Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The SmileDirect parties developed an online service model for patients to access certain orthodontic services; they allege the defendants (members and employees of the California Dental Board) conspired to harass them with unfounded investigations and an intimidation campaign, to drive them out of the market. The district court dismissed the suit. The Ninth Circuit reversed with respect to certain Sherman Act antitrust claims. The SmileDirect parties sufficiently pled Article III standing; they alleged an injury in fact that was fairly traceable to defendants’ challenged conduct and was judicially redressable. They sufficiently alleged anticompetitive concerted action, or an agreement to restrain trade. The court rejected an argument that regulatory board members and employees cannot form an anticompetitive conspiracy when acting within their regulatory authority.The court affirmed the dismissal of a claim under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce, and of a "disparate treatment" Equal Protection Clause claim. To plead a class-of-one equal protection claim, plaintiffs must allege that they have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. A class-of-one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed comparator in all material respects. Rather than claiming that they stood on the same footing as others, the SmileDirect parties argued their uniqueness. View "Sulitzer v. Tippins" on Justia Law

CalChamber filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, to “vindicate its members’ First Amendment rights to not be compelled to place false and misleading acrylamide warnings on their food products.” The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the Attorney General and related entities, including private enforcers from pursuing new lawsuits to enforce Proposition 65's requirement that “[n]o person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer . . . without first giving clear and reasonable warning.”The Ninth Circuit affirmed. CalChamber was likely to succeed on the merits of its compelled speech claim. Given the robust disagreement by reputable scientific sources over whether acrylamide in food causes cancer in humans, the warning was controversial and misleading. Proposition 65’s enforcement regime created a heavy litigation burden on manufacturers who use alternative warnings rather than the regulatory safe harbor warning. The serious constitutional issue provided sufficient reason to enjoin Proposition 65 acrylamide litigation until the case was finally decided; the injunction was not an impermissible prior restraint. CalChambers established irreparable harm, and the scope of the injunction was not impermissible; and the balance of hardships weighed in CalChamber’s favor. The injunction was in the public interest. View "California Chamber of Commerce v. Council for Education and Research on Toxics" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied Munoz-Gonzalez’s application to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asserting that his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)) was invalid because his predicate crime (racketeering) is no longer a categorical “crime of violence” under a new rule of constitutional law announced by the Supreme Court in “Davis” (2019).The new “Davis” argument was not “previously unavailable,” as required for authorization of a second or successive 2255 motion. A prisoner must show that real-world circumstances prevented him, as a practical matter, from asserting his "new rule of law" claim in his initial habeas proceeding. While pro se prisoners face unique difficulties and language barriers add to those difficulties, the limited exception to the broad prohibition on successive habeas proceedings should not be applied subjectively. Focusing on external barriers, the court noted “Davis” was issued before Muñoz-Gonzalez filed his reply brief for his initial habeas motion. He had the facts that he needed for his claim; no systemic or external barrier prevented him from presenting his claim; Muñoz-Gonzalez was clearly aware of Davis because he cited it in his reply brief in his initial habeas proceeding. View "Gonzalez v. United States" on Justia Law

Food manufacturer B&G sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Embry and her attorney violated B&G’s constitutional rights by suing B&G to enforce California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Proposition 65. Proposition 65 requires businesses to notify customers if their products contain chemicals known to the state to cause cancer. Acrylamide, the chemical allegedly found in B&G’s Cookie Cakes, is on a state list of such chemicals based solely on laboratory studies in which pure acrylamide was given to rats or mice.The district court dismissed B&G’s complaint based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which provides that those who petition any department of the government for redress are generally immune from statutory liability for their petitioning conduct. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. B&G’s section 1983 suit burdened Embry's petition activities; Embry's prelitigation communications and suit to enforce Proposition 65 were protected by the Petition Clause. B&G failed to show that any of the Noerr-Pennington sham exceptions applied. Even if Embry and her attorney were state actors, the suit was barred. The court remanded to allow B&G to amend its complaint. B&G proposed additional allegations concerning a sham exception that examines the objective reasonableness of a defendant’s suit and the defendant’s subjective motivation. View "B&G Foods North America, Inc. v. Embry" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of four counts of assault in the first degree for his participation in an attack involving two victims, holding that Defendant's allegations of error were unavailing.On appeal, the appellate division considered together Defendant's direct appeal from the judgment and his appeal by permission from Supreme Court's order denying his motion to vacate the judgment. The appellate division denied all relief, concluding that Defendant failed to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. On appeal, Defendant argued that his retained attorney's suspension from practice by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit rendered the attorney "constructively suspended" from the practice of law in New York and that, alternatively, his attorney's failure to inform him of of the suspension and pending reciprocal disciplinary proceedings in New York deprived him of his constitutionally-protected right to choice of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant was not deprived of the attorney of his choice solely due to the imposition of foreign discipline. View "People v. Burgos" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' action challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of the Texas Election Code regulating mail-in balloting is barred by sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the Secretary does not enforce the challenged provisions and thus the district court erred in finding the Secretary was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. View "Lewis v. Hughs" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs' challenges to Texas's system for verifying the signatures on mail-in ballots. The court concluded that the Secretary does not verify mail-in ballots; rather, that is the job of local election officials. Therefore, the district court erred in finding that the Secretary was the proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order enjoining the Secretary, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flores v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' constitutional claims challenging Texas's elimination of straight-ticket voting are barred by sovereign immunity because the Secretary of State does not enforce the law that ended straight-ticket voting. The court agreed with the Secretary that he lacks the necessary connection to enforcing House Bill 25's repeal of straight-ticket voting and therefore is not a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order enjoining the Secretary of State, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas Alliance for Retired Americans v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the predominant relationship between a medical resident and a hospital residency program is an employee-employer relationship, and so the rule of academic deference does not apply to the jury's determination whether the resident was terminated for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons. In this case, plaintiff presented credible evidence of gender discrimination and retaliation by SMMC, and there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the erroneous jury instruction, she would have obtained a more favorable verdict. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Khoiny v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of California the following question: Does California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, which defines “employer” to include “any person acting as an agent of an employer,” Cal. Gov’t Code 12926(d), permit a business entity acting as an agent of an employer to be held directly liable for employment discrimination? View "Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group" on Justia Law