Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of Metro Transit in an action brought by plaintiff, who is blind and deaf, alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). In this case, plaintiff's claims stemmed from 150 complaints he made regarding bus operators' failure to stop at T-Signs and announce the bus route. The court concluded that the record contains evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Metro Transit provided meaningful access to disabled bus riders. The court stated that, at trial, the DOT regulations cited by plaintiff are admissible as evidence that the jury may consider and weigh when determining whether he has met his burden of demonstrating that he was denied meaningful access to Metro Transit's services. View "Segal v. Metropolitan Council" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of Bi-State in an action brought by plaintiff under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiff's claims regarding federal transportation regulations were barred by judicial estoppel where his position on summary judgment is inconsistent with the position he took on Bi-State's motion for a judgment on the pleadings; he persuaded the district court that he was not pursuing a private right of action under the federal regulations; and allowing him to take an inconsistent position would give him an unfair advantage in the litigation.The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court erred when it determined his claims were barred by the previous settlement agreement and, alternatively, granted summary judgment to Bi-State on the merits. The court concluded that, even assuming the agreement does not bar plaintiff's claims, those claims would still fail because he cannot demonstrate that Bi-State denied him meaningful access to its services. In this case, plaintiff has not shown he was denied an opportunity to access the same services as non-disabled riders. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. View "Gustafson v. Bi-State Development Agency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgments of the trial court revoking Defendant's probation pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a.32, holding that Defendant's conduct leading to the revocation was not entitled to First Amendment protection.After an escalated emotional confrontation with the staff of his child's preschool the trial court found that the State had met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant had violated the standard terms of his probation by violating Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-181(a). On appeal, Defendant argued that his remarks warranted First Amendment protection because the State's evidence was insufficient to establish that his remarks constituted a true threat. The appellate court agreed and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court erred in concluding that Defendant's remarks warranted First Amendment protection. View "State v. Taveras" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and the United States filed suit against the State of Texas, as well as state and local officials, seeking to enjoin enforcement of some or all of the new provisions in Senate Bill 1, which amended various provisions of the Texas Election Code pertaining to voter registration, voting by mail, poll watchers, and more.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Committees' motion to intervene as defendants, concluding that the Committees have a right to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court determined that the Committees made a timely application to intervene by right; they claim interests relating to SB 1 which is the subject of this consolidated suit; their absence from the suit may practically impede their ability to protect their interests; and the existing parties might not adequately represent those interests. Accordingly, the court remanded to allow the Committees to intervene by right in this suit. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris County Republican Party" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doe v. Mckesson, 2 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The plaintiff in this personal injury case named as defendants the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) organization1 and DeRay Mckesson (alleged to be a leader and co- founder of BLM). The plaintiff alleges that he was a duly commissioned police officer for the City of Baton Rouge on July 9, 2016, when he was ordered to respond to a protest “staged and organized by” BLM and DeRay Mckesson, which was in response to the July 5, 2016 death of Alton Sterling, who was shot by a Baton Rouge police officer when Sterling resisted arrest. The issues raised by the Fifth Circuit were: (1) whether Louisiana law recognized a duty, under the facts alleged in the complaint, or otherwise, not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party; (2) assuming Mckesson could otherwise be held liable for a breach of duty owed to Officer Doe, whether Louisiana’s Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine barred recovery under the facts alleged in the complaint. The Court answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in the negative. View "Doe v. McKesson et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against University officials, alleging that the University's policy requiring a permit to engage in public speech on the University's sidewalk violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Eleventh Circuit previously concluded, among other things, that plaintiff had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his case and agreed with the district court that the sidewalk at issue is a limited public forum and thus the University's permit requirement needed to be only reasonable and view-point neutral.In this appeal, after careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argument—and even assuming that the City of Tuscaloosa owns the sidewalk at issue—the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with plaintiff that any facts material to its analysis have changed. Accordingly, the court again concluded that the sidewalk is a limited public forum. The court also reviewed the permitting requirement and found that the policy provisions on leafletting were reasonable, and that plaintiff's actions do not fall within the "casual recreational and social activities" exception. The court concluded that the University's advance-notice requirement was reasonable where the University phrases the ten-day advance-notice period in terms of "should," not "must," and the record contains no evidence that the University has rejected an application simply because it was not submitted ten days before the event. Furthermore, the University's reasons for the advance-notice requirement are also reasonable, and the sidewalk is a limited public forum. Moreover, the policy permits the fast-tracking of a permit if an event relates to a current issue or responds to another event. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Keister v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, rendered after a second jury trial, of second-degree murder, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.Over twenty-five years after the murder in this case, a woman told a cold-case investigator about a murder confession she witnessed as a girl from Defendant. Defendant was ultimately charged with and convicted of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as to Defendant's argument that the prosecution failed to timely disclose that certain evidence had been determined unsuitable for standard DNA testing, Defendant could have sought DNA testing prior to trial but chose not to do so, and Defendant may still pursue specialized DNA testing in a postconviction proceeding; (2) the twenty-six year delay in prosecution did not prejudice Defendant's ability to make her case, and there was no bad faith on the part of the prosecution; (3) the district court did not err in allowing the jury to scrutinize the credibility of witnesses; and (4) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Defendant guilty of second-degree murder. View "State v. Cahill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding Defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance and finding him to be a habitual criminal, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Defendant was arrested after a police officer discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in Defendant's vehicle and his person. After his conviction, Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and finding him to be a habitual criminal, and asserting that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion and that Defendant's ineffective assistance claims were either without merit or not alleged with sufficient particularity. View "State v. Drake" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction of carrying a firearm without a license, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.At issue was whether police officers may conduct a traffic stop on the basis of a traffic violation after having resolved the violation at a prior encounter, then having allowed the vehicle to leave, without any other traffic violation taking place. Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the traffic stop in this case under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress and vacated his conviction, holding (1) police may not conduct a traffic stop on the basis of a traffic violation after having previously addressed the violation and having resolved the issue in a separate, discrete encounter; and (2) in the instant case, police lacked the authority to conduct the second traffic stop, and therefore, the stop was unreasonable under article 14. View "Commonwealth v. Daveiga" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in this civil rights action brought by plaintiff against his prior employer with one exception: the court reversed as to the hostile work environment claim. The court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, a single incident of harassment, if sufficiently severe, can give rise to a viable Title VII claim. In this case, the incident plaintiff has pleaded, that his supervisor directly called him a racial epithet containing the n-word in front of his fellow employees, states an actionable claim of hostile work environment. The court remanded for further consideration. View "Woods v. Cantrell" on Justia Law