Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a three-and-a-half-year delay, a jury convicted Appellant of conspiring to launder the proceeds generated by a network of Brooklyn medical clinics. Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence. He argued that the district court erred when it denied his motions to dismiss based on violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3161 et seq. Specifically, Appellant claimed that the district court improperly excluded time based on the complexity of the case without determining, on the record, why the case was complex or that such exclusions outweighed the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. He contended that the excessive pre-trial delay, to which he objected, arose not from the supposed complexity of the prosecution but rather because the Government delayed production of certain documents possessed by state and federal agencies that had participated in the joint investigation and prosecution of Appellant.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction, vacated Appellant’s conviction and sentence, and remanded to the district court. The court held that the district court’s exclusion of time during at least two long periods of delay was insufficient under the Speedy Trial Act.   The court explained that the Speedy Trial Act was designed to enforce the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial. Here, the district court failed in this responsibility. It neither held the Government accountable for its discovery obligations nor appropriately considered the causes and implications of the extraordinary delays introduced by the Government’s dilatory conduct of discovery. View "United States v. Pikus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder arising from events in 1990 after his fourth trial, held almost thirty years after the crime, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that his conviction must be reversed due to juror misconduct, the improper admission of certain testimony, the erroneous exclusion of hearsay evidence, and a violation of due process. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed his conviction, holding that none of Defendant's allegations of error warranted reversal of his convictions. View "State v. Liggins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court finding Defendant guilty of kidnapping and rape and a repeat-violent-offender specification and imposing a ten-year sentence on each count, to be served concurrently, holding that the trial court denied Defendant his constitutional right to a fair jury as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.At issue was whether Defendant's right to a fair trial was violated when the alleged victim was introduced to the jury as the State's designated representative and was permitted to sit at counsel table with the prosecutor during the proceedings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in designating the alleged victim as the State's representative and by allowing her to sit at the prosecutor's table and that the error was not harmless, requiring reversal. View "State v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

In 2004, six men robbed a marijuana dealer, Thomas, at gunpoint in his home. Two of the robbers shot Thomas, who died. One of those shooters also shot Landon, Thomas’s business partner. Landon survived. Reyes was convicted of Thomas’s murder, Landon’s attempted murder, and home invasion. The state’s evidence against Reyes included Landon’s identification of Reyes as the shooter after viewing a photo array. It took the police five attempts to extract that identification from Landon; several times, he seemed to confuse Reyes with another man who was not a suspect in the robbery. Reyes moved, unsuccessfully, to suppress the identification.After Reyes exhausted state-court review, he sought federal collateral relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and that Landon’s identification was too unreliable to pass constitutional muster. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. While the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, as noted by the state court, it did not taint the conviction. Error alone is not enough to entitle Reyes to relief. A section 2254 petitioner must also show prejudice. Reyes cannot because the jury that convicted him heard significant evidence of his guilt beyond the identification and had the opportunity to evaluate most of the evidence bearing on the reliability of the identification. View "Reyes v. Nurse" on Justia Law

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Port Authority, a municipal bus and light-rail operator, required its uniformed employees to wear face masks. Initially, Port Authority was unable to procure masks for all its employees, so they were required to provide their own. Some employees wore masks bearing political or social-protest messages. Port Authority has long prohibited its uniformed employees from wearing buttons “of a political or social protest nature.” Concerned that such masks would disrupt its workplace, Port Authority prohibited them in July 2020. When several employees wore masks expressing support for Black Lives Matter, Port Authority disciplined them. In September 2020, Port Authority imposed additional restrictions, confining employees to a narrow range of masks. The employees sued, alleging that Port Authority had violated their First Amendment rights.The district court entered a preliminary injunction rescinding discipline imposed under the July policy and preventing Port Authority from enforcing its policy against “Black Lives Matter” masks. The Third Circuit affirmed. The government may limit the speech of its employees more than it may limit the speech of the public, but those limits must still comport with the protections of the First Amendment. Port Authority bears the burden of showing that its policy is constitutional. It has not made that showing. View "Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85 v. Port Authority of Allegheny County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of six offenses, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon in violation of Ind. Code 35-50-2-8, holding that none of Defendant's allegations of error required reversal.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in giving Preliminary Instruction 18, and that the error was fundamental. The court of appeals agreed and reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed, holding (1) Defendant invited any error that arose from Preliminary Instruction 18, which precluded relief on direct appeal; (2) the traffic stop leading to Defendant's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment; and (3) Defendant waived his last allegation of error. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of a settlement between Defendant Monsanto and Plaintiffs. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the notice to the class was sufficient or in concluding that payment to class members of 50% of the average weighted retail price of the items they purchased fully compensated the class members.    Plaintiffs filed suit pleading multiple claims arising out of the allegedly deceptive labeling of Roundup products manufactured by Monsanto. The parties agreed to a total Common Fund. They agreed that Monsanto would not object to Plaintiffs’ counsel seeking 25% of that amount as an attorney’s fee. Class members who filed claims were to receive 10% of the average retail price for the product(s) they bought, and any remaining funds after the costs of administration would be distributed cy pres. The parties executed a Second Corrected Class Action Settlement Agreement that made four changes to the initial agreement.   Appellant, a party injured by Roundup, made three objections to the settlement, all of which she renewed on appeal. First, she argued that the district court should have (1) required the parties to take additional steps to identify additional class members and (2) increased the pro-rata portion of the Common Fund up to 100% of the weighted average retail price. The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that notice to the class was sufficient in light of the comprehensive notice plan and the estimated results from the claims administrator.Further, the court wrote that cy pres distribution of residual funds pursuant to the settlement agreement neither constitutes speech by any individual class member nor infringes on their First Amendment rights. View "Lisa Jones v. Anna St. John" on Justia Law

Following a traffic stop during which Plaintiff was cited for driving with an open liquor bottle in his car, he filed suit against the Des Moines Police Department officers involved in the stop Officers as well as the City of Des Moines Chief of Police, and the City of Des Moines (collectively “Defendants”), alleging claims under state and federal law for violation of his constitutional rights.   The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and denied Plaintiff’s request to certify questions to the Iowa Supreme Court and his motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the officers based on qualified immunity on his federal and state claims for an unreasonable seizure.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court wrote that because Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to the officers on this claim.   Next, Plaintiff asserted that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the officers based on qualified immunity on his federal and state claims for racial profiling. The court affirmed holding that because Plaintiff failed to show that the officers were motivated in any part by Plaintiff’s race, the court need not conclusively resolve this issue to determine that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact necessary. View "Courtney Saunders v. Kyle Thies" on Justia Law

On remand, the Supreme Court directed the Eighth Circuit to “to employ an inquiry that clearly attends to the facts and circumstances” of the incident between Plaintiffs’ son and the officers in considering whether the officers used unconstitutionally excessive force or, if they did, whether the Plaintiffs’ son’s right to be free of such force in these circumstances was clearly established at the time of his death.   The court affirmed the district court’s ruling and concluded that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the right in question was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ son’s death and the City is not liable for a policy of deliberate indifference in the absence of a clearly established constitutional right.   The court explained that the Supreme Court has never addressed whether prone restraint generally, or a particular use of prone restraint, more specifically, is unconstitutional. And the Supreme Court has never answered the question of whether a right may be clearly established without a Supreme Court case specifically recognizing it. Thus, assuming, as the Supreme Court has, that a court of appeals decision may constitute clearly established law, the precedent in this area is insufficient to demonstrate that the facts, in this case, show a violation of a clearly established right of a detainee to be free from prone restraint while resisting.   Thus, the Plaintiffs’ son’s right to be free from prone restraint while engaged in ongoing resistance, even where officers applied force to various parts of his body, including his back, was not clearly established in 2015 when the incident occurred. View "Jody Lombardo v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting and committing Defendant for one count of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree child abuse, holding that there was no prejudicial error in this case.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the statement he made while at the police station after concluding that Defendant was not seized without probable cause prior to giving his statement; (2) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss all counts of the indictment as unconstitutionally vague; and (3) did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying Defendant's motion for new trial. View "State v. Jimenez" on Justia Law