Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court denying Petitioner's request for injunctive and declaratory relief claiming that the application of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.271 to his conduct violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, holding that the lower courts erred.Section 2969.271 allows the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation (DRC) and Correction to administratively extend an incarcerated defendant's prison term beyond his minimum prison term or presumptive earned early-release date but not beyond his maximum prison term. Petitioner entered Alford pleas to attempted burglary and other offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence under the "Reagan Tokes Law." On appeal, Petitioner argued that the sections of the statute allowing DRC to extend his prison term beyond the presumptive minimum term was unconstitutional. The court of appeals concluded that Petitioner's constitutional challenge was not ripe for review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a criminal defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of section 2969.271 is ripe for review on the defendant's direct appeal of his conviction and prison sentence. View "State v. Maddox" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of possessing a firearm without a license and possessing a large capacity feeding device, holding that Defendant's arguments on appeal were without merit.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the firearm and the attached large capacity feeding device as the fruits of a warrantless search and that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; and (2) there was sufficient evidence that Defendant possessed the firearm in question. View "Commonwealth v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by the admission into evidence of a codefendant's dual inculpatory statement to a fellow inmate acting at the behest of the state police, holding that there was no error.Defendant was convicted by a jury of murder, home invasion, burglary, and other crimes. The appellate court affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court correctly concluded that the admission of the codefendant's dual inculpatory statement did not violate Defendant's confrontation rights under either the United States or Connecticut constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. View "State v. Patel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that his public high school suspended him in violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the actions taken against him by school personnel after he engaged in a conversation with his classmates about the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas Highschool. The district court held that plaintiff's suit was barred under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the school board acted as the final policymaking authority in approving plaintiff's suspension, and thus Monell does not bar the suit. Furthermore, plaintiff's complaint plausibly alleges a First Amendment claim where the First Amendment does not permit schools to prohibit students from engaging in the factual, nonthreatening speech alleged here. In this case, plaintiff engaged in a factual conversation with his peers about a current event that is uniquely salient to the lives of American teenagers, a school shooting. The court stated that schools cannot silence such student speech on the basis that it communicates controversial or upsetting ideas. To do so would be incompatible with the very purpose of public education. However, the court concluded that the district court properly held that the complaint alleges no plausible Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City County School Board" on Justia Law

Exxon appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the New York and Massachusetts Attorneys General, alleging that the states' investigations into Exxon's purportedly deceptive speech regarding climate change were motivated by viewpoint discrimination and violated Exxon's constitutional rights. During the pendency of this appeal, the New York Attorney General closed the New York investigation and started an enforcement action, which resolved in Exxon's favor and is not being appealed by the state.The Second Circuit concluded that these events mooted Exxon's claims against the New York Attorney General and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over those claims. In regard to claims against the Massachusetts Attorney General, the court concluded that the claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata because Exxon could have pursued the relief it now seeks in an earlier Massachusetts state court proceeding arising from the same events that underlie the present suit. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus vacating petitioner's convictions for murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping with bodily injury. Of the twelve claims presented to the Circuit Court, only the first five challenged petitioner's conviction and thus are relevant here. Claims I and III incorporated numerous subclaims: Claim I had three subclaims, while Claim III had eight subclaims denoted A through H, with Claim III-H having an additional five subclaims of its own. Claim III-H-4, which provided the principal basis for the writ of habeas corpus the district court issued, alleged that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense as required by Brady v. Maryland the handwritten notes he made of a pretrial conversation he had with two named individuals.The court concluded that petitioner failed to exhaust Claim III-H-4 in the state courts because he failed to present the claim to the Florida Supreme Court such that the reasonable reader would understand the claim's particular legal basis and specific factual foundation. Furthermore, the district court's issuance of the writ based on a witness's statement constituted reversible error. The court considered the remaining claims and affirmed the district court's denial of relief as to petitioner's cross-appeal. View "Green v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Wayne Bowker died at the Carter County Jail on June 30, 2016, while awaiting trial for a drug possession charge. In the days and weeks preceding his death, Bowker did not receive several of his prescribed medications, experienced incontinence and catatonia, and was able to communicate with jail staff only by using strange repetitive phrases. Despite Bowker’s condition, jail officials failed to provide any medical attention in the nineteen days leading up to his death. His mother, Judy Prince, as the administrator of his estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and other claims. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to jail nurse Kimberlee Miller in her individual capacity, and whether it properly granted summary judgment to the Sheriff of Carter County in his official capacity. The Court concluded a reasonable jury could determine Miller violated Bowker’s constitutional right by acting with deliberate indifference toward his psychosis, incontinence, and catatonia. In addition, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Carter County’s failure to medically train jail employees, adequately staff the jail, and provide timely medical attention caused Bowker’s death. The Court reversed district court’s grants of summary judgment. View "Prince v. Sheriff of Carter County, et al." on Justia Law

After a jury found plaintiff not guilty of a drug trafficking offense, he filed a civil rights action against two police officers alleging they conspired to include false statements in an affidavit of probable cause executed shortly after his arrest.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity where the affidavit provided arguable probable cause for plaintiff's arrest even without the allegedly false statements at issue. The court concluded that the uncontested portions of the affidavit show officers knew at the time that plaintiff repeatedly had been with the targets of their investigation close in time to cocaine sales. Viewed in totality through the lens of common sense, the court stated that the affidavit with the alleged falsehoods removed still supports probable cause. The court affirmed the dismissal of all plaintiff's claims as they are derivative of the probable cause argument. View "Allen v. Monico" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Morton County and North Dakota state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights related to an incident where law enforcement officials shot plaintiff with lead-filled bean bags while he was protesting.The Eighth Circuit concluded that, although plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims are not Heck barred, they are subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the merits. In this case, the nonconclusory allegations in the complaint do not give rise to a plausible inference that the officers who allegedly shot and arrested plaintiff acted out of retaliatory animus. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the excessive force claims against the officers who shot plaintiff under the Fourth Amendment, as the complaint asserted use of more than de minimus force when plaintiff did not threaten anyone, flee, or resist arrest and the law was clearly established. The court stated that, if the allegations in his complaint are true, then Morton County law enforcement engaged in a persistent pattern of excessive force against peaceful protestors that was tacitly authorized by Sheriff Kirchmeier and that led to plaintiff's injury. Furthermore, Sergeant Kennelly is liable for the violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights because he failed to intervene. Finally, plaintiff's equal protection claims were properly dismissed where he failed to allege facts showing that otherwise similarly situated non-Native Americans were treated more favorably than he was. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Mitchell v. Kirchmeier" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the landlords' motion for a preliminary injunction in an action challenging the Minneapolis City Council's enactment of Ordinance No. 244.2030 under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (and similar provisions of the Minnesota Constitution). The Ordinance requires landlords to evaluate applicants for rental housing by either (1) "inclusive screening criteria" or (2) "individualized assessment."The court concluded that the landlords have neither demonstrated a physical-invasion taking nor a Penn Central taking. The court stated that, due to the individualized assessment option, the Ordinance is a restriction on the landlords' ability to use their property, not a physical-invasion taking. Furthermore, the district court properly ruled that the landlords offered nothing but conclusory assertions of economic impact and interference with investment-backed expectations. Finally, the Ordinance withstands rational basis review where it does not infringe a fundamental right and where the government had a legitimate purpose in ameliorating problems that often prevent people from finding housing. View "301, 712, 2103 and 3151 LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law