Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the habeas court denying in part Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the habeas court correctly concluded that Petitioner did not demonstrate that he had suffered prejudice from the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.Petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica who held a valid green card, pleaded guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine, to risk of injury to a child and strangulation in the third degree. The federal government subsequently initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner based, in part, on his conviction of risk of injury to a child. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that he would have gone to trial had his trial counsel not performed deficiently. The habeas court denied the petition as to the claim at issue in this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not meet his burden of establishing that there was a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial. View "Grant v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance, holding that the exclusion of "distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco" from the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 35-7-1031(a)(ii), did not violate Defendant's constitutional equal protection rights.In his motion to dismiss, Defendant argued that the Act violated his rights to equal protection and substantive due process under the United States and Wyoming Constitutions by operating in an unequal and disparate manner because the Act excludes from its application tobacco and alcohol. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the regulation of substances contained in the Act was reasonably related to the State's legitimate interests and did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to equal protection. View "Hardison v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court reducing the jury's punitive damages award against HALO Branded Solutions, Inc., holding that the circuit court's application of the punitive damages cap in Mo. Rev. Stat. 510.265 did not violate All Star Awards & Ad Specialities Inc.'s right to a jury trial, and the reduced award did not violate HALO's due process rights.All Star brought this action against HALO and All Star's employee, Doug Ford. A jury found HALO tortiously interfered with All Star's business expectancy, that Ford breached his duty of loyalty to All Star, and that HALO conspired with Ford to breach this duty of loyalty. The jury awarded All Star $525,542 in actual damages and assessed $5.5 million in punitive damages against HALO. The circuit court applied section 510.265 and capped the punitive damages award at five times All Star's actual damages - or $2,627,709 - and entered final judgment in accordance with the jury's verdicts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly reduced All Star's award of punitive damages; and (2) the reduced award was within the constitutional parameters of due process. View "All Star Awards & Ad Specialties, Inc. v. HALO Branded Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Minnesota Governor Walz (“Walz”) signed an executive order mandating a statewide residential eviction moratorium. Heights Apartments, LLC (“Heights”), a property owner of residential units, challenged the executive orders, raising First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims under Section 1983.The court found that the plaintiffs met the two-prong test to determine whether a state has impermissibly interfered with a contract. However, the court held that Heights has failed to allege a cognizable Petition Clause claim because the only potential remedy is damages; Heights has not pleaded damages that are somehow unique to its Petition Clause claim.Heights alleged it was deprived of its expected return on investment in the form of rental income. These alleged damages are sufficient to plausibly give rise to a Fifth Amendment takings claim. Finally, Heights has alleged violations of various rights that trigger protections under other constitution amendments; however, it has failed to plausibly plead a substantive due process violation. Thus, Heights has plausibly argued constitutional claims under the Contract Clause and Takings Clause. The court reversed the dismissal of those two claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Heights Apartments, LLC v. Tim Walz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court suppressing Defendant's blood test results in the State's prosecution of Defendant for operating under the influence, holding that the findings of the court did not support its legal conclusion that Defendant did not voluntarily give his consent.In suppressing the blood test results the trial court concluded that the blood draw was a result of simple acquiescence to the trooper's authority. On appeal, the State argued that the trial court erred in concluding that Defendant did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and reversed the the trial court's order suppressing the evidence, holding that, in the totality of the circumstances, holding that Defendant's response to the trooper's request objectively manifested free and voluntary consent. View "State v. Croteau" on Justia Law

The 2020 census revealed that Wisconsin’s State Assembly and Senate districts were no longer equally apportioned. The Governor vetoed new maps passed by the legislature. The Wisconsin Supreme Court invited proposed maps and selected the Governor's proposed maps; the Assembly map created seven majority-black districts—one more than the current map. The court stated there were “good reasons” to think that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301 “may” require the additional majority-black district.The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Under the Equal Protection Clause, districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest, such as compliance with the VRA. Preconditions to demonstrating a VRA violation require showings that the minority group is sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district, the minority group is politically cohesive, and a majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate. If the preconditions are established, a court considers the totality of circumstances.The Governor’s main explanation for the seventh majority-black district was that there is now a sufficiently large and compact population of black residents to fill it. Strict scrutiny requires more. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis of the preconditions improperly relied on generalizations and “made virtually no effort” to parse data at the district level or respond to criticisms of expert analysis. The court improperly reduced the totality-of-circumstances analysis to a single factor–proportionality--and failed to address whether a race-neutral alternative that did not add another majority-black district would deny black voters equal political opportunity. View "Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

In 2014, Franklin was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on six prior convictions, including three for Minnesota burglary and two for Illinois residential burglary. Franklin neither appealed nor pursued 28 U.S.C. 2255 collateral relief within a year. He sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 after the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision clarified that the Minnesota convictions did not qualify as ACCA predicates. Because three qualifying convictions remained, the district judge denied relief. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that Illinois residential burglary convictions do not qualify as ACCA predicates. The government conceded that Franklin’s sentence is unlawful but opposed section 2241 relief, arguing that Franklin could have challenged the use of his Illinois burglary convictions as ACCA predicates on direct appeal or in a timely section 2255 motion.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of relief, citing its “Davenport” holding that a federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus "if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255 motion.” Before the Mathis decision, any challenge to the use of his Minnesota or his Illinois burglaries as ACCA predicates was destined to fail given Eighth Circuit precedent. The limitations period in section 2255(f) blocked a Mathis-based motion in the sentencing court. View "Franklin v. Keyes" on Justia Law

Thompson was living with his fiancée and their newborn baby in a Brooklyn apartment. Thompson’s sister-in-law, apparently suffering from mental illness, called 911 to report that Thompson was sexually abusing the baby. When Emergency Medical Technicians arrived, Thompson denied that anyone had called 911. The EMTs returned with police officers, Thompson told them that they could not enter without a warrant. The police nonetheless entered. Thompson was arrested and charged with obstructing governmental administration and resisting arrest. EMTs took the baby to the hospital where medical professionals examined her and found no signs of abuse. Thompson was detained for two days. The charges against Thompson were dismissed without any explanation. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Thompson’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim.The Supreme Court reversed, resolving a split among the Circuits. To demonstrate favorable termination of criminal prosecution for purposes of a section 1983 Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff need not show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence but need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. The American tort-law consensus as of 1871 did not require a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit to show that his prosecution ended with an affirmative indication of innocence; similarly construing Thompson’s claim is consistent with “the values and purposes” of the Fourth Amendment. Questions concerning whether a defendant was wrongly charged, or whether an individual may seek redress for wrongful prosecution, cannot reasonably depend on whether the prosecutor or court explained why charges were dismissed. Requiring a plaintiff to show that his prosecution ended with an affirmative indication of innocence is not necessary to protect officers from unwarranted civil suits. View "Thompson v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that "tower dumps" are not per se unconstitutional and that investigators may use tower dumps so long as they comply with the warrant requirements of article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.The Commonwealth obtained search warrants for seven different "tower dumps," a law enforcement tool that provides investigators with the cell site location information for all devices that connected to specific cell towers during a particular time frame, corresponding to the locations of several crimes. Defendant was ultimately charged with six robberies and a homicide. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the tower dumps as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The superior court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding (1) investigators may use tower dumps so long as they comply with the warrant requirements of article 14; (2) the second of the two warrants in this case was supported by probable cause and therefore did not offend the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; but (3) the first warrant was not supported by probable cause, and any evidence obtained from it must be suppressed. View "Commonwealth v. Perry" on Justia Law

Gaddis cut branches from McCombs’s tree that extended into his yard and threw them into McCombs’s yard. McCombs asked Gaddis to pick up the branches but he ignored her. Upon learning that a neighbor, Winstead, had spoken to McCombs about the branches Gaddis went to Winstead’s home and told Winstead to mind his own business. McCombs called the police. Officers arrived. After talking to neighbors, they told Gaddis through the door that he was being arrested for disorderly conduct. Gaddis refused to come out of his home. He stepped outside after officers stated he could also be charged with resisting arrest. Gaddis was arrested for disorderly conduct. Neighbors claimed that Gaddis was erratic and threatening. Gaddis brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the officers, the city of Marion, and the neighbors, asserting false arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The police report provides ample information from which officers could have reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Gaddis for disorderly conduct. The consensual discussions between the officers and Gaddis did not amount to a “seizure.” At the time of Gaddis’s arrest, it was not clearly established that the officers’ statements that he would be charged with resisting arrest, followed by his choice to come out and face arrest, would violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on routine warrantless arrests inside the home. View "Gaddis v. DeMattei" on Justia Law