Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Boston’s City Hall Plaza has three flagpoles; one flies the American flag and another the state flag. The city’s flag usually flies from the third pole but groups may hold ceremonies on the plaza during which participants may hoist a flag of their choosing on the third pole. Over 12 years, Boston approved the raising of about 50 unique flags for 284 such ceremonies, most were other countries’ flags, but some were associated with groups or causes. In 2017, Camp Constitution asked to hold an event on the plaza to celebrate the civic and social contributions of the Christian community and to raise the “Christian flag.” Worried that flying a religious flag could violate the Establishment Clause, the city approved the event but told the group it could not raise its flag. The district court and First Circuit upheld that decision.The Supreme Court reversed. Boston’s flag-raising program does not express government speech so Boston’s refusal to let Camp Constitution fly its flag violated the Free Speech Clause. Employing a “holistic inquiry,” the Court noted that the history of flag flying, particularly at the seat of government, supports Boston, but Boston did not shape or control the flags’ content and meaning and never intended to convey the messages on the flags as its own. The application process did not involve seeing flags before plaza events. The city’s practice was to approve flag raisings without exception. When the government does not speak for itself, it may not exclude private speech based on “religious viewpoint”; doing so “constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.” View "Shurtleff v. Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is one of the principal shareholders of Riley’s American Heritage Farms (“Riley’s Farm”) Schools within the Claremont Unified School District booked and attended field trips to Riley’s Farm. In 2018, Plaintiff used his personal Twitter account to comment on a range of controversial social and political topics. After some parents complained and a local newspaper published an article about Defendant and his Twitter postings, the School District severed its business relationship with Riley’s Farm. Plaintiff brought suit against the School District, individual members of the school board, and three school administrators (the “School defendants”), alleging retaliation for protected speech.   The Ninth Circuit (1) amended its opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment for public school defendants in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action alleging First Amendment violations, (2) denied a petition for rehearing, (3) denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and (4) ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.   The court held there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights had been violated and the individual School defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the damages claims because the right at issue was not clearly established when the conduct took place. The court further held that Defendant failed to establish that the School District’s asserted interests in preventing disruption to their operations and curricular design because of parental complaints were so substantial that they outweighed Defendant’s free speech interests. View "RILEY'S AMERICAN HERITAGE FARM V. JAMES ELSASSER" on Justia Law

Under rules adopted and enforced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Wisconsin lawyers must join and pay dues to the State Bar of Wisconsin. Active membership in the association is “a condition precedent to the right to practice law” in the state. This regulatory regime, often called an “integrated, mandatory[,] or unified bar,” authorizes the State Bar to use membership dues to aid the courts in the administration of justice, conduct a program of continuing legal education, and maintain “high ideals of integrity, learning, competence… public service[,] and high standards of conduct” in the bar of the state.Attorney File contends that requiring him to join and subsidize the State Bar violates his First Amendment free speech and associational rights. Recognizing that Supreme Court precedent forecloses this claim (Keller v. State Bar of Cal. (1990)), File argued that the Court’s more recent cases—particularly “Janus” (2018)--implicitly overruled Keller. The district court rejected this argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Keller “may be difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s more recent First Amendment caselaw, but on multiple occasions and in no uncertain terms, the Court has instructed lower courts to resist invitations to find its decisions overruled by implication.” View "File v. Kastner" on Justia Law

Novak created “The City of Parma Police Department” Facebook account to exercise his “fundamental American right” of “[m]ocking our government officials.” He published posts “advertising” free abortions in a police van and a “Pedophile Reform event.” Some readers called the police station. Officers verified that the official page had not been hacked, then posted a notice on the Department’s page, confirming that it was the official account and warning that the fake page was “being investigated.” Novak copied that post onto his knockoff page. Officers asked Facebook to preserve all records related to the account and take down the page. Lieutenant Riley issued a press release and appeared on the nightly news. Novak deleted the page. The investigation continued. Officers got a search warrant for Facebook, discovered that Novak was the author, then obtained an arrest warrant and a search warrant based on an Ohio law that makes it illegal to use a computer to disrupt or impair police functions. Officers arrested Novak, searched his apartment, and seized his phone and laptop. He spent four days in jail before making bond.Indicted for disrupting police functions, Novak was acquitted. In Novak’s subsequent suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The officers reasonably believed they were acting within the law. The officers could reasonably believe that some of Novak’s Facebook activity was not parody, not protected, and fair grounds for probable cause. View "Novak v. City of Parma, Ohio" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the district court’s application of the independent intermediary doctrine to dismiss their Fourth Amendment false arrest claims. Plaintiffs are motorcyclists who had gathered at a meeting and were eventually arrested following a shootout for Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity (“EIOCA”). All were arrested pursuant to the same “form warrant affidavit” that was presented as the basis for the arrest warrants. Following their arrests, Plaintiffs filed multiple individual Sec. 1983 actions asserting similar false arrest claims, which were premised on alleged defects in the form affidavit used to secure the arrest warrants. The district court granted in full the motion to dismiss the false arrest claims, but it did not discuss the merits of the claims.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and found in favor of Plaintiffs in their challenge of the district court’s application of the independent intermediary doctrine to dismiss their Fourth Amendment false arrest claims. The court held that the district court erred in its application of the independent intermediary doctrine. The court reasoned that an adequately pled Malley or Franks claim will also suffice to functionally apply the taint exception to the magistrate’s decision, if a plaintiff adequately pleads that a second intermediary, such as a grand jury, has been misled in a similar fashion, then the taint exception will apply to that intermediary’s decision as well. The court declined to decide whether Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a Franks violation with respect to any of the named defendants. View "Miller, et al v. Stroman, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, Ky R. Crim. P. 10.02, Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02, and Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.03 motion for relief, holding that the circuit court did not err.Appellant was convicted of two counts of complicity to murder and other crimes and sentenced to death. In the instant motion, Appellant argued that McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018), governed his claim that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. The circuit court denied the motion, determining that the claim was both substantively and procedurally improper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's denial of relief. View "Epperson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding Defendant guilty of two counts of murder and four counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree and sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility of parole, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.In 2012, a jury found Defendant guilty but mentally ill of murder and wanton endangerment. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. On remand, the main issue at trial was Defendant's affirmative defense of insanity or, in the alternative, extreme emotional disturbance. A jury found Defendant guilty of the crimes and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Defendant's claims on appeal were without merit. View "Hall v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of one count of felony child molestation, holding that the trial court denied Defendant's requests for a continuance.An impermissible local rule and an improperly issued protective order prevented Defendant's defense attorney from obtaining a copy of the alleged victim's interview. Further, the trial court denied Defendant's requests for a continuance when the state disclosed extensive new evidence the day before trial in order to investigate the new allegations and reconstruct trial strategy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in prohibiting Defendant from obtaining a copy of the interview before trial, but reversal was not required on this basis; and (2) abused its discretion by denying Defendant's continuance request, and the error was prejudicial. View "Ramirez v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and other crimes, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence found at her apartment, denying her motion to suppress the evidence found in her vehicle, and violating her right to confront a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the trial justice's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the apartment based on insufficient probable cause; (2) the trial justice did not clearly err in denying Defendant's request for a Franks hearing; (3) the warrantless seizure of Defendant's vehicle did not violate her rights under either the State or Federal Constitution; and (4) Defendant's Confrontation Clause argument was waived. View "State v. Hudgen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of fifteen counts of unlawful possession of a firearm following a jury trial, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error by allowing the jury to hear a prejudicial, out-of-court statement made by a witness who never appeared or testified at trial.After Defendant was arrested on allegations of domestic violence against his wife, Beckey, Beckey told officers that Defendant illegally possessed numerous firearms. Defendant was subsequently charged with fifteen counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm. During trial, the out-of-court statement made by Beckey, who did not appear at trial, was elicited during an officer's testimony. The circuit court ruled that Beckey’s statement could be considered as substantive evidence. Defendant was subsequently convicted. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, holding that the circuit court prejudicially erred in allowing the officer's testimony over Defendant's violation. View "State v. Hollowell" on Justia Law