Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After the Spokane County prosecutor filed charges against Plaintiffs pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 77.15.265, Plaintiffs entered into a Stipulation to Police Reports and Order of Continuance (“SOC”), which provided that the charges would be dismissed if Plaintiffs complied with certain terms. Under Washington’s wildlife forfeiture statute, the entry of a SOC also resulted in the forfeiture of the wildlife and animal parts at issue. Plaintiffs successfully completed their SOCs, and the charges against them were dismissed. They brought suit alleging that the forfeiture and transfer of their property to Canada, without notice or a hearing, functionally destroyed their property interests, thus depriving them of due process.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed the due process claim as moot and affirmed the district court’s entry of judgment with respect to the constitutionality of Washington State’s forfeiture statute. The court held that because Plaintiffs signed the SOCs, which triggered the automatic forfeiture, their suit for recovery of the forfeited property was moot. To the extent Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims hinged on their argument that the seized property was not contraband, these claims were also mooted by the Plaintiffs’ agreement to forfeiture. The court reasoned that even if Plaintiffs had a property interest in the seized wildlife parts protected by the Fourteenth Amendment at the time the parts were transferred, they gave up that interest by agreeing to the ultimate forfeiture of the items to the state; Plaintiffs therefore could not maintain a concrete injury as a result of the transfer to British Columbia. View "CHAD BOCK V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court accepting Defendant's plea of nolo contendere to robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree and sentencing Defendant to an aggregate sentence of ten years' imprisonment, holding that a John Doe arrest warrant was invalid and could not commence prosecution for purposes of satisfying the statute of limitations.On appeal, Defendant argued that the John Doe arrest warrant that identified the suspect on the basis of a general physical description and several mixed partial DNA profiles to which the suspect may not have been a contributor and that did not state the probability that a random person would match any of the profiles did not satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment for purposes of commencing a prosecution within the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that, to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, the affidavit accompanying a John Doe DNA arrest warrant application must contain information assuring the judicial authority issuing the warrant that the DNA profile identifies the person responsible for the crime on the basis of his or her unique DNA profile and should include information as to the statistical rarity of that DNA profile. View "State v. Police" on Justia Law

Groom tried to refill a prescription for a drug that treats opioid addiction. A technician informed Groom that he could not use a coupon. Groom grabbed the prescription and left without paying. The pharmacist followed him out, offering a lower-cost drug. Groom kept walking. The dispatcher alerted police officers that a man carrying a large knife had robbed the pharmacy and that the suspect, Groom, ran toward another store. Captain Russ and Officer Lee responded. Russ was familiar with Groom, having heard that Groom suffered from mental illness and had attempted suicide. They spotted Groom in a parking lot and exited their vehicles. Russ announced himself. Groompulled a large knife out of a sheath, saying: “Not today David.” Both officers drew their firearms. Groom ignored several commands to drop the knife and walked toward Russ, waving his knife, stopping 30 feet from Russ. He repeatedly told Russ to shoot him. Lee testified that, although Groom at first was “being very belligerent,” he stopped walking and eventually stopped waving the knife. After 20 seconds, Groom took another step. Russ shot Groom. He died from the wound.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the trial court granted Russ summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing “[p]recedent involving similar facts” putting this case “beyond the otherwise hazy border between excessive and acceptable force" to "provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.” View "Lee v. Russ" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the trial court did not err.Defendant was charged with one count of driving while impaired and one count of reckless driving. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained at a Harnett County checking station. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Defendant later pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the trial court could not assess whether the public interest in the checking station outweighed its infringement on Defendant's Fourth Amendment privacy interests. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the unchallenged findings of fact supported the trial court's conclusion that the public interest served by the checking station outweighed the intrusion on Defendant's liberty interests. View "State v. Cobb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court and vacating Defendant's convictions on the grounds that the delay in his case was unjustified and violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, holding that remand was required.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony hit and run resulting in serious injury or death, two counts of second-degree murder, and attaining violent habitual felon status. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of Defendant's prior attorney where there was no waiver of the attorney-client privilege; and (2) the case is remanded for a rehearing on Defendant's speedy trial claim. View "State v. Farook" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of second degree murder and sentence of a period of incarceration of no less than sixty years and no more than life, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to one count of second degree murder. Under the plea agreement, the State agreed to make a recommendation of a sentence of twenty years. After she was sentenced, Defendant brought this appeal, arguing that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to make a sentencing recommendation consistent with the plea agreement and claiming that the sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's remarks regarding sentencing did not breach the plea agreement and were not improper; and (2) the district court did not impose an excessive sentence. View "State v. Cooke" on Justia Law

Inmates who were housed by three Illinois Department of Corrections centers between April-July 2014, alleged that the prison-wide shakedowns conducted violated their constitutional and statutory rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The shakedowns involved uniformed tactical teams called “Orange Crush” that operated according to a uniform plan, which involved a loud entry, strip searches, handcuffing, and other procedures involving allegedly humiliating physical contact. The inmates allege that the planning and execution of the shakedowns violated the Eighth Amendment because it was designed to inflict pain and humiliation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed class certification. The plaintiffs satisfied the “commonality” requirement because they alleged that the defendants acted pursuant to a common policy and implemented the same or similar procedures at each institution and that the challenge was to the constitutionality of that common plan as enacted. The claims require resolution of key common factual and legal questions, specifically: “whether Defendants developed and carried out a uniform policy and practice that had the effect of depriving the putative class members of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; whether the shakedowns were executed in the manner Defendants contend or as Plaintiffs claim; whether Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the putative class members of their constitutional rights through the shakedowns; and whether the Defendants knew of, approved, facilitated and/or turned a blind eye to the alleged unconstitutional shakedowns.” Those questions do not require individualized consideration. View "Ross v. Gossett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court convicting Appellant of capital murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of property but remanded for the circuit court to correct the sentencing order, holding that there was no reversible error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict on the capital-murder, kidnapping, and aggravated-robbery charges; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; (3) due to a discrepancy between the sentencing order and the pronouncement of sentence, this matter must be remanded for the court to correct the order; (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting three exhibits over Appellant's hearsay objections; (5) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to question Appellant about three prior bad acts; and (6) Appellant was not entitled to relief on his remaining claims of error. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss all electronic, wire, or oral communications obtained through the use of wiretaps and any subsequently-obtained evidence in these consolidated cases, holding that the trial justice did not err.In granting Defendants' motion to suppress, the trial justice found that an associate justice of the superior court had no authority to issue the wiretap orders. The State appealed this ruling and argued, alternatively, that the trial justice erred in concluding that suppression of the evidence derived from the wiretap orders was warranted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the associate justice was not vested with the statutory authority to administer and sign the wiretap orders and, therefore, that those orders were in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 12-5.1, the Interception of Wire and Oral Communications Act. View "State v. McGuire" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority to require that a trial court either canvass the defendant or, in certain circumstances, inquire of defense counsel directly to determine whether the defendant was properly advised regarding the waiver of his right to testify.Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the first degree following a jury trial at which he did not testify. On appeal, Defendant argued that defense counsel's representation that Defendant had waived his right to testify was insufficient to constitute a waiver of that right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the constitution does not require that a defendant personally assert the waiver of his constitutional right to testify on the record; but (2) an on-the-record canvass of a defendant is the best practice to ensure that the defendant's waiver of his right to testify is made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. View "State v. Morel-Vargas" on Justia Law