Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, one of whom is a former Montana State Senator, operate a website that tracks the voting records of Republican state legislators in Montana. Based on the travel expenses Plaintiffs incurred in giving presentations about the website, Montana’s Commissioner of Political Practices determined that Plaintiffs had formed a “political committee” under Montana law, subject to numerous reporting obligations.   Montana law broadly defines a “political committee,” in relevant part, as “a combination of two or more individuals . . . who receives a contribution or makes an expenditure” to “support or oppose” a candidate or a ballot issue. An expenditure of $250 or less does not create a political committee. Nor will expenditures that qualify as “de minimis acts,” which do not count towards the $250 threshold.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for Montana state defendants and held that Montana Administrative Rule 44.11603, under which Plaintiffs were required by the Montana Commission of Political Practices to register as a political action committee, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiffs.   The court held that Montana’s administrative scheme did not give Plaintiffs fair notice that when they traveled around Big Sky Country without pay to give presentations, their purchases of fast food, fuel, and lodging at a roadside motel were not considered de minimis expenses associated with volunteer services. The court wrote that nothing in Montana law suggests that only those persons providing volunteer services or efforts within an organizational structure of a group are exempted from a political committee designation. View "ED BUTCHER V. AUSTIN KNUDSEN" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. After pulling Defendant over in a rental vehicle for running a stop sign and arresting him for resisting, the Tampa Police Department (“Tampa PD”) conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and located a loaded firearm belonging to him. Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the search in the district court and moved to suppress the gun, but the court found that Defendant did not have Fourth Amendment standing to do so because his license was suspended and he was not an authorized driver on the rental car agreement.   On appeal, Defendant argued that driving with a suspended license does not prohibit him from establishing Fourth Amendment standing. He further asserted that the inventory search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the government failed to demonstrate that the search complied with department policy.   The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Defendant has standing to challenge the inventory search; nonetheless, it affirmed the district court’s denial of his suppression motion on the basis that the inventory search was lawful. The court explained that Defendant’s conduct of operating a rental vehicle without a license and without authorization from the rental company, without more, did not defeat his reasonable expectation of privacy giving rise to Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. However, the district court did not err in finding that the Tampa PD performed a permissible impound and inventory of Defendant’s vehicle because the record supports that it was conducted in accordance with the Department’s standard operating procedures. View "USA v. Devon Cohen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's postconviction motion but reversing the denial of Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count each of felony murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. In his motion for postconviction relief Defendant argued that the trial judge's ex parte contact with one juror violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to hearsay testimony. The circuit court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion but reversed and remanded on the ground that Defendant was entitled to a hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Spencer" on Justia Law

In this case regarding the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 939.46(1m) and the scope of the "affirmative defense for any offense committed as a direct result" of human or child sex trafficking the Supreme Court held that the statute is a complete defense to first-degree intentional homicide.Defendant was charged with first-degree intentional homicide, arson, and several other offenses in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her. At issue was whether Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the defense provided in section 939.46(1m) at trial as to some or all of the charges against her. The Supreme Court declined to answer this question because it would be available to Defendant at trial only if she put forth some evidence to support its application. The Court then held that if Defendant does provide such evidence, it will be the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. View "State v. Kizer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Petitioner's petition for postconviction relief, holding that the district court correctly denied the postconviction relief petition.After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of theft by common scheme for embezzling a sizable amount of money from a youth softball organization. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner later brought this postconviction petition alleging, among other claims, ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate deficiency in his appellate counsel's representation and that his remaining complaints were unsuitable grounds for postconviction relief. View "Crabtree v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress and remanded this case to the district court to vacate Defendant's conviction of criminal possession of dangerous drugs and use or possession of property subject to criminal forfeiture, holding the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.In his motion to suppress, Defendant claimed that law enforcement exceeded the scope of a lawful traffic stop by asking Defendant for his license and then questioning him behind the vehicle after learning that the license was valid. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the officer lawfully escalated his investigation from a traffic stop to an investigation of other criminal activity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer did not possess the requisite particularized suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop into a criminal investigation. View "State v. Carrywater" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for four offenses relating to Defendant's possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number and drugs found within the bag that he was carrying, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered during his arrest, alleging that his seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that he was coerced into handing over the bag to law enforcement. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the initial seizure of Defendant but an intervening voluntary act provided independent probable cause to arrest Defendant; (2) suppression was not warranted under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing limitations on cross-examination during the trial. View "United States v. Sierra-Ayala" on Justia Law

In 2011-2013, Fierro made six requests to be placed into protective custody, insisting that he was at risk of harm because he had received threats from the Border Brothers, a gang active throughout Arizona’s prisons. All six requests were denied. Fierro was physically assaulted in the prison yard by two other prisoners, at least one of whom was a suspected member of the Border Brothers. Fierro brought suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court instructed the jury to “give deference to prison officials in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that, in their judgment, are needed to preserve discipline and to maintain internal security in a prison.”The Ninth Circuit vacated a verdict in favor of the prison officials. The evidence at trial reflected a genuine dispute whether the decisions to deny Fierro’s requests for protective custody were made pursuant to a security-based policy, and, if so, whether the decisions were an unnecessary, unjustified, or exaggerated response to security concerns, so the district court’s deference instruction was erroneous. View "Fierro v. Smith" on Justia Law

After Wichita police received a seemingly legitimate call, officers had to make a split-second decision based on fraudulent threats and reports of violence. Unfortunately, that "swatting" call and the subsequent reaction from police resulted in an innocent man’s death. Officers rushed to Andrew Finch's house, where the caller claimed a deranged man who had just killed his father and was holding the rest of his family hostage at gunpoint. Finch had not committed any crime and had no way of knowing why police were surrounding his home. As Finch exited the house, multiple officers yelled different commands. Ten seconds later, one officer thought he saw Finch reaching for a weapon and shot him in the chest. Finch's estate brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and other constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgement in favor of some of the responding officers and the City of Wichita, but denied summary judgment as to the officer who fired the fatal shots. Finch appealed the grant of summary judgment to one officer and the City; the officer appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The district court held that a reasonable jury could have found that Finch was unarmed and unthreatening. The Tenth Circuit concluded it was bound by those findings for the purposes of this appeal. Thus, the claims against Officer Rapp could go forward. The Court found the claims against the City were properly resolved. In addition, the Court concluded the district court correctly found that Finch did not put forth sufficient evidence to prevail on his municipal liability claim against the City. View "Finch, et al. v. Rapp" on Justia Law

After Nygard removed his driveway and was about to pour a new one, an Orono inspector told Nygard that he needed a permit. The next day, Nygard finished the driveway and applied for a permit. The new driveway was narrower than the previous one. The city responded with a form, imposing several conditions. Nygard crossed out some conditions, initialed the modified form, and returned it. After several exchanges, the city notified Nygard that he must agree to the conditions or “this matter will be turned over to the prosecuting attorney.” Nygard did not acknowledge the conditions. A police officer drafted a statement of probable cause, alleging that “work had been completed without having first obtained a permit” and listing some alleged deficiencies in its construction. According to the Nygards, the police did not inspect the property and some allegations were not true.Nygard was acquitted of violating the city code. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the code was void for vagueness and alleging First Amendment retaliation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Nygard’s prosecution was not based on falsehoods. The report did not claim that the conditions were required by the code but that Nygard had not agreed to the conditions and had replaced a driveway without a permit. Any failure to investigate did not defeat probable cause; the city already knew that he installed a driveway without a permit. View "Nygard v. City of Orono" on Justia Law