Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Two plaintiffs, a middle school teacher and an assistant principal, were employed by a school district in Oregon. They created the "I Resolve" campaign, which included a website and a video uploaded to YouTube, advocating for policies on gender identity, parental rights, and education. They used their own devices and time but also sent emails from their school accounts to district employees with links to the campaign. Following complaints from employees, students, and concerned citizens, and an independent investigator's determination that they violated district policies, the district terminated them but later reinstated them and transferred them to other positions.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and individual defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs alleged that their termination was in retaliation for their protected speech and that they were discriminated against based on their religion and viewpoint. The district court concluded that the defendants' interests in avoiding disruption outweighed the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's summary judgment. It held that there were genuine disputes regarding the circumstances of the plaintiffs' expressive conduct and the extent of the resulting disruption. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the individual defendants on the First Amendment claim for damages due to qualified immunity but vacated the summary judgment for the district on the First Amendment claim for damages and the related claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also vacated the summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim and the Title VII claim, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the credibility of the district's proffered reasons for the terminations. View "DAMIANO V. GRANTS PASS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7" on Justia Law

Curtis Walker, who was 17 years old when he committed murder, was sentenced to life in prison with a parole eligibility date set for 2071, effectively making it a life-without-parole sentence. After serving nearly 30 years, Walker sought postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based on a series of Supreme Court decisions regarding juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole. Walker's request for a "meaningful opportunity" to demonstrate his rehabilitation was denied by the Wisconsin state courts, prompting him to file a federal habeas corpus petition.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied Walker's postconviction motion, holding that his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the sentencing judge had considered his youth and its attendant circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Walker then filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely and without merit, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent, particularly in light of the decisions in Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Mississippi. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the Supreme Court's precedents did not clearly establish a categorical prohibition against sentencing corrigible juvenile offenders to life without parole. View "Walker v Cromwell" on Justia Law

After a welfare check was requested by his fiancée, Joseph Maser was involved in a standoff with police at his suburban Iowa home. Maser had threatened suicide, fired a gun inside his house, and was reportedly intoxicated with access to firearms. Officers attempted to negotiate with Maser for nearly an hour, during which Maser became increasingly agitated and made threats. Maser exited his garage holding a rifle, ignored commands to drop the weapon, and raised the rifle outward from his body. Officer Joshua Van Brocklin, perceiving a threat, shot Maser twice in the chest. Maser survived and subsequently brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Van Brocklin used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.Initially, Maser filed suit in state court against Officer Van Brocklin, the City of Coralville, and other officers, asserting both state and federal claims. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Following a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court in Burnett v. Smith, which foreclosed excessive force claims under the Iowa Constitution, the district court granted summary judgment on those claims. The district court also granted summary judgment for Officer Van Brocklin on the federal excessive force claim, finding no constitutional violation and awarding qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Van Brocklin’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because Maser’s actions—raising a rifle outward after repeated noncompliance and threats—created an imminent threat of serious harm. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that Maser’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. View "Maser v. City of Coralville, IA" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which criminalizes unlawfully reentering the United States after a prior removal. They argued that the statute violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by discriminating against Mexican and other Latin American immigrants. Their theory was that the statute’s predecessor, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, was enacted with discriminatory intent, and that § 1326, first codified in 1952 and amended several times thereafter, perpetuates that taint.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss their indictments. The court assumed without deciding that the Arlington Heights framework applied but concluded that the defendants had failed to establish a discriminatory purpose behind § 1326’s enactment. The court also concluded that the statute easily satisfied rational-basis review. The defendants then entered conditional guilty pleas or proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, reserving their rights to appeal the constitutional issue. The District Court sentenced the defendants to varying terms of imprisonment and supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the District Court’s decision. The court found no clear error in the District Court’s conclusion that the defendants had not shown that § 1326 was enacted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. The court noted that the defendants’ evidence, including historical context, statements by public officials, and statistical disparities, was insufficient to establish that the 1952 Congress acted with discriminatory intent. The court also emphasized that laws do not carry forward “taint” through reenactment unless the later legislature acted with the same constitutionally impermissible purpose. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "USA v. Ferretiz-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Carvin Thomas and Terrell Lawrence, filed a class-action lawsuit against members of the Tennessee Board of Parole, alleging that the use of a computer test, STRONG-R, to determine parole eligibility violated their constitutional right to due process. They claimed that the test produced inaccurate results due to inadequate training of correctional employees and that the results were kept secret, preventing inmates from challenging them effectively. Both plaintiffs experienced changes in their STRONG-R scores without any new negative behavior, leading to parole denials based on these scores.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed the complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The court found that Tennessee’s parole statutes do not confer a protected liberty interest in parole, as they do not create a legitimate expectation of parole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Tennessee’s parole statutes do not sufficiently constrain the Board’s discretion to deny parole, thus not creating a constitutionally recognized entitlement to parole. The court noted that while the plaintiffs identified serious issues with the STRONG-R test, the lack of a protected liberty interest in parole precluded their due process claims. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. View "Thomas v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood of Montana and Dr. Samuel Dickman challenged three laws passed by the 2021 Montana Legislature regulating abortion care. The laws included a 20-week ban on abortions (HB 136), restrictions on medication abortions and requirements for informed consent (HB 171), and a mandate for providers to offer patients the opportunity to view an ultrasound and listen to a fetal heart tone before an abortion (HB 140).The Thirteenth Judicial District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of these laws, which was affirmed by the Montana Supreme Court. Following discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, concluding that the laws violated the Montana Constitution's guarantees of individual privacy, equal protection, and free speech. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of all three laws.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the 20-week ban on abortions (HB 136) violated the right to privacy because it prohibited pre-viability abortions and was not justified by a compelling state interest. The Court also found that the restrictions on medication abortions and the informed consent requirements (HB 171) infringed on the right to privacy and free speech, as they imposed unnecessary burdens on patients and providers without addressing a bona fide health risk. Lastly, the Court held that the mandate to offer patients the opportunity to view an ultrasound and listen to a fetal heart tone (HB 140) violated the right to privacy by interfering with the patient-provider relationship without a compelling state interest.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment, permanently enjoining the enforcement of the challenged laws. View "Planned Parenthood v. State" on Justia Law

Nathan Rinne sued Camden County and two of its commissioners, Greg Hasty and Donald Williams, Jr., alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights after Hasty and Williams voted to ban him from all County property for one year. The defendants sought summary judgment on the defenses of qualified and legislative immunity and on the merits of the issue of punitive damages. The district court denied these motions in full.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The defendants then appealed the denial of legislative immunity, qualified immunity, and the issue of punitive damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the denial of legislative immunity, holding that the commissioners' decision to ban Rinne from county property was administrative, not legislative, in nature. The court found that the act of banning Rinne did not concern the enactment or promulgation of public policy but was an effort to monitor and discipline his presence and conduct at future commission meetings. Consequently, the commissioners were not entitled to legislative immunity. The court dismissed the remainder of the appeal, including the issues of qualified immunity and punitive damages, for lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of fact that could not be resolved at the appellate level. View "Rinne v. Hasty" on Justia Law

DeShawn Gervin was on probation in Georgia with the sole condition that he not return to the South Georgia Judicial Circuit. He moved to North Carolina but was later imprisoned there for various crimes. A Georgia probation officer, Pamela Florence, learned of his North Carolina offenses and sought a warrant for his arrest in Georgia, falsely claiming he had violated probation by failing to report. Gervin was arrested in North Carolina and extradited to Georgia, where he spent 104 days in jail before a court found he had not violated his probation and ordered his release.Gervin sued Florence and another probation officer, Tandria Milton, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted summary judgment for the defendants on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims but denied it on the Fourth Amendment claim, characterizing it as a malicious-prosecution claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that Gervin presented enough evidence to support his Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim. The court found that Florence and Milton recklessly made false statements and omissions that led to Gervin's arrest and prolonged detention, violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the probation officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional violations were clearly established at the time of their actions. View "Gervin v. Florence" on Justia Law

Three-month-old La’Mello Parker died during a confrontation between his father, Eric Smith, and law enforcement. Smith, a fugitive wanted for double homicide, used La’Mello as a human shield and fired at officers, who returned fire, killing La’Mello. La’Mello’s grandfather and brother sued various law enforcement entities and officers, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the case, finding that the officers’ actions did not constitute constitutional violations and that they were protected by qualified immunity. The court also dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claims, stating that the conduct did not shock the conscience, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the officers did not violate La’Mello’s Fourth Amendment rights as their use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted that Smith posed a grave and immediate threat, and the officers’ decision to return fire was justified. The court also found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that their conduct was unconstitutional. Additionally, the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment claims failed as the officers’ actions did not shock the conscience. The court concluded that without an underlying constitutional violation, the bystander liability and municipal liability claims also failed. View "Estate of Parker v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The case involves Deliezha Davonte Gravely, who was pulled over by a police officer for speeding. During the stop, the officer discovered that Gravely was driving with a revoked license due to a DUI and found a loaded firearm in his pocket. Gravely was subsequently indicted on multiple charges, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person, based on his prior conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery.The Circuit Court of Mercer County ruled that Gravely's prior conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery qualified as a "felony crime of violence against the person of another" under West Virginia Code § 61-7-7(b). Gravely was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in classifying his conspiracy conviction as a crime of violence.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the elements of conspiracy under West Virginia Code § 61-10-31 include a violent act against a person. The court applied the elements test from State v. Mills, which requires examining the statutory elements of the predicate offense rather than the specific conduct of the defendant. The court found that the elements of conspiracy—an agreement to commit an offense and an overt act to effect the conspiracy—do not require a violent act against a person.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery is not a "felony crime of violence against the person of another" for the purposes of West Virginia Code § 61-7-7(b). Consequently, the court reversed Gravely's convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person, and remanded the case for resentencing on his remaining convictions. View "State v. Gravely" on Justia Law