Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, ten nurses and their former attorney, filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as well as common law claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution under New York law against defendants, alleging that Defendants Spota and Lato improperly prosecuted them for child endangerment, endangerment of a physically disabled person, and related charges by fabricating evidence and engaging in other improper conduct before a grand jury, in violation of plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights and New York state law. The district court found that Spota and Lato were entitled to absolute immunity for starting the criminal prosecution and presenting the case to the grand jury, and it dismissed plaintiffs' claims arising from any alleged misconduct during that prosecutorial stage. The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of the prosecutors and the DA's Office as to the remaining claims.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that although Spota and Lato may have unlawfully penalized plaintiffs for exercising the right to quit their jobs on the advice of counsel, under the court's precedent both of them are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions during the judicial phase of the criminal process. In regard to plaintiffs' claim that Spota and Lato fabricated evidence during the investigative phase of the criminal process, the court agreed with the district court that there was insufficient admissible evidence of fabrication to defeat summary judgment. View "Anilao v. Spota" on Justia Law

At the Detroit Detention Center, officers searched Lipford and did not find any contraband. Lipford denied being under the influence of drugs or carrying any medication. At 9:48 p.m., officers placed Lipford in a glass-walled room used to hold multiple detainees awaiting arraignment. Lipford nodded off. He slid to the floor at 11:02 p.m. Lipford laid on the floor motionless until 2:50 a.m. when he was found unresponsive. He was pronounced dead at 3:50 a.m. Hospital staff found cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl, concealed in Lipford’s rectum. The jail’s operating procedures required that officers conduct rounds every 30 minutes; “physically open the cell doors" and ensure that detainees are actually there; and check "that every detainee is living and breathing.” Although Officer Lewis ostensibly made his rounds that night, he did not physically enter the video-arraignment room nor speak with the detainees. Avoiding interaction with detainees was apparently common because detainees would become agitated at officers waking them up.The district court dismissed claims by Lipford’s estate against several defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lewis. The estate did not establish that a reasonable officer in Lewis’s position would have known that Lipford was potentially concealing drugs, subjecting himself to an excessive risk of harm, and that Lewis’s ignoring this risk was objectively reckless. Failure to follow internal policies does not, alone, equal deliberate indifference. View "Hyman v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Based on convictions for cocaine possession and facilitating second-degree murder Bailey was incarcerated until 2005. In 2008, Bailey was convicted for the possession and distribution of crack and powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1). Because Bailey had a prior felony drug conviction, he was subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment for the (b)(1)(A) offenses. Bailey was also classified as a career offender, resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. The court imposed a 360-month sentence. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of cocaine base necessary to trigger certain statutory penalties; the 2018 First Step Act allows courts to apply the change retroactively.Bailey sought a reduced sentence, citing his efforts at rehabilitation, his continuous employment during his incarceration, and his incident-free record in custody. The district court denied Bailey’s request, finding that the First Step Act did not affect Bailey’s guideline range as a career offender and that his sentence was already at the bottom of his Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court had the authority to reduce Bailey’s sentence, but neither Act required it to do so; not reducing his sentence was not an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

This case arose out of South Carolina's termination of Planned Parenthood's Medicaid provider agreement. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding in relevant part that the individual plaintiff had demonstrated that she was likely to succeed on her Medicaid Act claim since the free-choice-of-provider provision conferred a private right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and South Carolina had violated that provision by terminating Planned Parenthood's Medicaid provider agreement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The district court then issued a permanent injunction, which South Carolina now challenges in this appeal.The Fourth Circuit first concluded that this case presents a live case or controversy and rejected South Carolina's claim of mootness. Even assuming that the court were free to reexamine its precedents, the court declined to do so in this case. Rather, the court concluded that its previous decision was handed down as a matter of law and resolved the precise legal issue upon which South Carolina now seeks review.The court reaffirmed its prior decision, concluding that the free-choice-of-provider provision confers on Medicaid recipients an individual right enforceable under section 1983. The court stated that the statute plainly reflects Congress's desire that individual Medicaid recipients be free to obtain care from any qualified provider and it implements this policy in direct and unambiguous language. In this case, all three Blessing factors in determining whether a statute creates a private right enforceable under section 1983 are met. Furthermore, the Medicaid Act does not evince Congress's intent to specifically foreclose a remedy under section 1983. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), does not undermine the court's analysis. The court refused to nullify Congress's undeniable desire to extend a choice of medical providers to the less fortunate among us, individuals who experience the same medical problems as the more fortunate in society but who lack under their own means the same freedom to choose their healthcare provider. View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Kerr" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Nevada law against individual law enforcement officers and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from their arrest for chalking anti-police messages on sidewalks. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Detective Tucker.The panel affirmed the district court's holding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude from the evidence that Detective Tucker violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The panel reversed the district court's holding that Detective Tucker is entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time of plaintiffs' arrests that an arrest supported by probable cause but made in retaliation for protected speech violates the First Amendment. The panel stated that plaintiffs have shown differential treatment of similarly situated individuals, satisfying the Nieves exception. In this case, the district court correctly concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the anti-police content of plaintiffs' chalkings was a substantial or motivating factor for Detective Tucker's declarations of arrest. Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Detective Tucker violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Furthermore, a reasonable officer in Detective Tucker's position had fair notice that the First Amendment prohibited arresting plaintiffs for the content of their speech, notwithstanding probable cause. View "Ballentine v. Tucker" on Justia Law

The Albanian-born brothers lived in New Jersey illegally. They came to the FBI’s attention because of a 2006 video that depicted them at a firing range in the Pocono mountains shooting weapons and shouting “jihad in the States.” The FBI deployed cooperating witnesses to monitor their activities and arranged a controlled sale of semi-automatic weapons. Based on a plot to attack the Fort Dix Army base and other military facilities, they were convicted of conspiracy to murder members of the U.S. military, 18 U.S.C. 1114, 1117; possession or attempted possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); possession of machineguns, 18 U.S.C. 922(o); and possession of firearms by an illegal alien, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5).The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of their habeas petitions, in which they argued that their 18 U.S.C. 924(c) convictions must be vacated under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding. Because each defendant was subject to an unchallenged life sentence, any potential vacatur of their Section 924(c) convictions would result in no practical change to their confinement. The “concurrent sentence doctrine” provides a court “discretion to avoid resolution of legal issues affecting less than all of the counts in an indictment where at least one count will survive and the sentences on all counts are concurrent.” View "Duka v. United States" on Justia Law

On March 25, 2021, Georgia Governor Kemp signed into law Senate Bill 9 (“SB 9”), which created from the former Augusta Judicial Circuit two new judicial circuits: the Columbia Judicial Circuit, and the Augusta Judicial Circuit. The judicial circuit split, which was slated to become effective on July 1, 2021, was briefly stayed by three lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of SB 9. The lawsuits were filed in the Superior Court of Richmond County, one by Columbia County citizen Willie Saunders and two by the nonprofit, voting advocacy organization, Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. (“BVMF”). At the heart of each of these suits was a claim that Columbia County officials sought to form their own judicial circuit as a racially discriminatory reaction to the election of District Attorney Jared Williams in November 2020. These appeals and cross-appeals arose from the trial court’s July 13, 2021 final judgment addressing the merits of the appellants’ challenges to SB 9 in each of the three suits. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected the appellants’ challenges to SB 9, declaring it “valid and enforceable” and allowing the circuit split to proceed. However, The Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment as to BVMF and remanded those cases to the trial court with instruction that they be dismissed because BVMF lacked standing to pursue its actions. As to Saunders, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of his appeal because Saunders failed to challenge the trial court’s dispositive ruling dismissing the defendants he sued. Thus, the Supreme Court also vacated the judgment as to Saunders’ complaint and directed the trial court to dismiss his action upon remand. View "Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v. Kemp" on Justia Law

Burkhart, the CEO of ASC, a private company that operates Indiana nursing homes and long-term care facilities, orchestrated an extensive conspiracy exploiting the company’s operations and business relationships for personal gain. Most of the funds involved in the scheme came from Medicare and Medicaid. After other defendants pled guilty and Burkhart’s brother agreed to testify against him, Burkhart pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and healthcare fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349); conspiracy to violate the AntiKickback Statute (18 U.S.C. 371); and money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). With a Guidelines range of 121-151 months, Burkhart was sentenced to 114 months’ imprisonment.Burkhart later filed a habeas action, contending that his defense counsel, Barnes & Thornburg provided constitutionally deficient representation because the firm also represented Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, a victim of the fraudulent scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the firm labored under an actual conflict of interest, that conflict did not adversely affect Burkhart’s representation. Nothing in the record shows that the firm improperly shaded its advice to induce Burkhart to plead guilty; the advice reflected a reasonable response to the “dire circumstances” facing Burkhart. The evidence of Burkhart’s guilt was overwhelming. View "Burkhart v. United States" on Justia Law

Captain Van Lanen saw apparent contraband in Jackson’s cell and ordered a search, which uncovered prohibited items: bottles of unknown liquids, a hair pick, and documents containing the names and health information of other inmates. Van Lanen ordered the confiscation of the records, some of which belonged to inmate Jones. Jackson had the records because he was helping Jones prepare a civil rights lawsuit against Van Lanen and others. Jones sought to retrieve the paperwork, claiming the documents were privileged, confidential legal materials. Prison officials denied each request. Jones claims Van Lanen said: “you won’t get to use it to sue me with!” Jackson declined to support Jones’s claim. Captain Wickman found that much of the confiscated paperwork consisted not of legal materials but rather other inmates’ medical records, constituting contraband under prison policy, and ordered most of them destroyed. Jones invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated the First Amendment by confiscating and destroying the documents in an effort to retaliate against Jones for filing administrative grievances and taking steps to sue Van Lanen and that the document destruction deprived him of his right to access the courts.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the access to courts claim, agreeing that Jones had not identified any harm. Jones identified enough facts to get part of his remaining retaliation claim to trial. View "Jones v. Van Lanen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the USTA discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and discriminatorily interfered with his employment contract with AJ Squared Security, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, by rejecting his temporary assignment as a security guard for the 2016 U.S. Open.The Second Circuit concurred with the district court that plaintiff has failed to state any claim for relief under Title VII or section 1981. The court concluded that plaintiff did not plausibly allege the existence of an employer-employee relationship necessary to sustain his Title VII claims. Furthermore, plaintiff did not allege any facts to support his claim under section 1981 that, but for his race, the USTA would not have interfered with his employment contract. However, because plaintiff—represented by court-appointed counsel for the first time on appeal—has indicated that he can plead further allegations of a "joint employer" relationship, and because he has plausibly alleged that the USTA rejected his assignment in retaliation for his protected activities against a USTA subcontractor, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), and remanded with instructions that plaintiff be permitted to amend his complaint as to that claim. The court affirmed as to the Title VII and section 1981 claims. View "Felder v. United States Tennis Association" on Justia Law