Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Lindke and his ex-girlfriend, Moeller, engaged in a child custody dispute. Moeller obtained a domestic personal protection order (PPO) against Lindke, alleging that Lindke beat her repeatedly, threatened her, and sent nude photos of her to her family, friends, and coworkers. Lindke violated that PPO twice. When it expired, Moeller sought a second PPO, claiming that Lindke continued to harass her online. Michigan state court judge Tomlinson granted another PPO. Moeller obtained sole custody, then sued Lindke in state court, alleging that his “continued harassment . . . on social media” violated the 2016 PPO. Judge Tomlinson found that most of Lindke’s online activity was constitutionally protected speech but that his act of “tagging” Moeller in a specific Facebook post violated the PPO.Rather than appeal that decision, Lindke sued Judge Tomlinson and Sheriff King in federal court, claiming that Michigan’s domestic PPO statute violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). Lindke has previously sued a state-court judge in federal court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, concluding that no subject-matter jurisdiction existed in the case against Judge Tomlinson and that Lindke failed to state a claim against Sheriff King. View "Lindke v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff arrived at Becker County Jail in Minnesota with a number of physical ailments, two weeks later he was taken to the hospital and subsequently diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia. Plaintiff filed an action against Becker County Jail (“BCJ”) and its personnel, claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs, failure to provide adequate training to corrections officers, and negligence. The district court held that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and claims under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).On appeal, the court reasoned that qualified immunity “shields government officials from liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The court found no violation of the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendments because the undisputed facts do not provide sufficient proof that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs nor do they show intentional denial or delay in access to medical care. The court reasoned that Plaintiff gave mixed signals as to the severity of his pain. Because medical professionals failed to grasp the seriousness of his condition, prison staff without medical training could not have been expected to do so. Further, because the individual Defendants are entitled to official immunity, Becker County is entitled to the same immunity. View "Kyle Rusness v. Becker County, Minnesota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges that while he was detained at a detention center, officers subjected him to severe racial harassment, including the use of racial epithets, multiple times per day. He filed several internal grievances, but each was rejected. Plaintiff alleges the grievances were rejected because of his race. Plaintiff challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants. He also argues that the court should have construed his pleadings to include claims for retaliation and violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.Plaintiff argues that his summary judgment evidence and other evidence available in the record was sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Plaintiff identifies three “buckets” of relevant evidence: (1) his counter-affidavits; (2) the internal grievance forms filed with the adult detention center; and (3) other non-summary judgment evidence available in the record.The court found that the evidence does not raise a genuine dispute that either officer was personally involved in racial harassment or discrimination at the detention center. Plaintiff's statement fails to identify any direct or circumstantial evidence that would demonstrate the denial was racially motivated. Further, Plaintiff failed to obtain sworn testimony or documentary evidence asserting specific facts to help prove his claim. The court held that Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence is insufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants were personally involved in racial discrimination or harassment. Thus, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that either officer’s conduct violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and both are entitled to qualified immunity View "Wilbert Glover v. Matt Bostrom" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming Defendant's conviction of murder, holding that the appellate court did not err.On appeal, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in joining Defendant's case with the codefendant's case and that Defendant's right to confrontation was not violated when the trial court allowed a state's firearms examiner to testify about the findings of a second firearms examiner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court did not err in determining that the trial court's joinder of Defendant's and his codefendant's cases was proper; (2) the admission of CSLI information into evidence was not error; and (3) the appellate court did not err by not determining that Defendant's right to confrontation was not violated by the challenged testimony, but the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Tyus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, alleged that a corrections officer unlawfully tampered with his mail. The plaintiff moved pro se to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), but the district court denied his motion upon finding he was barred under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury, an exception that allows prisoners to proceed IFP notwithstanding the three-strikes rule.At issues on appeal are (1) whether the district court properly attributed three strikes to the plaintiff; and (2) must an allegation of imminent danger relate to a prisoner’s underlying claim to get around the PLRA’s three-strikes rule?The Ninth Circuit held a prior lawsuit constitutes a strike when it “was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The court found that the district court properly assessed three strikes based on the plaintiff's prior cases.Next, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff is not entitled IFP status regardless of whether a nexus exists, finding that Section 1915(g) contains a nexus requirement. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling because the plaintiff both accumulated three strikes and failed to establish a sufficient nexus. View "EDWARD RAY, JR. V. E. LARA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession of marijuana, aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude, reckless endangering, and interference with a peace officer, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant pleaded guilty to the offenses, conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of a traffic stop on the ground that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the parties disputed whether Defendant waived his constitutional claim by filing an untimely motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not waive his Fourth Amendment claim; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. View "Barney v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a temporary employee on a construction job suffered a diabetic attack at work. Six days later, the plaintiff was terminated along with several others. After exhausting her administrative remedies, the plaintiff sued her employer in the Eastern District of Texas, bringing claims for damages under the ADA, alleging she had been discriminated against due to her diabetes.The circuit court found that the evidence was that plaintiff was terminated immediately after an event that highlighted her ADA-protected disability. The court reasoned proximity of her diabetic episode on the job and her termination was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case that she was included in the group to be terminated for ADA violative reasons. The court further found that plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to rebut the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for termination and show that a fact question exists as to whether that explanation is pretextual. Thus, the plaintiff established the elements of her prima facie case and she has also presented “substantial evidence” that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory rationale for her inclusion in the reduction in force was pretextual. An issue of material fact remains regarding whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her disability by including her in the reduction of force. View "Gosby v. Apache Industrial" on Justia Law

Battle Creek Officers Ziegler and Kerschen stopped LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante's passenger, Robbins, exited the vehicle. As Kerschen dealt with Robbins, LaPlante exited the vehicle with an open beer and did not comply with orders to put the beer down and stop moving. Ziegler eventually pulled LaPlante to the ground in a prone position. The officers struggled to handcuff LaPlante. It took approximately 90 seconds to effectuate LaPlante’s arrest. Ziegler notified dispatch that LaPlante was experiencing pain and loosened the handcuffs at LaPlante’s request. LaPlante was transported to a hospital before being taken to jail. LaPlante had dislocated his elbow and sustained a small avulsion fracture. LaPlante pleaded guilty to felony DUI and a high misdemeanor charge of attempted obstruction of a police officer. LaPlante had an outstanding felony warrant for absconding parole and the officers recovered marijuana from LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante subsequently sought medical support for a variety of injuries.In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force action, LaPlante alleged that Ziegler threw him to the ground and Kerschen failed to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Ziegler and reversed the denial of qualified immunity as to Kerschen. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LaPlante resisted arrest; the use of a takedown maneuver, in some scenarios, can amount to excessive force. Kerschen did not have enough time to perceive what was going on and intervene. View "LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder, use of a firearm to commit a felony, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, holding that Defendant failed to show that he was entitled to relief on his claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that he was competent to stand trial and erred in admitting evidence that Defendant alleged was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that Defendant was competent to stand trial; and (2) there was no merit to Defendant's second and third assignments of error. View "State v. Surber" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged President Biden’s September 9, 2021 order requiring all executive employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccination. After finding that the equities favored the plaintiffs and that they were likely to succeed at trial, the district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of President Biden’s Order nationwide.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prelamination injunction. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) provides “comprehensive and exclusive procedures” for the review of employment-related disputes between civil-service employees and the federal government. The court held that the CSRA provides meaningful administrative review of the plaintiff’s claims. Because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust available review under the CRSA, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claim. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their claim was "wholly collateral" to the CSRA scheme. View "Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden" on Justia Law