal, asserting that his original appellate counsel's performance was deficient. The court of appeals denied the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant's application to reopen his appeal showed a genuine issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel warranting a reopening of the appeal. View "State v. Leyh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court judge denying Defendant's motion to suppress a video recording Defendant published to his social media account that showed an individual seen from the chest down holding what appeared to be a firearm, holding that no search in the constitutional sense occurred.After accepting a friend request from an undercover police officer, Defendant published the video at issue to his social media account. The officer made a recording of the posting, and that recording was used in the criminal proceedings against Defendant. The trial judge concluded that no search had occurred and denied Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in his social media stories. View "Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant based on qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff alleged that defendant violated her right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there was no longer probable cause to support her detention when the perpetrator said, "[T]hat's not her." The court concluded that plaintiff cannot prove that defendant violated her constitutional rights for three reasons: first, plaintiff's continued detention was supported by probable cause; second, defendant was entitled to rely on a facially valid and lawfully obtained warrant; and third, defendant did not take an affirmative action to continue the prosecution. View "Washington v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without leave to amend of a complaint brought by plaintiffs, a group of elected local government officials, asserting a pre-enforcement challenge to California Government Code section 3550, which states in part that a public employer shall not deter or discourage public employees from becoming or remaining members of an employee organization.The panel concluded that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact sufficient to establish their standing to pursue their preenforcement challenge. The panel explained that section 3550 does not regulate plaintiffs' individual speech, and any restrictions the statute does impose on plaintiffs' ability to speak on behalf of their employers do not injure plaintiffs' constitutionally protected individual interests. In this case, plaintiffs have not shown that they have a well-founded fear that PERB will impute these statements to plaintiffs' public employers, particularly in light of concessions made by PERB in this litigation.However, dismissals for lack of Article III jurisdiction must be entered without prejudice because a court that lacks jurisdiction is powerless to reach the merits. In this case, the district court erred by dismissing the case with prejudice. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court to enter judgment dismissing the case without prejudice. View "Barke v. Banks" on Justia Law

A teacher smelled marijuana burning in the classroom and alerted Principal Stamps and Assistant Principal Byars, who searched the belongings of every student in the class. They found marijuana stems and seeds, rolling paper, lighters, and assorted pills in T.R.’s backpack. T.R. denied smoking marijuana in the classroom that day. T.R. contends that during a first search, in a room with only Stamps and Counselor Dean, she removed her clothing, lifted her breasts, and bent over for an inspection while a window in the office, leading to a public hallway, remained uncovered. School officials did not find any drugs on T.R.’s person. T.R. alleges that school officials later again directed her to remove her clothing and she submitted. T.R. stated that she was on her menstrual cycle, which made her feel “humiliated.” T.R.’s teacher found the remains of the marijuana cigarette under T.R.’s desk the next day.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court found that the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity and the Defendants’ conduct was not extreme and outrageous. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. To grant qualified immunity on these facts "would severely diminish the protections afforded students from strip searches" set out in Supreme Court precedent. Considering the degree of intrusiveness of the search and that school officials searched her twice, T.R.’s claim for outrage creates a sufficient question for the jury. View "T.R. v. Lamar County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Washington then age 15, claimed that on January 30, 1989, he encountered Chinn, whom he had met a year earlier and only knew by the nickname, “Tony.” According to Washington, Tony had a gun. He and Tony robbed two men, fatally shooting one. A few days later, police arrested Washington, who confessed and named “Tony” as the killer but could not provide Tony’s last name. Washington helped police prepare a composite sketch, which a newspaper printed. Police arrested Chinn and conducted a lineup for Washington and four other witnesses. Three were able to identify Chinn. Chinn’s classmate and instructor testified that Chinn was present for a midterm examination on the night of the murder, and his classmate testified that Chinn rode home on a bus with her. Chinn’s mother testified that he was at home by 9:30 p.m. and stayed home the entire evening. Some witnesses also considered the shooter to be taller than Chinn.Convicted, Chinn was sentenced to death. The district court denied Chinn’s 2002 petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the prosecution suppressed evidence, in violation of “Brady,” that Washington suffered mental disabilities; the court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial testimony concerning Chinn’s alleged visit to a law office before his arrest; and Chinn was denied his right to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer on remand and was sentenced to death without a valid jury recommendation. View "Chinn v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

At a gas station, police detained the vehicle that Patterson was driving because it fit the description of a car whose occupants had reportedly menaced a woman with a firearm in a nearby supermarket parking lot. They discovered a gun. Patterson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The district court granted Patterson’s motion to suppress the firearm, stating that the degree of force used in detaining Patterson’s vehicle and its occupants—pointing firearms at, shouting orders toward, and blocking an exit route for the vehicle—exceeded that permissible for a reasonable investigatory stop and had to be viewed as a de facto arrest; the arrest was unlawful because, when first effected, it was not supported by probable cause; and the firearm seized from the car’s glove compartment after Patterson fled the scene had to be suppressed as a fruit of the unlawful arrest.The Second Circuit reversed. Patterson’s initial detention in the vehicle was not an arrest but an investigatory stop supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion. Pointing firearms at, shouting toward, and blocking an exit route for the vehicle driven by Patterson, were reasonable safety precautions given that the officers were investigating a report of menacing with a firearm. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting a robbery, holding that the district court did not err in holding that Defendant failed to prove that his constitutional right to an impartial jury had been violated.On appeal, Defendant, an African-American, argued that his right to an impartial jury under both the United States and Iowa Constitutions was violated because his jury, and even the jury panel, did not contain any African-Americans. The Supreme Court remanded the case to allow Defendant to develop his impartial-jury claims, but the district court ultimately rejected Defendant's arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in holding on remand that Defendant failed to prove that his right to an impartial jury had been violated in the proceedings below. View "State v. Lilly" on Justia Law