Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction of carrying a firearm without a license, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.At issue was whether police officers may conduct a traffic stop on the basis of a traffic violation after having resolved the violation at a prior encounter, then having allowed the vehicle to leave, without any other traffic violation taking place. Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the traffic stop in this case under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress and vacated his conviction, holding (1) police may not conduct a traffic stop on the basis of a traffic violation after having previously addressed the violation and having resolved the issue in a separate, discrete encounter; and (2) in the instant case, police lacked the authority to conduct the second traffic stop, and therefore, the stop was unreasonable under article 14. View "Commonwealth v. Daveiga" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in this civil rights action brought by plaintiff against his prior employer with one exception: the court reversed as to the hostile work environment claim. The court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, a single incident of harassment, if sufficiently severe, can give rise to a viable Title VII claim. In this case, the incident plaintiff has pleaded, that his supervisor directly called him a racial epithet containing the n-word in front of his fellow employees, states an actionable claim of hostile work environment. The court remanded for further consideration. View "Woods v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

Butler County Jail (BCJ) booked Westmoreland on a bench warrant for failure to appear. Westmoreland requested to be separated from fellow inmate St. Clair because St. Clair believed Westmoreland was an informant. Westmoreland was assigned to a general population dormitory with six cellmates that did not share a common area with St. Clair. Westmoreland’s mother called to express concerns that St. Clair was telling other inmates Westmoreland had “told on him.” The next day, St. Clair was permitted to mop floors outside of Westmoreland’s cell and allegedly told Westmoreland’s cellmates that he was a “rat.” Westmoreland's subsequent request to be moved was denied. That night, other inmates attacked Westmoreland, who required two surgeries for his injuries; his jaw was wired shut for several months. The district court rejected Westmoreland’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court applied the wrong standard in evaluating the liability of an individual jail supervisor. A failure-to-protect claim by a pretrial detainee requires only an objective showing that an individual defendant acted (or failed to act) deliberately and recklessly. Whether BCJ is liable for that officer’s actions is contingent on whether a constitutional violation occurred. View "Westmoreland v. Butler County" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the Town of Marblehead and its buildings commissioner, and dismissing this lawsuit brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), holding that the district court did not err.St. Paul's Foundation and the Shrine of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, Patron of Sailors, Brewers and Repentant Thieves (collectively, St. Paul's), brought this action alleging that Defendants substantially burdened St. Paul's religious exercise. Specifically, St. Paul's sought to reinstate a building permit that it had secured for the redevelopment of a site on which the Shrine of St. Nicholas was located but that had been suspended prior to the completion of that construction. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that St. Paul's did not successfully advance a basis for reversing the summary judgment in this case. View "St. Paul's Foundation v. Ives" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that John Doe, a pseudonymous student at Samford University, has not stated a claim against the university for a violation of Title IX, based on a university disciplinary board finding him responsible for sexual assault and suspending him for five years. The court concluded that the alleged facts do not permit a reasonable inference that the university discriminated against Doe "on the basis of sex" where the alleged procedural irregularities do not make sex discrimination plausible; the alleged public pressure and public statements do not make sex discrimination plausible; and the Clery statistics do not change the plausibility of the Title IX claim.The court also concluded that the Title IX claim failed under the Yusuf tests; nor has Doe satisfied the selective enforcement test. Finally, the court concluded that the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the university and dismissed as moot the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. Samford University" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant, Sergeant Dan Ponder, in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that Ponder used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he shot Clemente Najera-Aguirre six times without warning and killed him. After determining that it has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and that Ponder did not waive his qualified immunity defense, the panel concluded that Ponder's conduct was not objectively reasonable, and his use of excessive force violated the Fourth Amendment. In this case, nothing in the record suggested that Najera was threatening bystanders or advancing toward them when he was killed. Furthermore, Najera presented no threat at all to the officer in that moment. The panel also concluded that ponder was on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful at the time. View "Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its prior opinion, denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.In the amended opinion, the panel affirmed the district court' s order denying qualified immunity to Police Chief James McElvain on plaintiff's First Amendment and Equal Protection disparate treatment claim. The panel stated that McElvain was profoundly mistaken in arguing that to state an equal protection claim, proof of discriminatory animus alone was insufficient, and plaintiff must show that defendants treated plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals. Rather, the panel held that the existence of a comparator is not a prerequisite to stating a disparate treatment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, plaintiff established a prima facie claim for disparate treatment and the record supported the conclusion that McElvain's articulated reasons for not promoting Ballou were pretextual.In regard to McElvain's argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim that she was retaliated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the panel cannot discern from the district court's order whether it has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to resolve that question, and thus the panel remanded to the district court to clarify its ruling. Finally, the panel concluded that plaintiff's speech opposing sex discrimination in the workplace was inherently speech on a matter of public concern and was clearly protected by the First Amendment. View "Ballou v. McElvain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of burglary and two counts of simple assault arising from a home invasion, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary and simple assault. Defendant was tried on a part two habitual offender information alleging two prior felon convictions. The jury found Defendant to be a habitual offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the show-up identification; (2) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial; and (3) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal in the habitual offender trial. View "State v. Red Cloud" on Justia Law

Ramirez was sentenced to death for a 2004 murder. Texas informed Ramirez of his September 2021 execution date. Ramirez requested that his pastor be present in the execution chamber. Texas amended its protocol to allow a prisoner’s spiritual advisor to enter the execution chamber. Ramirez then asked that his pastor be permitted to “lay hands” on him and “pray over” him during his execution. Texas denied Ramirez’s request without reference to its execution protocol despite a history of allowing prison chaplains to engage in such activities. The district court and Fifth Circuit declined to grant injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc–1(a). The Supreme Court stayed Ramirez’s execution, then reversed. Ramirez is likely to succeed on his RLUIPA claims because Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the state’s compelling interests. Ramirez's requests are “sincerely based on a religious belief.” The laying on of hands and prayer are traditional forms of religious exercise; Ramirez’s pastor confirmed that they are a significant part of their faith tradition.The Court rejected arguments about security and possible trauma to the victim’s family; that absolute silence is necessary to monitor the inmate; and that if spiritual advisors were allowed to pray aloud, the opportunity “could be exploited to make a statement to the witnesses or officials.” Prison officials have less restrictive ways to handle any concerns. Ramirez is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. The balance of equities and public interest tilt in Ramirez’s favor because it is possible to accommodate Ramirez’s sincere religious beliefs without delaying or impeding his execution. There was no evidence that Ramirez engaged in litigation misconduct that should preclude equitable relief. View "Ramirez v. Collier" on Justia Law

Wilson, a member of the Board of Trustees of the Houston Community College System, brought multiple lawsuits challenging the Board’s actions. In 2016, the Board publicly reprimanded Wilson. He continued to charge the Board with violating its ethical rules and bylaws, in media outlets and in state-court actions. In 2018, the Board adopted a public resolution “censuring” Wilson and stating that his conduct was “not consistent with the best interests of the College” and “reprehensible.” The Board deemed Wilson ineligible for Board officer positions during 2018. The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Wilson’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Supreme Court held that Wilson does not possess an actionable First Amendment claim arising from the Board’s purely verbal censure. In First Amendment cases, long-settled and established practice “is a consideration of great weight.” Elected bodies have long exercised the power to censure their members. In disagreements of this sort, the First Amendment permits “[f]ree speech on both sides and for every faction on any side.”A plaintiff pursuing a First Amendment retaliation claim must show that the government took an “adverse action” in response to his speech that “would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Any fair assessment of the materiality of the Board’s conduct must consider that elected representatives are expected to shoulder some criticism about their public service and that the only adverse action at issue is itself a form of speech from Wilson’s colleagues. The censure did not prevent Wilson from doing his job and did not deny him any privilege of office. Wilson does not allege it was defamatory. The censure does not qualify as a materially adverse action capable of deterring Wilson from exercising his own right to speak. View "Houston Community College System v. Wilson" on Justia Law