Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of possession of child pornography, holding that Defendant suffered no prejudice from any claims deficient performance of his trial counsel.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to an under-Guidelines-range sentence of forty-six months. Defendant appealed, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his sentencing proceedings because counsel failed to object to the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(4)(B) on constitutional grounds. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were unavailing. View "United States v. Messner" on Justia Law

Each of the plaintiffs has been convicted of multiple sex offenses involving children. Wisconsin law requires some sex offenders to wear GPS tracking devices for life, even after they have completed post-confinement supervision, WIS. STAT. 301.48. The tracking device is attached to an ankle bracelet. The tracking data is not monitored in real-time; officials review it about every 24 hours to determine if an offender has been near a school, a playground, or another place that might raise a concern. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute violates their rights under the Fourth Amendment and sought a preliminary injunction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction, noting that it addressed section 301.48 in 2016 and upheld a provision that imposes lifetime monitoring on sex offenders who have been released from post-prison civil commitment. Applying the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, the government’s interest in deterring recidivism by dangerous offenders outweighs the offenders’ diminished expectation of privacy. Any differences between the 2016 plaintiff and these plaintiffs are too immaterial to make the earlier holding inapplicable. View "Braam v. Carr" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court of special appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court, sitting as the juvenile court, denying D.D.'s motion to suppress evidence of a loaded gun found by law enforcement officers in D.D.'s waistband, holding that there was no constitutional violation in this case.At issue in this case was whether this Court should extend the holding in Lewis v. State, 470 Md. 1 (2020), that the odor of marijuana alone does not provide probable cause to believe that the person is in possession of a criminal amount of the drug, to an investigatory detention. In reversing the juvenile court's denial of D.D.'s suppression motion, the court of special appeals held that the investigatory detention of D.D., which was based solely on the order of marijuana, violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the odor of marijauna provides reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to conduct a brief investigatory detention; and (2) the officers in the instant case had reasonable suspicion to detain D.D., and therefore, the pat-down that led to the discovery of the gun on D.D. was also reasonable. View "In re D.D." on Justia Law

An FBI informant provided a cell phone number for Lewis, a distributor in a drug-trafficking operation. The government obtained a tracking order under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). Cell-site location information (CSLI) from Lewis’s cell phone provider showed that his phone was within a 1,099-meter radius of Greenwood, Indiana. From there, officers searched parking lots and hotels where a deal might take place. Officers eventually saw a woman resembling Lewis’s wife enter a room at a hotel, drop off a duffel bag, and drive away in a car registered in Lewis’s name. After a drug-sniffing dog alerted at the room, officers obtained a search warrant. The team executed the warrant the same day. Inside the room, officers found Lewis, $2 million in cash, and 19.8 kilograms of cocaine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Lewis’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. The court rejected his arguments that the dog sniff violated his reasonable expectation of privacy or, in the alternative, that the application for the section 2703(d) order lacked probable cause. Lewis lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel's exterior hallway, where the dog sniff occurred. Regardless of whether the government’s use of real-time CSLI amounted to a search, the good-faith exception applies. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Twyford was convicted of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death. Ohio courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, then denied post-conviction relief, rejecting Twyford’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of a head injury Twyford had sustained. The district court dismissed most of Twyford’s federal habeas claims but allowed others to proceed and ordered the state to transport him to a medical facility for neurological testing that might lead to evidence to support his claim. The court cited the All Writs Act, which authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. 1651(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court reversed. A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a claim for relief. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) restricts the ability of a federal habeas court to develop and consider new evidence: Before a federal court may decide whether to grant an evidentiary hearing or “otherwise consider new evidence” under 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2), it must first determine that such evidence could be legally considered in the prisoner’s case. The All Writs Act cannot be used to circumvent statutory requirements or binding procedural rules. Twyford never explained how the results of neurological testing could be admissible in his habeas proceedings, given that AEDPA review is limited to “the record that was before the state court.” View "Shoop v. Twyford" on Justia Law

Maine offers tuition assistance for parents who live in school districts that neither operate a secondary school nor contract with a school in another district. Parents designate the secondary school they would like their child to attend; the school district sends payments to that school to defray tuition costs. To be eligible for tuition payments, private schools had to be accredited by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges or approved by the Maine Department of Education. Since 1981, Maine has limited tuition assistance payments to “nonsectarian” schools. The First Circuit affirmed the rejection of constitutional challenges to the “nonsectarian” requirement.The Supreme Court reversed. Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause, which protects against “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.” A state need not subsidize private education but if it does so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious. A law that operates in that manner must be subjected to “the strictest scrutiny.” A neutral benefit program in which public funds flow to religious organizations through the independent choices of private benefit recipients does not offend the Establishment Clause; a state’s anti-establishment interest does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise. View "Carson v. Makin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court finding the legislative reapportionment in the map colloquially known as "Ad Astra 2" constitutionally deficient as a partisan and racial gerrymander, holding that Plaintiffs did not prevail on any of their claims that Ad Astra 2 violates the Kansas Constitution.The district court held that Sub. SB 355 violates the Kansas Constitution as both a partisan and a racial gerrymander. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims; (2) claims of excessive partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable in Kansas; and (3) Plaintiffs did not establish the elements of their race-based claims. View "Rivera v. Schwab" on Justia Law

Detroit police officers apprehended a fleeing suspect who had run across several yards, including White’s yard. Believing that the suspect had disposed of a weapon nearby, officers called in a canine unit to search. Bodycam and security camera footage captured the events that followed. Officer Cherry arrived with her trained canine, Roky. The White family had two dogs outside, White’s daughter, Mi-Chol, grabbed Chino, a pit bull, to put him inside but he escaped and ran to the front yard. Mi-Chol went inside to grab a leash. As Officer Cherry and Roky reached the corner of the adjoining yard, Chino lurched through the fence’s vertical spires and bit down on Roky’s snout. Roky yelped. Cherry turned and saw Roky trapped up against the fence with his nose in Chino’s mouth. Cherry tugged at Roky’s leash and yelled at Chino to “let go.” Chino began “thrashing.” Unable to free Roky and afraid for the dog’s life, Cherry shot Chino. Six seconds passed between Chino’s attack and Cherry’s shot. Chino died from the shot. The Whites sued. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Officer Cherry acted reasonably. View "White v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Harrington, the founder of a nonprofit corporation that engages in anti-abortion protests, sought to demonstrate at the Democratic Party’s presidential-primary debates in Detroit in 2019. In response to security concerns, the Detroit Police Department imposed and enforced several measures that impeded the group’s speech. A “restricted area” blocked access to the debate venue’s immediate vicinity. Protestors were divided into “right-leaning” and “left-leaning” camps and were barred from commingling. Harrington was briefly detained after a confrontation with police. Harrington and his group eventually abandoned the site. They filed suit, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause.The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants—the city and three individual officers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The restricted area satisfies intermediate scrutiny; to hold that law enforcement could not establish a restricted area around such an event without a known, specific threat would make it essentially impossible to guard against terroristic violence. The plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine dispute that the defendants’ asserted security rationale was somehow pretextual or non-existent. Noting that the protestors were not “similarly situated” to other groups, the court rejected equal protection claims. The court further noted that the property that the group was asked to leave was privately owned; when officers began to place Harrington in cuffs, they reasonably believed he was committing criminal trespass. View "Reform America v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions on two counts of first-degree burglary and two counts of second-degree assault, holding that there was no error.After the jury announced its verdicts in this case Defendant exercised his right to poll the jury. While the record showed that the jury was composed of twelve members, the transcript of the jury polling contained only eleven responses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was afforded his constitutional right to a unanimous, twelve-person jury. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient evidentiary support in the record established that Defendant was found guilty by a twelve-member jury; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief for any error in the jury polling because it was not a structural error, and Defendant did not satisfy the plain error doctrine. View "State v. Bey" on Justia Law