Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's plea-based conviction for a drug offense, a class "C" felony, holding that Defendant's challenges to the validity of his plea were unavailing.At issue was this Court's supervisory orders promulgated in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic temporarily allowing written pleas. On appeal, Defendant argued that the rules of criminal procedure, precedent, and due process required an in-person plea colloquy in open court and that the supervisory orders violated due process and separation of powers principles. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant met the good cause requirement by presenting questions of first impression as the the validity of this Court's supervisory orders and Defendant's written guilty plea to a felony; but (2) this Court's supervisory orders are lawful exercises of this Court's constitutional and inherent authority during the pandemic. View "State v. Basquin" on Justia Law

In 2016, the out-of-state petition circulators challenged Section 2869 of the Pennsylvania Election Code, which requires that any circulator of nomination petitions be “a qualified elector of the Commonwealth, who is duly registered and enrolled as a member of the party designated in said petition.” The district court found that the ban was not facially unconstitutional, but was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs for the 2020 election only. The plaintiffs did not appeal the conclusion that the ban was not facially unconstitutional. The court declined to expand the injunctive relief to cover future elections for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals. The Third Circuit held that permanent injunctive relief for all future elections is appropriate for the plaintiff circulators only, not to all similarly situated individuals, and only if the plaintiffs continue to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction. The request for permanent relief for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals goes beyond the specific plaintiffs and circumstances of this litigation and seeks facial relief. A factual record specific to each similarly situated individual circulator will be necessary to determine the appropriate relief in future elections. Each individual circulator will need to demonstrate their willingness to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction for the purpose of nomination circulation. View "Benezet Consulting LLC v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court denying the State's motion to dismiss and granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiff, holding that the preliminary injunction was granted erroneously.Plaintiff, a hearing-instrument dispenser whose license was not renewed, brought this action against the Arkansas Department of Health, the Secretary of Health, and Arkansas Board of Hearing Instrument Dispensers, and the Executive Director of the Board of Hearing Instrument Dispensers (collectively, the State), arguing that the Board's refusal to provide him a proper renewal notice and a hearing violated his due process and equal protection rights and was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of the Board's power. The circuit court granted Plaintiff's request for a temporary injunction and declaratory relief. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff adequately pleaded a due process claim; (2) Plaintiff's equal protection claim was barred by sovereign immunity; and (3) because the preliminary injunction order contained no findings on irreparable harm or likelihood of success on the merits, the case must be remanded for findings in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). View "Arkansas Department of Health v. Solomon" on Justia Law

Reck, an Illinois Menard Correctional Center inmate, filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a prison physician (Dr. Trost), the Health Care Unit Administrator (Walls), a prison nurse (Smith), and Wexford Health Sources, which provides medical services to inmates under a contract. Reck developed a “painful perianal abscess with recurrent bloody discharge” because of his Crohn’s disease, which previously had been in remission. His condition caused him considerable pain and he alleges he submitted multiple sick call requests, most of which got no response. The defendants deny having received most of those requests. He suffered several burst abscesses.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found no indication that Dr. Trost ignored the gravity of Reck’s condition or “slow-walked” his treatment plan; neither Walls nor Smith was deliberately indifferent. Dr. Trost might have been negligent but a mere failure to attend to one’s responsibilities, without more, does not reach the level of deliberate indifference the Constitution prohibits. There is no evidence that Wexford, or any of its employees, had responsibility for the design, monitoring, or maintenance of the system of transmitting a prisoner’s sick call request. The court rejected challenges based on staffing. View "Reck v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnson pleaded no contest in Michigan state court to drug crimes. He was sentenced as a habitual offender, at the bottom of his guidelines range. Johnson later sought state post-conviction relief, seeking to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel was ineffective, and seeking resentencing because the judge based his sentence on a fact not admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson sought to compel his trial counsel to produce his case files and sit for an interview with Johnson’s new counsel. That interview apparently never took place, but Johnson secured an affidavit from his trial counsel. Johnson did not file that affidavit (or any other evidence) and did not ask for additional discovery, for a date for an evidentiary hearing, or for a ruling on his motion.Johnson filed a federal habeas petition, acknowledging that the state court had not yet ruled on his motion but asserting that special circumstances existed due to “the inordinate delay.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Any delay was attributable to Johnson, particularly his failure to request a state court evidentiary hearing. Johnson’s case is not the extreme instance in which circumstances beyond his control left him “incapable” of remedying the constitutional violations he alleges. View "Johnson v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Officers approached Buster as he was walking; 30 minutes earlier, the officers had responded to “a domestic assault where a firearm discharged in the air.” The officers believed Buster matched descriptions of the assailant and that he was the person they had seen outside the victim’s apartment earlier. Buster declined to stop and eventually ran but tripped. The officers tackled him. Buster was wearing a cross-body bag. The officers pulled the bag to Buster’s back and handcuffed him. Buster said the strap was choking him. An officer cut the strap, removed the bag, which felt “[h]ard to the touch,” then opened the bag and found a gun and ammunition. The officers questioned Buster without giving the Miranda warnings. At the police station, an officer gave Buster the Miranda warnings, and elicited “‘essentially’ the same material discussed in the pre-Miranda interview.”The government agreed not to use the pre-Miranda statements. The court suppressed Buster’s post-Miranda statements, as “the product of an impermissible two-step interview tactic” but concluded the initial stop was valid and that “the pat-down of Buster’s person and the search of his bag were reasonable.” Buster was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit reversed. The “Terry” exception does not cover a warrantless search of a bag recently possessed by a person who was—by the time the bag was opened— handcuffed and face-down on the ground. View "United States v. Buster" on Justia Law

The 2021 South Carolina Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act bans abortions after an ultrasound detects a “fetal heartbeat,” usually around the sixth week of pregnancy, before the “viability threshold” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act includes exceptions for medical emergencies, rape, and incest and requires abortion providers to “perform an obstetric ultrasound,” display the ultrasound images to the pregnant woman, and "record a written medical description of the ultrasound images of the unborn child’s fetal heartbeat.” The Act provides a private cause of action for a woman to sue an abortion provider if the abortion was performed or induced in violation of the Act or the woman “was not given the information” abortion providers are required to disclose before an abortion procedure.The district court enjoined the Act's enforcement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The abortion providers suffered an injury in fact sufficient to establish standing. The defendants acknowledged that the six-week “fetal heartbeat” abortion ban is unconstitutional. The district court reasonably determined that, notwithstanding the Act’s severability clause, its provisions were not severable. The function of each of the provisions remaining in the Act after the removal of the six-week abortion ban reveals that the entire statute was designed to carry out the ban. View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Then-lieutenant Hasson was arrested at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. Agents found 196 Tramadol pills in Hasson’s backpack and another 106 in his desk. A search of Hasson’s residence uncovered another 122 Tramadol pills; 15 firearms; silencers; hundreds of rounds of ammunition, hormones, and steroids. Hasson had Tramadol in his bloodstream. The government alleged Hasson was “a domestic terrorist,” contemplating “biological attacks followed by attack on food supply” and “a bombing/sniper campaign.” His emails stated: Looking to Russia ... or any land that despises the west’s liberalism. … appropriate individual targets, to bring greatest impact. Professors, DR’s, Politian’s, Judges, leftists in general. He compiled manifestos of murderers and terrorists and information about explosives and other weapons.Hasson was charged with unlawful possession of unregistered firearm silencers, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d); unlawful possession of firearm silencers unidentified by serial number, 5861(i); possession of firearms by an unlawful user of and addict to a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3); and possession of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). The district court rejected Hasson's argument that Section 922(g)(3)'s phrases “unlawful user” and “addicted to” were unconstitutionally vague on their face and increased Hasson’s Guidelines range (U.S.S.G. 3A1.4), concluding that his offense was intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Section 922(g)(3) is facially vague and that Section 3A1.4 cannot apply because he was not convicted of a federal crime of terrorism. View "United States v. Hasson" on Justia Law

One of two reports of an armed confrontation at the Eden Apartments identified one perpetrator as “Thomas Johnson,” who was driving a red truck with rims. Officer Green responded and encountered a stationary red truck near an elementary school, which had been closed for months. When Green exited his car, Johnson stepped out holding a semiautomatic pistol with an extended magazine. His brother was driving. Johnson ran toward the school. As vehicles passed nearby, Green drew his weapon and yelled, “Drop the gun!” Johnson continued to run, Green fired at him. Green chased Johnson into an open field and continued to chase Johnson, ordering him to drop the gun and instructing onlookers to lie on the ground. Officer McKinney, at the opposite side of the field, saw Johnson outrunning Green. Johnson changed direction toward a neighborhood. Johnson ignored orders to stop. McKinney fired at Johnson, who continued to flee. Both officers gave chase, repeatedly ordering Johnson to stop and drop the gun. When in range, both officers shot. Johnson fell and dropped his gun. Johnson died on the scene.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted the officers summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. The use of deadly force was not constitutionally excessive. The officers could have reasonably believed that Johnson threatened them and others with serious physical harm. View "Wilson v. City of Bastrop" on Justia Law

Heather operated a health-coaching business called Constitution Nutrition. She started her business in California, which did not require a license. After moving to Florida in 2015, she continued to run her business—meeting online with most of her clients and meeting in person with two clients who lived in Florida. She described herself as a “holistic health coach” and not as a dietician. Heather tailored her health coaching to each client, which included dietary advice. After a complaint was filed against her and she paid $500.00 in fines and $254.09 in investigatory fees, Heather sued, claiming that Florida’s Dietetics and Nutrition Practice Act, which requires a license to practice as a dietician or nutritionist, violated her First Amendment free speech rights to communicate her opinions and advice on diet and nutrition to her clients. The district court granted the Florida Department of Health summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, after considering the Supreme Court’s decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018). The Act “is a professional regulation with a merely incidental effect on protected speech,” and is constitutional under the First Amendment. View "Del Castillo v. Secretary, Florida Department of Health" on Justia Law