Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Oregon minority-party state senator alleged that majority party members retaliated against him for engaging in protected speech when Defendants ordered him not to enter the state capitol without giving them 12 hours advance notice.     The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The court held that Plaintiff’s complaint raised a plausible inference that he was engaged in protected speech. However, in considering Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s speech was unprotected fighting words, the court held that at the motion to dismiss stage, it could not say that Plaintiff’s statements created a likelihood that the person addressed would make an immediate violent response.   The court explained that an elected official raising a First Amendment retaliation claim has the initial burden of pleading and proving that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant official to demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would have taken the action complained of.   Here, Plaintiff satisfied the second prong of the prima facie test and his complaint plausibly alleged that his speech played a part in the retaliation. Thus, Defendants’ affirmative defense was not grounds for dismissal at the pleading stage. View "BRIAN BOQUIST V. PETER COURTNEY" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of the first-degree murder of his father and the second-degree murders of his stepmother and stepsister and sentencing him to death, holding that Defendant's second-degree murder convictions must be reversed.A federal court vacated Defendant's initial conviction and sentence. After a retrial, Defendant was convicted of first- and second-degree murder, and the jury found true a multiple-murder special-circumstance finding and various firearm- and weapon-use findings. Defendant was sentenced to death. At trial, Defendant's counsel conceded his responsibility for the deaths of all three victims, but Defendant was willing to accept responsibility only for the killing of his father and objected to admitting responsibility for the other two deaths. The Supreme Court held (1) defense counsel violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to choose the fundamental objectives of his defense; and (2) while the error did not affect Defendant's first-degree murder conviction or the associated firearm-use finding, the error requires reversal of the remainder of the judgment and the judgment of death. View "People v. Bloom" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court finding co-defendants Adrianna Reecy and Kevin Dickerson guilty of robbery and burglary and also finding Dickerson guilty of aggravated assault against Julio Rojas, holding that exclusion of certain evidence resulted in violation of both defendants' Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.On appeal, both defendants argued that the circuit court erred in precluding any reference to Rojas's immigration status and in admitting into evidence an exhibit listing transactions from Rojas's debit card. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the circuit court's exclusion of the immigration evidence was error, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the circuit court erred in admitting the bank records at issue because the State did not lay an adequate foundation for the admission of the documents and the court erroneously determined that Rojas was a qualified witness, as contemplated by the exception to the hearsay rule. View "State v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant for capital murder in the death of a police officer. The Fifth Circuit rejected Appellant's last-minute efforts to stop the imposition of his sentence.The Fifth Circuit held that Appellant is unlikely to prevail on his request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”), and he is unlikely to succeed on his Sec. 1983 claim. In addressing habeas, the court rejected Appellant's request for COA on his future-dangerousness claim, and his request for COA on his Lackey claim. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a stay of execution and dismissal of the 1983 claim and denied the COA.Here, Appellant argued his death sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it was based in part on the jury’s finding of a “probability that Appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” The court explained that reasonable jurors would not find it debatable whether Sec. 2244(b)(1) barred this claim. Further, the court reasoned that it’s undebatable that this claim is procedurally defaulted. Additionally, the court held substantive meritlessness is an independent ground for refusing a COA on Plaintiff’s future-dangerousness claim. Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s claim is not a method-of-execution challenge; it is a challenge to the validity of his death sentence. It is therefore not cognizable under Sec. 1983. View "Buntion v. Collier" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the subjects of an unconstitutional search. Relying on the fruits of that search, prosecutors obtained grand jury indictments against Plaintiffs. After a court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the criminal charges against Plaintiffs, they sued the state trooper who conducted the search under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim, reasoning that their 1983 claim was based on an unconstitutional search and seizure of property and accrued at the time of the search. Thus, because Plaintiffs filed suit more than two years after the search the 1983 claim is time-barred.Plaintiffs argued that, even if a Fourth Amendment search claim typically accrues at the time of the search, this particular search claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed because the claim “necessarily threatens to impugn” their prosecutions. Plaintiffs argue that a favorable-termination accrual rule is required anytime a 1983 claim “necessarily threatens to impugn” a prosecution. The court disagreed, finding that the accrual date is based on the nature of the constitutional violation when it is completed. The court found the claim accrued when the trooper performed the unlawful search in 2014. And the applicable two-year statute of limitations ran out well before Plaintiff’s sued in 2019. Thus the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Fernando Smith v. Michael Travelpiece" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of possession of marijuana, holding that the traffic stop in this case was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances.Defendant was the passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for following a semi-truck too closely. The officer requested a drug-detection canine to be dispatched to the location and subsequently found approximately forty-two pounds of marijuana. Defendant was subsequently charged with two drug-related counts. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the initial traffic stop was unreasonable. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Defendant entered a guilty plea to count two. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the traffic violation for following too closely was not objectively justified and was unreasonable at its inception; and (2) therefore, the district court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress. View "Levenson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion collaterally attacking two prior convictions from 1995 and 2002, holding that the lack of a transcript meant that Defendant retained the burden to prove a violation of her right to counsel occurred.Defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI), and her driving record showed three prior OWI convictions. Defendant collaterally attacked two of those convictions, claiming that she did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her right to counsel. The relevant documents of the convictions, however, no longer existed, and the State could therefore not produce transcripts from either case at the motion hearing. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion, concluding that Defendant's testimony shifted the burden to the State, which submitted insufficient evidence to refute the testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant retained the burden to demonstrate a violation of her right to counsel. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 alleging that the prosecution violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.C. 79 (1986) during his criminal trial, holding that there was no error.Based on an interaction with four white men outside an apartment building Petitioner was convicted in the Maine Superior Court of reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. Petitioner later filed his petition for habeas corpus. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that the prosecution's race-neutral explanation for striking the sole person of color from the jury pool was not pretextual and, therefore, that there was no purposeful discrimination. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error. View "Hollis v. Magnusson" on Justia Law

In the course of responding to a dispute between neighbors, a Deputy fatally shot a man while he was standing inside his home holding a loaded shotgun. The personal representative of the deceased's estate (“the Estate”), subsequently brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming that the Deputy used excessive force in violation of the deceased’s Fourth Amendment rights, along with various related state law claims.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the following claims and remand the case for further proceedings: (1) the 1983 claim against the Deputy in his individual capacity; (2) the wrongful death claim for both compensatory and punitive damages under North Carolina law against the Deputy in his individual capacity; and (3) the claims under the Macon County Sheriff’s Office’s surety bond against the Deputy and Sheriff in their official capacities, and against Western Surety, for up to $25,000 in damages.Notably, the court found that parties’ factual disputes are quintessentially “genuine” and “material.” Assuming that a jury would credit the Estate’s expert evidence over the Deputy’s competing testimony and expert evidence, leads to the conclusion that the Deputy’s use of force was objectively unreasonable.The court affirmed the district court’s conclusions that: (1) the Estate’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law; (2) Macon County’s liability insurance policy preserves the Sheriff’s Office’s governmental immunity from suit; and (3) the Estate’s claims brought directly under the North Carolina Constitution are precluded. View "Melissa Knibbs v. Anthony Momphard, Jr." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the habeas court dismissing Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus as barred by a procedural default, holding that Petitioner's pleadings met the standard necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. In the instant case, Petitioner sought a second writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he suffered from severe intellectual disabilities and mental health afflictions at the time of trial and that he was denied due process because he was incompetent to be prosecuted and to stand trial. The habeas court dismissed the petition on the ground that Petitioner's due process claims were procedurally defaulted. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner was not precluded from raising a freestanding competency claim; and (2) the habeas court erred in finding that Petitioner failed to allege sufficient prejudice to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law