Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the habeas court dismissing Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus as barred by a procedural default, holding that Petitioner's pleadings met the standard necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. In the instant case, Petitioner sought a second writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he suffered from severe intellectual disabilities and mental health afflictions at the time of trial and that he was denied due process because he was incompetent to be prosecuted and to stand trial. The habeas court dismissed the petition on the ground that Petitioner's due process claims were procedurally defaulted. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner was not precluded from raising a freestanding competency claim; and (2) the habeas court erred in finding that Petitioner failed to allege sufficient prejudice to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

When a person is arrested for driving under the influence, the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") holds a hearing to determine if the driver's license should be suspended. The DMV requires that the hearing officers act as both advocates for the DMV as well as triers of fact. The DMV also authorizes managers to change hearing officers’ decisions, or demand hearing officers change their decisions, without providing notice to the driver.Plaintiffs, a group of lawyers, challenged the DMV's administrative hearings process on three grounds. The district court resolved one of Plaintiffs' grounds in favor of the DMV in summary judgment, entering judgment as a matter of law for Plaintiffs on their two remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the hearing officers' dual roles as an advocate for the DMV and adjudicator violates drivers’ due process rights; and (2) granting the DMV’s motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim.The Second Appellate District reversed on these issues, finding Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all their 1983 claim. The lack of neutral hearing officers violates drivers’ federal and state due process rights. The court also found that the trial court did not err in awarding attorneys fees to Plaintiffs. However, because Plaintiff's succeeded on appeal, the court remanded the case for a recalculation of the attorney's fee award. View "California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA2/" on Justia Law

Previously, a panel of 11th Circuit judges affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's 42 Sec. 1983 claims under the three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The panel based its decision on precedent holding that a "dismissal for failure to exhaust qualifies as a strike under the PLRA."The court voted, deciding to hear the appeal en banc. Thus, the panel's decision was vacated. View "Jeremy John Wells v. Warden, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reinstating Respondent's driving privileges, holding that the OAH incorrectly reversed the revocation of Respondent's driving privileges.After Respondent was arrested under suspicion for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs (DUI) a sample of his blood was drawn for testing. The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Respondent's driving privileges. When Respondent appealed, DMV advised that the blood sample had been destroyed without testing. The OAH reversed the revocation, reasoning that the State violated Respondent's due process rights by depriving him of the opportunity to present potentially exculpatory evidence as a result of his blood sample. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was error to find that the destruction of Respondent's blood sample violated his right to due process; and (2) reversing Respondent's revocation was error. View "Frazier v. Null" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that the district court did not err in denying the motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in death and was sentenced to imprisonment for seventy years to life. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Defendant later filed her motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. The district court concluded that the motion should be summarily dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it denied Defendant's postconviction claims without an evidentiary hearing. View "State v. Cullen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed two of Defendant's convictions in this case arising from a fatal drug overdose and remanded the case to the circuit court to resentencing, holding that the convictions violated the constitutional prohibition against putting an individual twice in jeopardy.Defendant was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), delivery of a controlled substance (Fentanyl), conspiracy to commit a felony, drug delivery resulting in death, and possession of Fentanyl. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in permitting Defendant to be convicted of both delivery of a controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance causing death; and (2) there was no error in regard to Defendant's remaining two issues. View "State v. Duke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court enjoining the enforcement of the Bentonville School District's mask policy in favor of Plaintiffs, parents of school children, holding that the the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO).In granting the TRO, the circuit court concluded that the school policy at issue violated Plaintiffs' right under Ark. Const. art. II, 21 and 29 to care for their children and that the District lacked the authority to issue the mask policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that the policy violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights and was enacted without proper authority; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to show that irreparable harm would result in the absence of a TRO. View "Bentonville School District v. Sitton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' son was killed when he attempted to drive through a low water crossing in Camp Bullis, a military training base outside San Antonio, Texas. As Plaintiff's son navigated the crossing, water swept across the road, ultimately resulting in his death.Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States, claiming the government failed to inspect the low water crossing, failed to warn approaching motorists about the dangers of flooding, and failed to install guard rails that may have prevented water from accumulating on the road. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, finding the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") applied.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under the FTCA, the federal government waives sovereign immunity for actions based on the negligence of federal employees who are acting within the scope of their employment. However, immunity is not waived if the federal employee is carrying out a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency. To be discretionary, an action must involve some element of judgment or choice.Here, the relevant regulation states that "[a]ll Range/Control Area/Impact Area gates will either be locked or guarded by the unit using the area." A natural reading of the regulation imposed an obligation on the officers who were on-site to lock the gate. Thus, the discretionary exception to the FTCA did not apply. View "Barron v. USA" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to medical providers at Orange County Jail in 1983 claims alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Plaintiff, a detainee who died from a ruptured aortic dissection.The court stated to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that a reasonable official would have understood that their actions presented an unconstitutional substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Defendant, the on-call physician at the time, could not have reasonably believed that he could provide constitutionally adequate care without even examining a patient with Plaintiff’s symptoms. Therefore, the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to this Defendant.The court further held that the first nurse to see Plaintiff had access to facts from which an inference could be drawn that Plaintiff was at serious risk. The court held that the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to Defendant.The court also held that the second nurse to see Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity. Reasoning that a jury could not reasonably conclude that this Defendant was deliberately indifferent. Finally, the court held that the third nurse to see Plaintiff was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would have inferred that Plaintiff was at serious risk if not hospitalized. View "PATRICK RUSSELL V. JOCELYN LUMITAP" on Justia Law

Vacaville Officer Hill followed a car and noticed the license plate light and third brake light at the vehicle's back window appeared not to be working. Hill initiated a traffic stop. Pantoja was alone in the car. When Pantoja gave his name, Hill remembered Pantoja “had a history of violence and firearm possession, and he was at the time an investigative lead in a homicide.” There was no smell of marijuana and no contraband in plain view. Hill saw no signs that Pantoja was intoxicated. Hill ran a record check and learned Pantoja had a valid license and was not on probation or parole. Hill asked Pantoja if he could look in the vehicle for contraband. Pantoja declined. Hill then asked Pantoja to exit his car and put his hands behind his head because Hill was going to issue a citation for the lighting infractions. Pantoja did not make any furtive gestures or sudden movements. As Hill patted Pantoja’s waistband area, he found a revolver. Pantoja was arrested.The trial court granted Pantoja’s motion to suppress, explaining: “[T]he officer … didn’t have any specific or articulable facts to believe that this individual was presently armed or dangerous. The court of appeal affirmed. An officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s past arrests or convictions is inadequate to furnish reasonable suspicion as is the knowledge that a suspect is merely under investigation. View "People v. Pantoja" on Justia Law