Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against law enforcement officers and other city employees based on qualified immunity. Plaintiff's claims arose from the officer's actions handcuffing, detaining, and involuntarily committing him after a welfare check. Plaintiff alleges that he experienced pain in his shoulder from tight handcuffing that occurred over a matter of minutes. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim that the officers violated his clearly established rights where tight handcuffing alone, even where a detainee sustains minor injuries, does not present an excessive force claim. View "Templeton v. Jarmillo" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit the Harris County District Attorney (DA) from enforcing a Texas anti-barratry law. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that his First Amendment claim is likely to succeed on the merits where the anti-barratry law is likely narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest in preventing confusion that damages relationships between appointed counsel and indigent defendants. The court declined plaintiff's request to assign the case to a different district judge on remand, concluding that this case does not merit reassignment under either of the two relevant tests. View "Willey v. Harris County District Attorney" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims for sexual harassment and retaliation against the City of Houston. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the repeated viewing of a private, intimate video of plaintiff by two senior firefighters. While the court agreed that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to plaintiff's retaliation claim, the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that no genuine issue exists as to her sexual harassment claim and that summary judgment for the City was appropriate.In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff, a woman, is a member of a protected class and that she experienced unwelcome harassment; the harassment was based on sex and thus based on plaintiff's status as a member of a protected class; plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive and hostile work environment; and the conduct was objectively offensive to plaintiff and affected a term or condition of her employment. The court also concluded that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether the City knew or should have known about the harassment, and thus can be held liable. View "Abbt v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Garcia was convicted of attempted homicide, recklessly endangering safety, and aggravated battery based on a drive-by shooting that left one victim seriously injured. Garcia’s post-conviction counsel unsuccessfully sought a new trial claiming that trial counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses amounted to ineffective assistance. Garcia filed a consolidated appeal and post-conviction order. In the meantime, the state acknowledged that the reckless endangerment counts were lesser-included offenses; the judge modified the judgment, which was affirmed as modified.Garcia filed another post-conviction motion, raising new claims of ineffective assistance. Wisconsin rules require a defendant to raise all available claims for relief in his first post-conviction motion or on direct appeal unless the defendant can demonstrate a “sufficient reason.” Garcia needed to allege specific facts that would establish his post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, including allegations showing that the defaulted claims were “clearly stronger” than the issues post-conviction counsel chose to present.After Wisconsin courts rejected his petition, Garcia sought federal habeas relief. The district judge rejected the state’s procedural objection but agreed that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, the mistakes were not prejudicial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The state appellate court rejected Garcia’s second post-conviction motion based on failure to satisfy the pleading standard for overcoming procedural default. That independent and adequate state procedural basis barred federal review unless Garcia can establish cause for and prejudice from his default. He has not done so. View "Garcia v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the city in an action brought by a former city employee, alleging that he had been unlawfully terminated from his job because of his age. The court agreed with the district court that no genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff had been fired because of his age. In this case, plaintiff was largely unqualified for the burgeoning responsibilities of his position, and plaintiff's contention -- that a fact finder would infer this to mean that defendants thought he was old and slow -- was pure speculation. View "Harris v. City of Schertz" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal as untimely of a complaint brought by plaintiff, a former university student, alleging civil rights claims arising from on-campus incidents where he was issued a disciplinary warning, which was later removed. Citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), plaintiff argues that his claims did not accrue until the university withdrew its disciplinary warning against him. However, the panel held that neither Heck nor a Heck-like rule of delayed accrual applies here. The court explained that there was no conviction or confinement here, and plaintiff's claims were not properly analogized to the tort of malicious prosecution, either factually or legally. In this case, plaintiff had complete and present causes of action by August 24, 2017, at the latest. But plaintiff did not file his complaint until January 20, 2020, more than two years later. Therefore, under traditional accrual principles, his action is untimely. View "Bonelli v. Grand Canyon University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court finding Defendant guilty of four counts of violence under Minn. Stat. 609.713, subd. 1, holding that section 609.713, subd. 1 does not violate the First Amendment.After he was charged, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the portion of section 609.713, subd. 1 that applies to threats of violence made "in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror" was unconstitutionally overbroad. The district court denied the motion and found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that even if the statute prohibited some protected speech, it was not facially overbroad under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) specific intent is not required to make a communication a true threat; (2) the statute punishes only reckless speech that is a true threat; and (3) because few situations of reckless but protected threats would be swept up in criminal prosecutions, the statute is not facially overbroad. View "State v. Mrozinski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in concluding that more than 220,000 former State employees (the Retirees) possessed no vested rights within the meaning of the Contracts Clause to the benefit of lifetime enrollment in any particular premium-free health insurance plan, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the Retirees had obtained a vested right protected under the Contracts Clause.After the General Assembly enacted a statute eliminating Retirees' option to remain enrolled in the plan of their choice, the Retirees argued that the State had undertaken a contractual obligation to provide them with the option to remain enrolled in the premium-free preferred provider organization health insurance plan that allocated eighty percent of the costs of health care services to the insurer and twenty percent to the insured for life. The trial court entered partial summary judgment for Retirees. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court correctly determined there were no genuine issues of material fact relating to whether Retirees possessed a vested right protected under the Contracts Clause. View "Lake v. State Health Plan for Teachers & State Employees" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the superior court (MAR court) granting Defendant's motion for appropriate relief (MAR) and awarding him a new trial, holding that the MAR court neither abused its discretion nor committed legal error in granting Defendant a new trial.Defendant was fourteen years old when he was indicted for and assaulting a cab driver who later died. Based largely on the basis of a confession Defendant made while being interrogated by a police detective outside the presence of a parent or guardian Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. Years later, Defendant filed a MAR alleging that he was entitled to relief based on the newly discovered evidence of the testimony of a man who claimed that, on the night of the crime, another person confessed to him to assaulting the cab driver. The MAR court allowed the MAR and vacated Defendant's conviction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the MAR court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence all elements necessary to demonstrate his entitlement to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. View "State v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that the district court did not err in summarily denying Defendant's motion.A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, rape, and two counts of aggravated sodomy. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504, arguing that his sentence was illegal because he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial and his right to allocution at sentencing. The district court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither of Defendant's claims was properly before the court in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law