Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the state holds exclusive title to Lake Michigan and its shores up to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark. The plaintiffs, who own beachfront property on Lake Michigan’s Indiana shores, believed that their property extended to the low-water mark, and filed suit, alleging that the ruling amounted to a taking of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment–a “judicial taking.” The defendants were Indiana officeholders in their official capacities: the Governor, the Attorney General, the Department of Natural Resources Director, and the State Land Office Director.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. None of the named officials caused the plaintiffs’ asserted injury or is capable of redressing it, so the plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Pavlock v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for felony driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI), holding that there was no harmless error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not violate Defendant's right to equal protection by denying his Batson objection to the State's peremptory strike of the only racial minority member of the venire; (2) while one of the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument was erroneous, the prosecutor's remarks, considered cumulatively, did not violate Defendant's right to a fair trial; and (3) the district court did not err when it relied on one of Defendant's prior convictions to support enhancement of his DUI conviction to a felony offense and in determining that the prior conviction was constitutionally valid. View "State v. Wellknown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs and misdemeanor criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized after a vehicle search that resulted from an unlawfully prolonged investigative driving under the influence (DUI) stop. The district court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that the initial stop of Defendant was lawful based on a reasonable particularized suspicion of DUI. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) while Defendant was lawfully stopped on a reasonable particularized suspicion of DUI, the officers unlawfully prolonged the duration of the stop before subjecting Defendant to the confirmatory DUI field sobriety testing; and (2) therefore, the district court erroneously denied Defendant's motion to suppress. View "State v. Zeimer" on Justia Law

As a condition of getting a permit, the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (“LADOT”) required e-scooter operators to provide vehicle location data through an application programming interface called Mobility Data Specification (“MDS”). Plaintiff, an e-scooter user, filed a complaint alleging that the location disclosure requirement violates the Fourth Amendment and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit first held that Plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts giving rise to Article III standing and therefore the court rejected LADOT’s assertion that the complaint was beyond the court’s constitutional purview because it was premised on a hypothetical invasion of privacy that might never occur.   Next, the court concluded that the third-party doctrine, which provides that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties, foreclosed Plaintiff’s claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy over the MDS data. The court reasoned that Plaintiff could not assert a reasonable expectation of privacy because Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily disclosed location data to the e-scooter operators.   Further, the court determined that the nature of MDS location data indicated a diminished expectation of privacy. The data only discloses the location of an e-scooter owned by the operator and typically re-rented to a new user after each individual trip. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”) on the grounds that the statute did not provide Plaintiff with authorization to bring an independent action to enforce its provisions. View "JUSTIN SANCHEZ V. LADOT" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the detectives and the City of Henderson (collectively, Defendants) under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case arose following an incident where Defendants believed they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a series of armed robberies and forcibly tackled him as he was leaving a Nevada state courthouse.   The detectives moved for summary judgment arguing that they are protected by qualified immunity, and the City moved for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff could not establish municipal liability. The district court denied the detectives’ motion and denied the City’s motion except as to Plaintiff’s ratification theory.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the use of force was substantial. Although Plaintiff was suspected of a serious crime, the detectives knew that he was not armed and was not posing an immediate threat to anyone as he exited the courthouse. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that the degree of force used against Plaintiff violated his Fourth Amendment right against excessive force, and the detectives were not entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether they committed a constitutional violation.   The court held that Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) clearly established, that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by tackling and piling on top of a relatively calm, non-resisting suspect who posed little threat of safety without any prior warning and without attempting a less violent means of effecting an arrest. View "DANIEL ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (together, “NetChoice”)—are trade associations that represent internet and social-media companies. They sued the Florida officials charged with enforcing S.B. 7072 under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. They sought to enjoin enforcement of Sections 106.072 and 501.2041 on a number of grounds, including, that the law’s provisions (1) violate the social-media companies’ right to free speech under the First Amendment and (2) are preempted by federal law.   The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it preliminarily enjoined those provisions of S.B. 7072 that are substantially likely to violate the First Amendment. But the district court did abuse its discretion when it enjoined provisions of S.B. 7072 that aren’t likely unconstitutional.   The court reasoned that it is substantially likely that social-media companies—even the biggest ones—are “private actors” whose rights the First Amendment protects, that their so-called “content-moderation” decisions constitute protected exercises of editorial judgment and that the provisions of the new Florida law that restrict large platforms’ ability to engage in content moderation unconstitutionally burden that prerogative. The court further concluded that it is substantially likely that one of the law’s particularly onerous disclosure provisions—which would require covered platforms to provide a “thorough rationale” for each and every content-moderation decision they make—violates the First Amendment. However, because it is unlikely that the law’s remaining disclosure provisions violate the First Amendment, the companies are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief with respect to them. View "NetChoice, LLC, et al. v. Attorney General, State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

While imprisoned in Indiana, Lauderdale-El petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the loss of good-time credits resulting from a prison disciplinary conviction. His petition asserts that prison officials violated his due process rights in applying an Indiana Department of Correction policy rescinding previously restored good-time credits.The district court concluded that Lauderdale-El could challenge the restoration policy in state court, so it dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A). Lauderdale-El had exhausted administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that dismissal of a habeas corpus petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies is a final and appealable judgment. Indiana law permits state-court review of Lauderdale-El’s claims. Because Lauderdale-El is still on parole, the court concluded that the matter was not moot. View "Lauderdale-El v. Indiana Parole Board" on Justia Law

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed each prisoner's conviction and death sentence on direct review; each was denied state postconviction relief. Rejecting their petitions for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, the district court found their ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims procedurally defaulted as not properly presented in state court. Each unsuccessfully argued that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel constituted "cause" to excuse the procedural default. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.The Supreme Court reversed. Under section 2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, section 2254(b)(1)(A), requires state prisoners to “exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal habeas relief. The doctrine of procedural default, a “corollary” to the exhaustion requirement, generally prevents federal courts from hearing any federal claim that was not presented to the state courts “consistent with [the State’s] own procedural rules.” Together, exhaustion and procedural default protect against “the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal courts to respect” state procedural rules,Federal courts may excuse procedural default only if a prisoner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice.” Attorney error cannot provide cause to excuse a default in proceedings for which the Constitution does not guarantee the assistance of counsel except where the state requires prisoners to raise such claims for the first time during state collateral proceedings. Under section 2254(e)(2), when a prisoner is “at fault” for the undeveloped record in state court, a federal court may hold “an evidentiary hearing on the claim” in only two limited scenarios not relevant here and also must show that further fact-finding would demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is innocent. State postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance in developing the state-court record is attributed to the prisoner because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. When a federal habeas court convenes an evidentiary hearing for any purpose or otherwise reviews any evidence for any purpose, it may not consider that evidence on the merits of a negligent prisoner’s defaulted claim unless the exceptions in section 2254(e)(2) are satisfied. View "Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker issued a series of executive orders that first required Illinois residents to shelter in place at their residences, compelled “non-essential” businesses temporarily to cease or reduce their operations and prohibited gatherings of more than 10 people (later increased to 50 people). Believing that these orders violated numerous provisions of the U.S. Constitution, several individuals joined with some Illinois businesses and sued the Governor in his official capacity. After granting the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, the district court found that they lacked standing to sue. The court also concluded that it would be futile to allow a second amendment because, even if it had erred about the existence of a justiciable case or controversy, the plaintiffs could not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. With respect to five out of six counts, the plaintiffs have not satisfied the criteria for Article III standing to sue. The remaining count attempts to state a claim under the Takings Clause. The business plaintiffs “may have squeaked by the standing bar” for that theory but have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Nowlin v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of drugs seized following a pat-down, holding that law enforcement's conclusion that Defendant possessed drugs met the bar to establish probable cause.The district court concluded that the officer's inability to discern the type of the drugs in the packaging before removing them from Defendant's pocket required suppression of the evidence. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the evidence was sufficient under the plain-feel exception to the warrant requirement that Defendant believed the package contained heroin, powder cocaine, or crack cocaine, despite not knowing which one. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence established probable cause for the officer to have arrested Defendant for drug possession. View "State v. Hunt" on Justia Law