Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

An elderly couple in Greenville, North Carolina, reported a breaking-and-entering at their residence around 4:00 a.m., hearing glass break and a male voice yelling. Officer David Johnson, who was nearby, responded to the call. Upon arrival, Johnson heard loud yelling and saw Sean Rambert running towards him while yelling. Johnson commanded Rambert to get on the ground eight times, but Rambert did not comply and continued to charge at Johnson. Johnson fired multiple shots at Rambert, who continued to advance even after being shot. Rambert eventually fell and later died from his injuries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied Johnson’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of Johnson’s conduct and concluded that a jury could determine that Johnson violated Rambert’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. The court also denied summary judgment on the remaining federal and state law claims against Johnson and the City of Greenville.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. The court found that Johnson’s use of deadly force was not objectively unreasonable given the circumstances, including Rambert’s aggressive behavior and failure to comply with commands. The court also determined that the law did not clearly establish that Johnson’s conduct was unconstitutional at the time of the incident. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against Johnson. However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding the related state and federal claims and claims against the City of Greenville, remanding those issues for further proceedings. View "Rambert v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law

Emilee Carpenter, a wedding photographer, filed a preenforcement challenge against New York’s public accommodations laws, which prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Carpenter argued that these laws violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by compelling her to provide photography services for same-sex weddings, which she claimed conflicted with her religious beliefs. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the laws against her.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed all of Carpenter’s claims. The court found that Carpenter had not sufficiently pled that the public accommodations laws violated her rights to free speech, free association, free exercise of religion, or the Establishment Clause. The court also rejected her claims that the laws were unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Consequently, the court denied her request for a preliminary injunction as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, the appellate court agreed that Carpenter had plausibly stated a free speech claim. However, the court denied her request for a preliminary injunction at this stage, remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings to develop a factual record. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Carpenter’s other claims, including those related to free association, free exercise of religion, the Establishment Clause, and vagueness. The court concluded that the public accommodations laws were neutral, generally applicable, and did not provide for individualized exemptions that would undermine their general applicability. The court also found that Carpenter had waived her overbreadth claim due to inadequate pleading and briefing.The Second Circuit thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Carpenter v. James" on Justia Law

Three sets of parents refused to allow their newborns to receive Vitamin K shots at private hospitals in Illinois, citing concerns about risks and religious reasons. Hospital staff reported the refusals to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), which investigated the parents for medical neglect. In one case, hospital staff took temporary protective custody of the child. The parents sued the hospitals and certain medical professionals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the cases, ruling that the private entities could only be liable under § 1983 if they were engaged in state action. The court found that the hospitals and their staff were not acting under color of state law when they reported the parents to DCFS or took temporary custody of the children. The parents appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the hospitals and their staff did not act under color of state law. The court found no evidence of a conspiracy or joint action between the hospitals and DCFS to infringe on the parents' constitutional rights. The court also determined that the hospitals were not performing a public function traditionally reserved to the state, as the mere threat of taking protective custody did not constitute state action. Additionally, the court found no entwinement or symbiotic relationship between the hospitals and the state that would make the hospitals state actors. Therefore, the parents' § 1983 claims could not proceed. View "Scott v. University of Chicago" on Justia Law

Three sets of parents refused to allow their newborns to receive Vitamin K shots at private hospitals in Illinois due to concerns about risks and religious reasons. Hospital staff reported the refusals to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), which investigated the parents for medical neglect. In one case, hospital staff took temporary protective custody of the child. The parents sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the hospitals and medical professionals.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the cases, ruling that the private entities were not engaged in state action and thus not liable under § 1983. The parents appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the private hospitals and their staff did not act under color of state law. The court found no evidence of a conspiracy or joint action between the hospitals and DCFS to infringe on the parents' constitutional rights. The court also determined that the hospitals were not performing a public function traditionally reserved to the state, as the mere threat of taking protective custody did not constitute state action. Additionally, the court found no symbiotic relationship or entwinement between the hospitals and the state to the point of largely overlapping identity.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the parents' claims, concluding that without state action, there could be no § 1983 liability. View "Bougher v. Silver Cross Hospital and Medical Centers" on Justia Law

The case involves a property owned by Indiana Land Trust #3082, located in Hammond, Indiana, which houses a lucrative fireworks and tobacco business operated by Omar and Haitham Abuzir. The City of Hammond seeks to use its eminent domain power to take this property to build a road connecting Indianapolis Boulevard and the Water Gardens neighborhood. The Abuzirs allege that the City’s actions are part of a conspiracy involving political motives and favoritism towards competitors who support the mayor.The Hammond Redevelopment Commission initially offered to purchase the property in 2018, but the Abuzirs declined. Consequently, the Commission initiated a condemnation action in Indiana state court under the state’s eminent domain statute. The Abuzirs objected, arguing that the taking was for a private purpose and motivated by ill will. Unable to assert counterclaims in state court, they filed a federal lawsuit alleging constitutional and federal law violations, including claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed the Abuzirs' third amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the City had a legitimate government interest in building a road and that the Abuzirs failed to state a claim for equal protection, substantive due process, or civil conspiracy. The court noted that the Abuzirs' complaint itself provided a rational basis for the City’s actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the Abuzirs failed to state a class-of-one equal protection claim because the City’s actions had a rational basis. The court also found that the proposed substantive due process claim was futile as the Abuzirs did not allege a deprivation of a protected interest. Lastly, the court upheld the denial of leave to add a § 1983 conspiracy claim, as the Abuzirs failed to establish any underlying constitutional violation. View "Indiana Land Trust #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Commission" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jack Potter, a man who lived in a 23-foot travel trailer hitched to his truck, which he parked on public lots and streets in the city of Lacey, Washington. In 2019, the city passed an ordinance barring people from parking such large vehicles and trailers on public lots and streets for more than four hours per day. The city then ordered Potter to move his trailer and truck off the city hall parking lot and off Lacey streets. Potter sued the city, claiming that its new ordinance violated his state constitutional “right to reside,” which he argued was inherent in the state constitutional right to intrastate travel.The case was initially filed in Thurston County Superior Court but was later moved to the federal district court for the Western District of Washington. The district court granted summary judgment to the city on nearly all of its claims, including Potter’s state right to intrastate travel claim. The court explained that the ordinance did not fundamentally impede the right to exist or reside in a given area. It was a parking ordinance applicable to all people in Lacey, and only by extension did it restrict the manner in which a person could live in Lacey. The right to travel did not include a right to live in a certain manner.The case was then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which certified questions of state law to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. The Supreme Court held that the RV parking ordinance did not violate Potter’s claimed Washington State constitutional right to intrastate travel. Potter had not established that his claimed right to reside was inherent in a Washington state constitutional right to intrastate travel or that it protected his preferred method of residing in Lacey: by siting his 23-foot trailer on a public street in violation of generally applicable parking ordinances. View "Potter v. City of Lacey" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Wendell Shane Mackey, a local resident, and Jeff Rising, a real-estate agent who served one term as a part-time City Commissioner for Adrian, Michigan. Mackey posted information about Rising on Facebook that Rising believed to be false. Rising responded by calling Mackey’s mother and allegedly threatened to “hurt” Mackey if he did not delete the post. Mackey sued, arguing that Rising’s threat of physical violence violated the First Amendment because Rising made it in his capacity as a Commissioner to stifle Mackey’s speech.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to Rising, concluding that he had acted as a private citizen when he made the alleged threats. Mackey appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Rising, as a legislator, did not have any “authority” to use (or threaten) physical force on behalf of the City of Adrian. His alleged “misuse” of the power, therefore, could not qualify as state action. The court also found that Rising’s acceptance of the City’s insurance for his defense did not conflict with his state-action defense on the merits, and thus, neither waiver nor judicial estoppel applied. View "Mackey v. Rising" on Justia Law

The case involves Dianne Hensley, a justice of the peace in Texas, who announced that due to her religious beliefs, she would not perform weddings for same-sex couples but would refer them to others who would. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct issued her a public warning for casting doubt on her capacity to act impartially due to the person's sexual orientation, in violation of Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. Hensley did not appeal this warning to a Special Court of Review (SCR) but instead sued the Commission and its members and officers for violating the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA) and her right to freedom of speech under Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. The trial court dismissed her claims for lack of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Hensley's suit was not barred by her decision not to appeal the Commission’s Public Warning or by sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing one of Hensley's declaratory requests for lack of jurisdiction, reversed the remainder of the judgment, and remanded to the court of appeals to address the remaining issues on appeal. The court found that the SCR could not have finally decided whether Hensley is entitled to the relief sought in this case or awarded the relief TRFRA provides to successful claimants. View "HENSLEY v. STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT" on Justia Law

The case involves a harassment injunction issued against Brian Aish, an anti-abortion protestor, for statements he made to Nancy Kindschy, a nurse practitioner at a family planning clinic. Aish regularly protested outside the clinics where Kindschy worked, initially expressing his Christian and anti-abortion beliefs broadly. However, in 2019, Aish began directing his comments towards Kindschy, which she perceived as threatening. Kindschy petitioned for a harassment injunction under Wisconsin law, which allows for an injunction if there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the petitioner."The circuit court heard two days of testimony and found that Aish's statements were intimidating and did not serve a legitimate purpose. The court issued a four-year injunction prohibiting Aish from speaking to Kindschy or going to her residence or any other premises temporarily occupied by her. Aish appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunction.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the injunction. The court concluded that the injunction was a content-based restriction on Aish's speech and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The court held that the injunction failed to satisfy either of the two standards required for such a restriction to comply with the First Amendment: (1) Aish's statements were not "true threats" and he did not "consciously disregard a substantial risk that his statements would be viewed as threatening violence," or (2) the injunction did not satisfy strict scrutiny, meaning it was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. View "Kindschy v. Aish" on Justia Law

Raynard Jackson, a prisoner at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF), was placed in a cell without running water for five days. He alleged that Lieutenant Dane Esser, among other WSPF staff, knew that he did not have water and yet failed to turn the water on. After Jackson showed another staff member that he did not have water, the water was promptly turned on; however, he claimed Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff failed to provide him with medical care for his dehydration. Jackson filed grievances pertaining to these issues. After he exhausted his administrative remedies within the WSPF, he sued Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The district court, only considering the processed grievances, and without holding an evidentiary hearing, found that Jackson had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to certain claims and defendants. Additional defendants, Nurse Beth Edge and Captain Dale Flannery, were dismissed at summary judgment, leaving only the claims against Lt. Esser for trial. The jury found for Lt. Esser on both claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Jackson that the district court should not have disregarded his allegedly unprocessed grievances without holding an evidentiary hearing. However, the court found no error in the district court’s conclusion that Jackson’s processed grievances did not exhaust remedies as to all his claims. The court also found no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nurse Edge or its evidentiary rulings before trial. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a hearing on the allegedly unprocessed grievances. View "Jackson v. Esser" on Justia Law