Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Whyte was convicted of second-degree intentional homicide for killing his girlfriend, Weiland, during a 2006 altercation. In his habeas petition, Whyte argued his constitutional rights were violated when he was required to wear a stun belt in front of the jury. The parties dispute whether the jury ever saw the stun belt or understood the nature of the device but when Whyte took the stand to testify, he declined to reenact the altercation with Weiland for fear the jury would see the device and draw negative inferences. Whyte also claims the belt had a chilling effect on his testimony, rendering his account of the incident “stilted” and “emotionless,” which the state underscored in its closing argument. Whyte’s trial counsel did not object to the stun belt’s use. Whyte also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Whyte’s claims are procedurally defaulted under adequate and independent state grounds, so federal review is foreclosed. Whyte failed to challenge the stun belt or the effectiveness of his trial counsel, either on direct appeal or in a state court post-conviction motion. Whyte offered no external impediment that prevented him from complying with the state court pleading standards. View "Whyte v. Winkleski" on Justia Law

Two female students at Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS), were videoed by other students engaging in sexual activity with male students at school. One student told school officials that the incident was forcible rape; afraid to remain at the school, she enrolled in a new school. When the other girl’s mother asked that something be done about the circulation of the video, school officials stated that it was a criminal matter and to contact Metro Police; the girl was called names in the hallway and threatened. She finished the school year at home.In a suit alleging violations of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted MNPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Disciplinary records established that MNPS was aware of issues with sexual harassment in the school system before the two students reported their incidents. Many of these incidents involved photos or videos. To hold MNPS is immune from liability as long as no student is assaulted twice, would defeat Title IX’s purpose. With respect to one girl’s treatment after notifying the school of her harassment, a reasonable jury could conclude that, rather than take steps to remedy the violation, MNPS opted to avoid the problem, resulting in her having to homeschool or endure further misconduct. View "Doe v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

Hasanaj, a teacher certified in Michigan, was employed by the Detroit Public Schools as a teacher for 10 years under a series of contracts. After about seven years, the District stopped sending him contract renewal notices. Hasanaj received “ineffective” ratings in the three years that followed. The District dismissed him as required by Mich. Comp. Laws 380.1249(2)(j).Hasanaj sued, alleging procedural due process violations because he and defendants “acted with the understanding that he had tenure,” the evaluation ratings violated Michigan’s statutory evaluation system, and now he cannot use his certificate to teach in Michigan. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit. Hasanaj has not satisfied Michigan’s Teachers’ Tenure Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 38.71-.191, and has no protected property interest in continued employment. Hasanaj has not alleged that he satisfied the statutory probation requirements to acquire tenure. A contract or a tacit understanding cannot override the statutory requirements. It is irrelevant that Hasanaj stopped receiving contract renewal notices, that the three-strikes provision was invoked for firing him, that he was notified that he could appeal to the Tenure Commission, and that the parties stipulated before the Tenure Commission that Hasanaj obtained tenure. Nor was he deprived of his liberty to pursue his profession because he still holds a valid certificate to teach. View "Hasanaj v. Detroit Public Schools Community District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court finding Defendant guilty of first degree murder and the jury's findings of the lying-in-wait special circumstance and the special circumstance allegations that Defendant intentionally killed the victim for financial gain while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of rape, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to initiate competency proceedings; (2) there was no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings; (3) sufficient evidence supported the jury's true findings of the special circumstances, and the special circumstances, as applied, are not unconstitutional; (4) there was no instructional error; (5) Defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct were without merit; and (6) Defendant's remaining claims of error were unavailing. View "People v. Parker" on Justia Law

Wholesale pharmaceutical distributors sued two private entities, OptumRx and National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of constitutional and federal law. They claim that their due process rights were violated when OptumRx announced that its network pharmacies would purchase only from distributors accredited under the Association’s “Verified Accredited Wholesale Distributor” program. The plaintiffs’ applications for VAWD accreditation were canceled with little explanation and no opportunity to challenge the result. Because the criteria for VAWD accreditation were more stringent than the federal Drug Supply Chain Security Act’s requirements, they alleged violations of the Act and the Supremacy Clause.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Most constitutional amendments protect only against wrongs caused by the states or the federal government; section 1983, the main cause of action for seeking damages for constitutional violations, contains a “state actor” requirement, allowing suit only against those who can be fairly said to be acting for the state itself. There is no "state actor" in this case. View "Matrix Distributors Inc v. National Association of Boards of Pharmacy" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit issued a certificate of appealability and concluded that the district court properly denied Section 2254 habeas petition. The court reviewed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland. To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, the petitioner must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.   The court held that counsel’s failure to assert the failure-to-inform theory as trial court error in briefing Petitioner’s appeal could not amount to ineffective assistance under Strickland. The fact that Petitioner was concerned about a joint trial, not joint representation, fully supports the Florida District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) rejection of this ineffective assistance claim. The court reasoned that the trial court appropriately responded to Petitioner’s concern by explaining why Petitioner would not be prejudiced by a joint trial: because the State had charged Petitioner as a principal in the armed robbery, all of the evidence that would be introduced in co-defendant’s trial would be introduced in his as well.   Further, the district court correctly concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that the DCA’s affirmance of this ineffective assistance claim constituted an adjudication that was “contrary to, or an incorrect application of,” the Supreme Court’s holdings in Strickland. View "Gregory Lamar Blackmon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's claims challenging the termination of his employment on free speech grounds, holding that summary judgment was improper in this case.Plaintiff, a former bus driver for the Worcester Regional Transit Authority (WRTA), brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that Defendants violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment to the federal constitution and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) when they terminated his employment following public comments that he made to a television network about proposed budget cuts to the WRTA. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not speaking "as a citizen" during the television interview; and (2) Defendants did not have an adequate justification for treating Plaintiff differently from other members of the general public by terminating him for his protected speech. View "Bruce v. Worcester Regional Transit Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of tampering with a judicial officer and second-degree harassment of his probation officer, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's facial overbreadth challenge to the second-degree harassment statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.091, was without merit; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for second-degree harassment; and (3) the district court did not violate Defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy when it sentenced Defendant for both tampering with a judicial officer and second-degree harassment. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of assault with a weapon, a felony, and misdemeanor possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia and sentencing him to a nine-year prison term, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the State's peremptory strike of the only non-white member of the jury venire was not plain error under the three-prong equal protection analysis set forth by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) Defendant failed to establish plain error as to his arguments regarding various unpreserved assertions of error regarding the prosecutor’s closing argument and rebuttal comments; and (3) defense counsel's withdrawal of the Batson challenge and failure to object to certain statements by the prosecutor did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion for entry of an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 922, incorporated into Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. 2101-2241, through 48 U.S.C. 2161(a), holding that Defendants were entitled to an automatic stay.Plaintiffs, who owned an operated the Integrand Assurance Company, sued Defendants, Puerto Rico government officials whose defense was assumed by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico pursuant to the Commonwealth's legal representation and indemnification statute, alleging, among other claims, that the government officials violated their First Amendment rights, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Defendants, who were granted legal representation under Law 9, filed a notice of automatic stay. The district court denied the motion, concluding that PROMESA did not stay the litigation. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the automatic stay provision in Title III of PROMESA applied to this action. View "Victor J. Salgado & Associates v. Cestero-Lopategui" on Justia Law