Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the panel of the court of appeals that applied the 2018 amendments to Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567, the driving under the influence (DUI) statute, to Defendant, who committed a DUI before, but was sentenced after, the amendments came into effect, holding that the court of appeals erred.The Supreme Court clarified the general rule established in State v. Reese, 333 P.3d 149 (Kan. 2014), that courts should apply the DUI sentencing provisions in effect at the time of sentencing but holding that a sentencing court should apply the version of section 8-1567 in effect at the time of sentencing unless the Legislature amended the statutory provisions after the offense was committed and that amendment increases the defendant's penalty. The Court remanded the matter to the district court for resentencing under the sentencing provisions in effect when Defendant committed the DUI, holding that applying the 2018 amendments to Defendant at sentencing would increase his punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "State v. Patton" on Justia Law

The FCC promulgated a regulation which originally authorized the installation on private property, with the owner's consent, of "over-the-air reception devices," regardless of State and local restrictions, "including zoning, land-use, or building regulation[s], or any private covenant, homeowners' association rule or similar restriction on property." The FCC later expanded coverage to include antennas that act as "hub sites" or relay service to other locations. Petitioners, expressing concern about possible health effects from increased radiofrequency exposure, argued that the proliferation of commercial-grade antennas would increase the suffering of those with radiofrequency sensitivity—violating their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and the U.S. Constitution's protections of private property and personal autonomy. Petitioners also contend that the amendments would deny affected individuals fair notice and an opportunity to be heard.The DC Circuit first concluded that two of the petitioners' interests are impacted directly by the FCC's order and that CHD has associational standing. The court also concluded that the Commission's citation of and reliance on the Commission's Continental Airlines decision provided sufficient explanation for its authority to expand the regulation to hub-and-relay antennas carrying broadband Internet. The court rejected petitioners' contentions to the contrary that the order is unsupported by Section 303 of the Communications Act. Finally, the court rejected petitioners' contention that the order lacks a reasoned foundation because the Commission disregarded the human health consequences of its action. Rather, the court concluded that the Commission sufficiently explained that its order does not change the applicability of the Commission's radio frequency exposure requirements and that such concerns were more appropriately directed at its radiofrequency rulemaking. Furthermore, the Commission may also preempt restrictions on the placement of the new category of antennas now included in the regulation. Therefore, the court denied the petition challenging the FCC's order. View "Children's Health Defense v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part the order of the district court overruling Defendant's motion for absolute discharge, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Defendant was not entitled to absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds.Defendant was charged with one count of first degree sexual assault. Defendant later filed a motion for absolute discharge, arguing that the State violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial and that the district court erred by finding that continuances of trial in response to the COVID-19 pandemic were for good cause. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant was not entitled to absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds; and (2) this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to review Defendant's claim that he was entitled to absolute discharge on constitutional speedy trial grounds. View "State v. Abernathy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Defendant was sentenced on the murder conviction to a term of life in State prison, to be served after his sentence for assault and battery. On appeal, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error in the trial proceedings and that there was no reason for this Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. View "Commonwealth v. Denson" on Justia Law

In 2012, Brown pled guilty in the Eastern District of Missouri to unlawfully possessing a firearm and admitted to eight prior state law felony convictions, leading to an enhanced, 262-month sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). After unsuccessfully seeking habeas relief in the Eighth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Brown used 28 U.S.C. 2241 to file a habeas petition in the Seventh Circuit, where he was then confined, contending that Supreme Court precedent leaves him without the three predicate offenses necessary to sustain his ACCA-enhanced sentence. Brown cited a Seventh Circuit holding (Davenport) that a federal prisoner may seek section 2241 relief in the circuit of confinement where section 2255’s limits on second or successive motions would deny that prisoner even one opportunity to seek habeas relief based on a newly-issued statutory interpretation decision.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Circuit of conviction law (here, the Eighth Circuit) generally applies to Davenport-based habeas petitions. Eighth Circuit precedent clearly leaves Brown with the three predicate offenses necessary to sustain his ACCA-enhanced sentence. The Eighth Circuit has held that a weapons-exhibiting offense remains a violent felony under section 924(e)’s elements clause, which Supreme Court precedent left untouched. View "Brown v. Krueger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision granting Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the magistrate court did not err in determining that the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment did not apply.After Sioux Falls dispatch received a call from a six-year-old boy saying that "daddy was being mean to mom" and that his dad was leaving to go to his car an officer followed the dad (Defendant) in his automobile. The officer initiated a traffic stop and, after further investigation, placed Defendant under arrest for driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer stopped his car without probable cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion. The magistrate court granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer's actions were beyond the scope of a community caretaker, and therefore, Defendant's motion to suppress was properly granted. View "State v. Grassrope" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's two first-degree murder convictions and two corresponding sentences of death, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.After a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder with a firearm. The jury rendered unanimous verdicts recommending a penalty of death on both murder counts, determining that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances. In this direct appeal, Defendant raised fifteen claims, including several challenges to the trial court's evidentiary rulings and to Florida's death penalty scheme. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and his sentences of death, holding that Defendant failed to establish prejudicial error in any respect. View "Joseph v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the supplemental order of the circuit court denying Ark. R. Crim. P. 37 relief, holding that the circuit court did not err.Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Defendant later sought postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not denied the right to a fair and impartial jury; (2) the circuit court did not clearly err in denying Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel arguments; (3) Defendant's challenges to the third death-penalty verdict form did not constitute grounds for relief under Rule 37; (4) Defendant's challenges to the verdict forms did not constitute grounds for relief; and (5) Defendant's remaining allegations of error were without merit. View "Gay v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying relief.In denying and dismissing Appellant's petition, the circuit court found that the criminal information in this case was not deficient and that Appellant's counsel provided effective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, contrary to Appellant's contention on appeal, the criminal information complied with Ark. Const. art. VII, 49. View "Halliburton v. State" on Justia Law

Mills and his ex-wife struggled with drug addictions and neglected their four children. The children’s maternal grandparents obtained custody of the children. Around 10:00 p.m. on June 29, 2016, Mills showed up unannounced at their home, picked up his two-year-old daughter and carried her outside, then drove away with the child. The grandparents called the police. Mills ran out of gas, abandoned his vehicle, and walked up the road carrying his daughter. Officers arrived and ordered Mills to stop, but he ignored their commands. Mills fell and released the girl. Officers engaged in a five-minute struggle with Mills, using a taser, striking Mills with a flashlight, kneeing Mills in the face and head, and repeatedly hitting Mills with a baton. An officer eventually shot Mills twice, killing him. According to the officers and bystanders Mills had threatened to harm the officers, fought them with “super-human” strength, and charged at them. One bystander later claimed that the officers brutally beat Mills although Mills did not resist and that they could have easily handcuffed him.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the officers. The testimonial dispute instead raises a classic jury question. Even accepting the testimony, however, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their initial use of force to recover the child, and the local government is entitled to summary judgment on the federal claim. View "Gambrel v. Knox County" on Justia Law