Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Tyler owned a Minneapolis condominium. She stopped paying her property taxes and accumulated a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000. The county retained the net proceeds from the sale. Tyler sued the county, alleging that its retention of the surplus equity—the value of the condominium in excess of her $15,000 tax debt—constituted an unconstitutional taking, an unconstitutionally excessive fine, a violation of substantive due process, and unjust enrichment under state law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. Minnesota’s statutory tax-forfeiture plan allocates the entire surplus to various entities with no distribution of net proceeds to the former landowner; the statute abrogates any common-law rule that gave a former landowner a property right to surplus equity. Nothing in the Constitution prevents the government from retaining the surplus where the record shows adequate steps were taken to notify the owners of the charges due and the foreclosure proceedings. View "Tyler v. Minnesota" on Justia Law

Russell was a passenger in a car that the East Cleveland Police stopped and searched. They found two handguns, which resulted in a felon-in-possession charge for Russell. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Russell entered a conditional guilty plea.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction. To assert a Fourth Amendment claim, Russell must have “standing” to challenge the search; normally a car passenger without a possessory interest in the car lacks such standing. The government failed to object to Russell’s lack of standing before the district court and raised the argument for the first time on appeal. Fourth Amendment standing, unlike Article III standing, is not jurisdictional and can be forfeited or waived. The government’s failure to raise the argument below was a forfeiture, not a waiver because the government took no steps to “expressly abandon” its objection. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the government can raise a forfeited argument for the first time on appeal and prevail if it satisfies the plain-error inquiry under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The government satisfied that test. Even if the government did not object, Russell had at least some burden to establish standing. Allowing Russell to benefit from the exclusionary remedy would lead to a rightfully diminished view of the judicial proceeding. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

One of the mandatory conditions of Dennis’s probation for stealing social security funds was that she not commit any new state crimes. A police officer later investigated Dennis for theft of services after he suspected that she took food from a restaurant without paying. During a heated exchange with the officer, Dennis repeatedly disobeyed his commands. Based on this encounter, a probation officer provided written notice that Dennis had committed theft, battery, and felony obstruction.After a hearing, the district court found that Dennis committed misdemeanor obstruction and sentenced her to a term of supervised release. Dennis objected to that sentence on the ground that she had not been given written notice that her probation could be revoked for committing misdemeanor obstruction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Because misdemeanor obstruction is a lesser included offense of felony obstruction, the inclusion of felony obstruction in the petition “thereby g[ave] notice to the defendant that [s]he may be [found guilty] on either charge.” The notice given to Dennis satisfied the requirements of “due process of law.” View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Officer Martin responded to a call about neighbors throwing trash in the caller’s yard. A subsequent 911 call came from the man’s neighbor, Craig, complaining that the man had grabbed her son by the neck because the boy had allegedly littered. Martin activated his body camera at the scene. Martin got into a verbal altercation with Craig; Craig’s 14-year-old, 15-year-old, and adult daughters became involved. Martin used physical force to get them into his squad car.Craig and her children sued Martin for unlawful arrest and excessive force. Craig also sued Martin on behalf of her another minor child, alleging injuries suffered as a bystander. The district court dismissed A.C.’s claim as incognizable; it dismissed the remaining claims for unlawful arrest, holding Martin was entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied Martin qualified immunity on the excessive force claims, concluding that the video evidence submitted by Martin was “too uncertain.” The Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claims, expressing no opinion on the dismissal of the other claims. Martin’s actions were sufficiently measured in relation to the plaintiffs’ resistance. Martin’s conduct was not objectively unreasonable and did not violate any of their Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs failed to provide any controlling precedent showing that Martin’s particular conduct violated a clearly established right. View "Craig v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court entering a declaratory judgment that Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.646 violated public officials' right to free speech and was void for vagueness, holding that the circuit court erred.Section 115.646 prohibits officials from directly using public funds to advocate, support, or oppose a ballot measure or candidate for public office. Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit seeking a judgment declaring section 115.646 unconstitutional. The circuit court sustained Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring that section 115.646 violated the officials' First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) because section 115.646 regulates the use of public funds, not the officials' speech, it does not implicate the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) the circuit court erred in declaring certain words and phrases in the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. View "City of Maryland Heights v. State" on Justia Law

In 2019, Lopez was charged with seven felonies, including forcible rape against Amalia, the mother of his minor children. At his September 2020 trial, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Los Angeles Superior Courts were operating under the safety protocols in General Order No. 021, which mandated that all persons entering any courthouse wear a face mask covering the nose and mouth at all times. After a jury trial in which all persons in the courtroom were masked, including witnesses, Lopez was convicted on six charges. The court imposed a 16-year prison sentence and a 10-year protective order prohibiting Lopez from contact with Amalia and both children.The court of appeal rejected Lopez’s argument the court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by denying his pretrial motion to remain unmasked during the trial and to have all witnesses testify without a face mask. Supreme Court precedent establishes the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” The masking procedure fairly balanced Lopez's speedy trial rights with the need to reduce the substantial risk of infection to everyone in the courtroom. The court remanded in part; the minor children were not properly included in the postconviction protective order imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2(i). View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court allowing certain districting maps to stand, holding that the enacted maps violated several rights guaranteed to the people by the North Carolina Constitution.The General Assembly enacted districting maps for the United States Congress, the North Carolina House of Representatives, and the North Carolina Senate that "subordinated traditional neutral redistricting criteria in favor of significant partisan advantage by diluting the power of certain people's votes." The trial court denied Plaintiffs' claims, concluding as a matter of law that claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering present purely political questions that are nonjusticiable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable under the North Carolina Constitution; and (2) the maps failed strict scrutiny and must be rejected. View "Harper v. Hall" on Justia Law

In 1991, McFarland and an accomplice robbed Kwan’s store. McFarland’s accomplice pressed a gun against a security guard’s head. The guard dropped his weapon. McFarland or the accomplice then fatally shot Kwan. Only McFarland was prosecuted. He is on death row. After exhausting his state remedies, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first rejected a claim of ineffective assistance. During trial, McFarland’s retained counsel, Benn was sleeping throughout significant portions of the trial and otherwise presented as unprepared. The trial judge decided to appoint additional counsel. McFarland refused to agree, but the judge appointed Melamed to serve as “second chair.” Melamed was an experienced criminal defense lawyer but he had yet to try a capital case. McFarland repeatedly affirmed that he wanted to keep Benn as counsel and would not cooperate with Melamed in securing mitigation witnesses. The court also rejected Sixth Amendment and Brady claims. McFarland did not have counsel during an identification lineup; a finding that his arrest warrant was not a formal criminal complaint giving rise to his right to counsel was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, nor was a finding that “the prosecution did not fail to disclose.” View "McFarland v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

In 2003, Gamboa was convicted of seven counts of drug and firearm crimes. The court found that Gamboa had two or more prior convictions for felony drug offenses and was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). After an unsuccessful direct appeal and multiple 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions and 28 U.S.C. 2241 petitions, Gamboa sought habeas corpus relief under section 2241, arguing that, under the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision, his prior state drug convictions did not constitute felony drug offenses for the purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A)'s sentencing enhancement, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802(44). Mathis narrowed the range of state statutes that qualify as violent-felony predicates under the Armed Career Criminal Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Gamboa cannot seek relief under the saving clause gateway to section 2241 because, whether under the categorical approach or a comparison of the straightforward federal definition to the state statute of conviction, the law was not squarely against Gamboa and it would not have been futile for him to raise his arguments in his initial 2255 motion. Precedent did not prevent Gamboa from making an argument that an alternatively phrased statute could be indivisible under the categorical approach at the time of his initial 2255 motion. View "Gamboa v. Daniels" on Justia Law

After seeing Alvarez in their yard on their home security camera, the homeowners called 911. Deputies apprehended Alvarez just as he was at a side door to the house. Taking Alvarez to their patrol car, deputies noticed a large plastic trash bag and asked Alvarez whether the bag was his. Alvarez replied, “Yeah.” Deputies did not provide Alvarez with Miranda warnings before this exchange. Alvarez was convicted of first-degree residential burglary (Pen. Code 459).The court of appeal affirmed. By not properly objecting at trial, Alvarez forfeited a “Miranda” argument that the trial court erred in admitting his statement about the bag. The court also rejected Alvarez’s argument that the court’s order during the COVID-19 pandemic that all persons in the courtroom, including testifying witnesses, wear a mask covering the mouth and part of the nose interfered with the jury’s ability to assess witness demeanor and thus violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The masking order satisfied an important public policy and retained essential safeguards of reliability. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law