Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to petitioner on the issue of whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the State's introduction and use of prison-conditions evidence at the penalty phase. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to state officials, concluding that the state postconviction court properly applied Strickland v. Washington to petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim, and in doing so, it was not unreasonable in finding no reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's errors, the jury would not have sentenced petitioner to death.Applying the prejudice analysis in Sigmon v. Stirling, 956 F.3d 183, 193 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1094 (2021), the court did not think it was unreasonable for the state court to have found that the substantial aggravating evidence overcame petitioner's offered mitigation case based on his mental health. With that conclusion firmly in mind, the state court weighed the effect of the prison-conditions evidence and determined that there was a relative equality of presentation by both sides on this evidence and that the defense scored as many points if not more than the State. In this case, the court could not say that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it weighed the prison-conditions evidence and found its effect on the verdict inconsequential. Furthermore, petitioner's challenges to the state court's consideration of his mitigation evidence are unavailing. The court also rejected petitioner's contention that the state court unreasonably discounted his mental health evidence; nor did the state court unreasonably conflate the adaptability and prison-conditions testimony. Finally, the court did not fault the state court for not expressly considering the jury's deadlock in its prejudice analysis. View "Wood v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order, dismissing on ripeness grounds, an action brought by Twitter against the Attorney General of Texas, in his official capacity, alleging First Amendment retaliation. Specifically, Twitter alleged that the service of a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) by the OAG to Twitter after the company banned President Donald Trump for life following the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, was government retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment. Twitter asked the district court to enjoin the AG from enforcing the CID and from continuing his investigation, and to declare the investigation unconstitutional.The panel held that the case was not prudentially ripe because the issues were not yet fit for judicial decision where the OAG has not yet made an allegation against Twitter; where facts were not yet developed; and where Twitter need not comply with the CID, could challenge its enforcement, and could challenge the CID in state court. The panel stated that, while Twitter could suffer hardship from withholding consideration, adjudicating this case now would require determining whether Twitter has violated Texas's unfair trade practices law before OAG has a chance to complete its investigation. Furthermore, any hardship to Twitter from the alleged chill of its First Amendment rights was insufficient to overcome the uncertainty of the legal issue presented in the case in its current posture. View "Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Dongarra, incarcerated for bank robbery, was transferred to a new prison and went through the onboarding process, supervised by Officer Smith. Smith gave him an ID card that indicated “Registered Offender,” and a T-shirt “know[n]” to be a “sex offender T-shirt.” The shirt falsely suggested that he had been imprisoned at Terre Haute, “a sex offender prison.” Dongarra stated that he “could be killed” if prisoners mistook him for a sex offender. Smith said he did not care and that he “hope[d] [Dongarra] kn[e]w how to fight.” Dongarra appealed to other staff, who asked Smith for another T-shirt. Smith refused. Frightened, Dongarra skipped meals and lost weight and stopped going out for recreation. Dongarra filed a grievance. Though he never got a response, a few weeks later the prison replaced his ID card and T-shirt.Dongarra sued Smith and two unnamed officers, seeking damages and an injunction, citing “Bivens.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 case. Injunctive relief is not available because Dongarra had not sued anyone who could fire or discipline Smith and by the time Dongarra sued, the prison had corrected the error. No court has extended Bivens to cover similar facts; “special factors” bar extending Bivens here. Although the officer violated Dongarra’s rights, the feared risk never materialized. Damages cannot be awarded to compensate him for an assault that never happened. View "Dongarra v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction and the denial of his motion to suppress, holding that the State did not meet its burden in rebutting a presumptively unreasonable seizure.The police found Defendant sleeping in his car in a McDonald's parking lot. The officers asked Defendant to exist his vehicle and ordered him to perform a field sobriety test. Defendant was subsequently charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant moved to suppress evidence and statements as a result of his seizure, arguing that his seizure and subsequent searches were unlawful. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant's seizure was justified by the community caretaking doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not meet is burden to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of First Care in an action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that First Care unlawfully terminated them from their positions at an assisted-living facility. First Care claimed that plaintiffs were terminated because, as mandatory reporters, they had failed to immediately report observed abuse.The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege a claim of retaliation under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1114(1)(c) where they have failed to identify any demand by First Care to engage in an unlawful action. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII, and Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1104(1) failed because plaintiffs ultimately failed to identify a similarly situated comparator. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue for trial regarding the district court's exclusion of investigator notes and reports on hearsay grounds. View "Walker v. First Care Management Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied defendants' motion for a partial stay of the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining the Department of Defense, United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and United States Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro from enforcing certain COVID-19 vaccination requirements against 35 Navy special warfare personnel and prohibiting any adverse actions based on their religious accommodation requests. Specifically, defendants seek a partial stay pending appeal insofar as the injunction precludes them from considering plaintiffs' vaccination statuses "in making deployment, assignment and other operational decisions."The court weighed the Mindes abstention factors and determined that this dispute is justiciable. However, the court concluded that defendants have not carried their burden to warrant the issuance of the stay. The court agreed with the district court that defendants have not shown a compelling interest to deny religious accommodations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to each of the 35 plaintiffs at issue. Rather, the "marginal interest" in vaccinating each plaintiff appears to be negligible and thus defendants lack a sufficiently compelling interest to vaccinate plaintiffs. The court also concluded that the preliminary injunction does not irreparably damage the Navy and the public; partially staying the preliminary injunction pending appeal would substantially harm plaintiffs; and issuance of the requested stay would disserve the public interest. View "U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden" on Justia Law

Deputy Johns shot and killed Palma after responding to a 9-1-1 call at Palma's home. Johns knew that there was a dispute about the television and that Palma suffered from mental health issues. Arriving, Johns saw Palma standing outside with his hands in his pockets. Palma did not respond to greetings but began walking toward Johns. Johns repeatedly told Palma to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. Palma did not respond. Johns radioed for backup with “intermediate” priority. Johns warned Palma he would use his taser. Palma did not stop. Johns tased him twice before Palma fell down. As Palma got up, Johns tased him again. Palma walked toward Johns, still not responding to commands. Johns kept retreating; he believed that Palma’s intention was to “perhaps obtain [his] weapon.” Johns pointed his gun at Palma, who did not stop. Johns first shot Palma’s leg. Palma continued to walk toward Johns, who continued shooting until Palma "no longer came towards [him].” Palma never spoke and never reached toward Johns. Palma was unarmed. The encounter lasted eight-10 minutes.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment of qualified immunity. There are genuine disputes of material fact; a reasonable jury could find that Johns used excessive force when he shot at Palma. In cases involving mental health crises, officers should use the least force necessary to subdue the person. View "Palma v. Johns" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff, a federal prisoner, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleged that a correctional officer labeled him a snitch to other prisoners, offered them a bounty to assault plaintiff, and failed to protect him from the predictable assault by another prisoner.The panel construed the pro se complaint liberally and held that plaintiff's complaint alleged conduct beyond deliberate indifference. The panel applied Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), explaining that if the Supreme Court allowed a guard who is aware of and deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that a prisoner will suffer medical harm from an asthma attack to be sued under Bivens, it was but a modest extension to allow a suit against a guard who creates the substantial risk of harm and then allows it to occur. The panel stated that, although this case represents a modest extension of Bivens, no special factors caution against extending the remedy to encompass this well-established claim, brought against a single rogue officer under the same constitutional provision applied in a well-recognized Supreme Court Bivens case. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Hoffman v. Preston" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of police officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights to companionship and familial association when they shot and killed Sergio Ochoa.Reviewing the district court's decision de novo and viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the panel concluded that the district court selected the correct legal test to assess whether the conduct here shocks the conscience, and it correctly concluded that it does not. In this case, the officers did not have time to deliberate before firing and the district court correctly applied the purpose-to-harm test in order to determine if the officers' conduct shocked the conscience. The panel explained that Ochoa had engaged in a domestic dispute that allegedly involved a gun while possibly under the influence of drugs, he had entered a stranger's home stating that he was armed with knives, he failed to yield to a police car, and drove erratically. Furthermore, Ochoa ignored repeated commands from the officers, refused to drop two kitchen knives, and then took a large step. Therefore, under the purpose-to-harm test, defendants did not violate plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights. Rather, the officers' actions reflected their attempts to satisfy legitimate law enforcement objectives: apprehension of an armed, dangerous suspect and protection of the safety of the officers, the home’s inhabitants, and the public. View "Ochoa v. City of Mesa" on Justia Law

Pretrial detainees Kemp, Dearborn, Galvez, and Lind-Enriquez had lived together in the cellblock without incident for several months when a fight broke out, with Kemp throwing the first punch. Officer Burget was patrolling the jail but, to avoid being considered a “snitch,” Kemp did not tell Burget about threats made before the fight. The fight ended with Kemp lying motionless on the floor. Officer Williams, conducting her rounds, saw Kemp lying on the floor and called for emergency medical services. The medics responded about eight minutes later. Kemp suffered severe injuries.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Kemp’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit on summary judgment. Although Burget had about 60% hearing loss in one ear and about 40% hearing loss in the other and was not wearing his prescribed hearing aid, the evidence did not indicate that his impaired hearing made any difference in the response to the beating. Nothing in the record would have put a reasonable guard on notice of a substantial risk of harm to Kemp. The court also rejected wrongful hiring and wrongful retention claims. View "Kemp v. Fulton County" on Justia Law