Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit denied a writ of habeas corpus sought by Petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to vacate her conviction for murder in the first degree, holding that there was no error.Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Petitioner later filed a habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no prejudice on any of the alleged errors claimed by Petitioner. View "Field v. Hallett" on Justia Law

Charter Day School (“CDS”) a public charter school in North Carolina, requires female students to wear skirts to school based on the view that girls are “fragile vessels” deserving of “gentle” treatment by boys. Plaintiffs argued that this sex-based classification grounded on gender stereotypes violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and subjects them to discrimination and denial of the full benefits of their education in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”).  In response, despite CDS’ status as a public school under North Carolina law, CDS denied accountability under the Equal Protection Clause by maintaining that they are not state actors.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their Equal Protection claim against CDS. The court also vacated the district court’s summary judgment award in favor of all Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim.   The court held that CDS is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause. By implementing the skirts requirement based on blatant gender stereotypes about the “proper place” for girls and women in society, CDS has acted in clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court further held that sex-based dress codes like the skirts requirement, when imposed by covered entities, are subject to review under the anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX. View "Bonnie Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc." on Justia Law

Bell asked why Officer Korkis pulled him over. Korkis responded that Bell first needed to provide his driver’s license, registration, and car insurance and that more officers were on their way. Bell claims the officers forcefully removed him from his vehicle, despite Bell volunteering again to exit on his own. Dash-cam videos show Korkis and Bell arguing for three minutes. Korkis asked for Bell’s information about 20 times, then reached into the window to unlock the door. A physical struggle ensued, not fully visible in the videos. Officers eventually pried open the door and told Bell to get on the ground; he repeatedly refused. Officers wrestled him to the pavement, where he refused to comply. An officer warned Bell about the taser. Bell still did not put his hands behind his back. An officer tased him.Bell sued the officers (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming they violated the Fourth Amendment’s bar against excessive force. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part after holding that the video footage could be considered at the motion-to-dismiss stage to determine whether allegations in the complaint were implausible. The court dismissed the appeal with respect to claims concerning the officers removing Bell from his car, noting that factual issues remain. With respect to claims concerning the tasing, Bell had not shown that the officers violated his clearly established rights. View "Bell v. City of Southfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for operating under the influence, entered after a jury trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.After a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of operating under the influence and of having a blood-alcohol level of .15 grams or more per 210 liters of breath at the time of the offense. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's challenge for cause to a prospective juror based on implied bias; and (2) did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights by factoring into her sentence the court's view that her testimony was untruthful without making perjury findings. View "State v. Hemminger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against several DeKalb County, Georgia investigators, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights during his arrest. Plaintiff claimed that S.D. used excessive force when he shot him three times, that V.J. used excessive force when he pistol-whipped him, and that all three Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on every claim.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for V.J. on the pistol-whip claim. But affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for S.D. on the shooting claim and for all Defendants on the deprivation of medical care claim.   The court held that V.J. used excessive force in pistol-whipping Plaintiff and that Plaintiff’s right to be free of V.J.’s use of force was clearly established at the time. Further, viewing the facts through the appropriate lens, V.J. could not have reasonably believed that Plaintiff was resisting when he tried to sit up after communicating that he needed to do so to breathe. And because “a handcuffed, non-resisting [suspect’s] right to be free from excessive force was clearly established” at the time, V.J is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against him.   Finally, even though Plaintiff met his burden that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the court concluded that there was no established law on how long before officers must request medical care for a suspect that has been shot to constitute deliberate indifference. View "Nicholas C. Wade v. Solomon Daniels, et al." on Justia Law

Georgetown Law invited Yung to interview an alumnus. Yung thought his interviewer was rude. Georgetown rejected Yung's application. Yung launched a cyber-campaign, creating fake obituaries for the interviewer’s wife and son, social-media profiles and blogs in the interviewer's name, containing KKK content and bragging about child rape. A Google search of the interviewer’s name revealed thousands of similar posts. In reports to the Better Business Bureau, Yung accused the interviewer of sexually assaulting a female associate and berating prospective employees. Impersonating the interviewer’s wife, he published an online ad seeking a sex slave. The interviewer’s family got hundreds of phone calls from men seeking sex. Strange men went to the interviewer’s home. The interviewer hired cyber-investigators, who, working with the FBI, traced the harassment to Yung.Yung, charged with cyberstalking, 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)(B) & 2261(b) unsuccessfully challenged the law as overbroad under the First Amendment. Yung was sentenced to prison, probation, and to pay restitution for the interviewer’s investigative costs ($70,000) and Georgetown’s security measures ($130,000). The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction. A narrow reading of the statute’s intent element is possible so it is not overbroad--limiting intent to harass to “criminal harassment, which is unprotected because it constitutes true threats or speech that is integral to proscribable criminal conduct.” The court vacated in part. Yung could not waive his claim that the restitution order exceeds the statute and Georgetown suffered no damage to any property right. View "United States v. Yung" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Indian Affairs filed a CFR court complaint against Denezpi, a member of the Navajo Nation, charging Denezpi with crimes alleged to have occurred within the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation: assault and battery, terroristic threats, and false imprisonment. CFR courts administer justice for Indian tribes where tribal courts have not been established. Denezpi pleaded guilty to assault and battery and was sentenced to time served. Months later, a federal grand jury indicted Denezpi for aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country, under the federal Major Crimes Act. Denezpi unsuccessfully argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the consecutive prosecution and was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment.The Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them. Denezpi’s single act transgressed two laws: the Ute Mountain Ute Code’s assault and battery ordinance and the U.S. Code’s proscription of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country. The two laws—defined by separate sovereigns—proscribe separate offenses, so Denezpi’s second prosecution did not place him in jeopardy again “for the same offence.” The Court did not address whether CFR prosecutors exercise tribal or federal authority because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit successive prosecutions by the same sovereign but only prohibits successive prosecutions “for the same offence.” The Double Jeopardy Clause does not ask who puts a person in jeopardy; it focuses on what the person is put in jeopardy for. View "Denezpi v. United States" on Justia Law

Arteaga-Martinez, a citizen of Mexico, was removed and reentered the U.S. His earlier removal order was reinstated and he was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a). Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. An asylum officer determined he had established a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if returned to Mexico. DHS referred him for withholding-only proceedings before an immigration judge. After being detained for four months, Arteaga-Martinez filed a habeas corpus petition, challenging his continued detention without a bond hearing. The government conceded that Arteaga-Martinez would be entitled to a bond hearing after six months of detention based on circuit precedent. The district court ordered a bond hearing. The Third Circuit affirmed. At the bond hearing, the Immigration Judge authorized his release pending resolution of his application for withholding of removal.The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Section 1231(a)(6) does not require the government to provide noncitizens, detained for six months, with bond hearings in which the government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community. Section 1231(a)(6) “does not permit indefinite detention” but “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States”; it allows the government to provide bond hearings but does not require them. The Court remanded for consideration of Arteaga-Martinez’s alternative theory. View "Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's judgment convicting Defendant of one count of murder, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations on appeal.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the appellate court correctly concluded that the trial court (1) did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense by excluding from evidence a statement purportedly made by an unknown female bystander and an autopsy toxicology report; (2) did not violate Defendant's right to due process by declining to give a jury instruction on self-defense; and (3) did not abuse its discretion by declining to sanction the state for its late disclosure of the murder weapon and related expert reports by excluding this evidence or dismissing the murder charge. The Court further cautioned the State regarding the late disclosure of evidence. View "State v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Watkins was convicted of first-degree murder in Massachusetts state court in 2005 for a fatal 2003 shooting. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed his conviction. His federal habeas petition was denied.The First Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state courts made an error of fact in their decisions, rejecting a “Brady” claim that a withheld a police report could have been used for the impeachment of a witness (Rudolph), finding that the report did not show the investigating officers were aware that Rudolph was a witness against Watkins. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's deferential standard of review or applying de novo review, Watkins has not shown prejudice arising from the error or with respect to any of his other claims. There was an extensive examination of bias, and the failure to add onto any such evidence hardly would be prejudicial. Rudolph's motivation for reaching out to the police and the agreement that Rudolph later reached with the Commonwealth were discussed at trial and clearly informed Watkins and the jury that Rudolph sought an incentive in return for his cooperation and testimony. View "Watkins v. Medeiros" on Justia Law