Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Tiwari and Sapkota sought to establish a home healthcare company that would focus on serving Nepali-speaking individuals in the Louisville area. Kentucky restricts the number of such companies that may serve each county. When the Commonwealth denied their certificate-of-need application, Tiwari and Sapkota filed suit, claiming that the regulation violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to earn a living, serving only the illegitimate end of protecting incumbent home healthcare companies from competition, and lacking a rational basis.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, upholding the requirement. Economic regulations, even those affecting an individual’s liberty to work in a given area, are subject to “rational basis” review. While expressing skepticism about certificate-of-need laws, the court concluded that a legislator could plausibly believe that the regulation has a rational connection to increasing cost efficiency, improving quality of care, and improving the healthcare infrastructure in place. View "Tiwari v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

In 1989, Stevens randomly shot at people on or near Interstate 580 in Oakland, leaving four people dead and six people injured. Stevens was sentenced to death.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The court rejected Stevens’ “Batson” claim concerning the prosecutor’s decision to use seven peremptory challenges to strike black prospective jurors. The California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications for striking prospective jurors were supported by the record. As required by Batson, the court considered the claims on a strike-by-strike basis, in light of “all of the relevant facts and circumstances.” The Ninth Circuit noted that in reviewing a state court’s decision and the trial court’s findings of fact, its role is limited to guarding against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Finding no such malfunction the court declined to substitute its judgments for the factual credibility determinations made almost three decades ago by the state trial court. View "Stevens v. Davis" on Justia Law

Four months after passing the bar exam, Shane was appointed as counsel for Rogers in a 1981 capital case involving a triple murder. She was the only attorney in a Nevada State Public Defender's satellite office. Shane recognized that a “not guilty by reason of insanity” (NGRI) argument was her client’s only meaningfully supported defense. Another inexperienced public defender became co-counsel shortly before trial. Counsel failed to prepare their mental health experts for trial and to rebut foreseeable evidence. They did not even consult the expert appointed to address Rogers’s legal sanity at the time of the offense. Rogers was sentenced to death.The Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment conditionally granting Rogers’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The ineffective assistance claim was never adjudicated on the merits by the Supreme Court of Nevada. Rogers satisfied the “Strickland” test. Even applying the presumption of reasonableness, counsel’s investigation, preparation, and execution of the insanity defense fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel’s most significant error was failing to consult the expert appointed to assess Rogers’s competency for trial and sanity at the time of the offenses; this error was compounded by the inadequate preparation of counsel’s mental health experts. Counsel's failures to rebut the prosecution’s expert and to explain the NGRI defense to the jury in opening statements fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. There was a reasonable likelihood that Rogers’s NGRI defense would have succeeded if counsel had performed effectively. View "Rogers v. Dzurenda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained after surveillance was conducted at Defendant's apartment building via a hidden video camera placed on a nearby public utility pole, holding that although the pole camera surveillance constituted a warrantless search under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, it was nevertheless constitutional.Defendant was indicted on child pornography charges. After the surveillance at issue in this case took place but before the superior court decided Defendant's motion to suppress, Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 Mass. 360 (2020) was decided. In Mora, the Supreme Judicial Court decided that pole camera surveillance could, under certain circumstances, constitute a search requiring a warrant. After the motion to suppress in this case was decided, Defendant brought an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) the pole camera surveillance constituted a search; but (2) probable cause existed to conduct the pole camera surveillance prior to the time the search began. View "Commonwealth v. Comenzo" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendants in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for conspiracy to commit retaliatory employment termination. The court concluded that plaintiff plausibly averred that defendants deprived him of his First Amendment rights, and that defendants had fair warning that using their respective government positions to violate plaintiff's First Amendment rights would be objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time. The court also concluded that plaintiff has also stated a claim for conspiracy under section 1983. View "Bevill v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of USS on plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim, concluding that USS carried its burden to show that plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at its Midwest Plant. In this case, USS's judgment was premised on the consideration of adequate evidence, as contemplated by the ADA and supporting regulations. Furthermore, USS's imposition of restrictions was based on information pertinent to plaintiff's personal experience with his seizure disorder. Therefore, the assessment USS conducted was sufficiently individualized. The court agreed with the district court that whether plaintiff's seizure disorder was controlled is a material fact about which there is no genuine dispute.Applying the direct threat analysis and weighing factors such as duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of harm that will occur, and imminence of harm, the court concluded that all the factors weigh in favor of finding that there is a direct threat. Therefore, USS has shown through undisputed evidence that, if hired for the Utility Person position, plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at the Midwest Plant. View "Pontinen v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Barbee sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018. Barbee suffers from Type II diabetes, hypertension, and obesity, and is serving his sentence at a facility that experienced a large outbreak of COVID-19 infections around the time that Barbee filed his motions. He argued that his medical conditions placed him at significant risk of contracting COVID-19 and contended that he had used his time in prison productively, completing a drug abuse program, passing two parts of the GED test, and taking classes. He had one disciplinary incident two years earlier.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Barbee had the burden of establishing extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting release and the request must be consistent with the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing considerations. The court noted Barbee’s extensive criminal history, the seriousness of his most recent offense, the relatively small portion of his sentence that he had served, and that Barbee had received two doses of the Moderna vaccine. Although Barbee argued that he remains at risk as the COVID-19 situation continues to evolve, he did not present any evidence establishing that he is more at risk for an adverse outcome in prison than he would be if released. View "United States v. Barbee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's conviction for taking indecent liberties with a child, holding that the case must be remanded for a new trial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State's expert to testify that the minor child in this case was sexually abused in the absence of physical evidence confirming her opinion, that the State's expert identifying Defendant as the perpetrator of the charged offense constituted plain error, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) permitting testimony that the minor child was sexually assaulted in the absence of definitive physical evidence constituted plain error; (2) the trial court committed plain error in permitting testimony as to the medical recommendations identifying Defendant as the perpetrator; and (3) the court of appeals did not err in dismissing Defendant's IAC claim without prejudice. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, holding that the prosecutor's exclusion of an African-American potential juror constituted a substantive violation of Defendant's constitutional right to equal protection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).After the court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, Defendant filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court, asserting that the case presented a substantial constitutional question under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and N.C. Const. art. I, 19. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration of Defendant's Batson challenge in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016). On remand, the Supreme Court again ordered that Defendant's Batson objections be overruled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State committed a substantive violation of Defendant's constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. View "State v. Clegg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals finding no prejudicial error in the criminal proceedings resulting in Defendant's conviction for second-degree forcible rape and first-degree kidnapping, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below. On appeal, Defendant alleged several trial court errors, including the two errors at issue on appeal. The court of appeals affirmed, thus rejecting each of Defendant's arguments. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the court of appeals, holding that, assuming without deciding that the trial court's admission of certain testimony violated Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause and that other testimony violated N.C. R. Evid. 404(b), the assumed errors were not prejudicial. View "State v. Pabon" on Justia Law